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Academic endeavors in international business research have produced a number of 
convincing studies that argue for the importance of negotiation activities and environments 
in the process of the global interaction of two international counterparts. Despite the effort 
and time given to negotiation research, the empirical and academic investigation of the 
relationship between the influencing factors and the process or outcome of negotiations is 
still fresh. The issues in negotiation dynamics can be categorized so that they can be 
explained in a broader group of components defined by characteristics such as individual, 
strategic, and contextual components, which influence the cooperative process during 
international M&A negotiations. What are the desirable outcome variables? Those issues 
still need to be explored due to the very nature of the negotiation activity. Thus, this 
research empirically tests the effects of attractiveness and personality (i.e., compliance, 
aggressiveness, and detachement) as the individual components, tactics (i.e., hard, rational, 
and soft) as the strategic components, and time pressure and relative power (i.e., legitimate, 
reputational, and informational) as the contextual components on the face-to-face 
cooperative negotiation process of international M&As, which is intended to ensure 
satisfaction and strengthen future relationships.  
We performed regression analysis in SPSS with 11 observable variables, with the 
cooperative process of negotiation as a dependent variable. Samples were collected through 
a questionnaire survey of respondents who were experienced in international M&A 
negotiations with foreign partners. The results showed that variables such as the 
attractiveness, rational tactics, and reputational power of negotiators have a strong positive 
influence, and the perceived time pressure and a compliant personality have a strong 
negative effect on the cooperative atmosphere during face-to-face M&A negotiations. Most 
hypotheses were supported as we predicted, whereas the negative influence of a compliant 
personality on the cooperativeness was unexpected. This is due to the broad range of its 
definition, which includes sensitivity and generosity both in a compliant individual, for 
instance (Brooks and Rose, 2004). 
This research contributes to our understanding and discovery of the links assumed based 
on the previous research. It thereby also contributes to the formulation of a practical 
strategy before the actual negotiation activity by reviewing the important variables in each 
category such as the individual, strategic, and contextual components. Methodologically, 
we overcame the previous limitations of descriptive research and of Kelley’s (1966) 
simulation study that used student samples, by conducting the survey with experienced 
international negotiators. With our application of a process-related variable instead of the 
financial outcome as the dependent variable, we also overcame the traditional perspective 







1.1 Introductory remark 
 
Today’s business environment is characterised by increasing complexity, uncertainty and 
discontinuity, given the rapidly changing economy, methods of doing business and 
technological advances. One aspect of this is that acquisitions and mergers have turned out 
to be necessary survival strategies (Patrick and Mc Coy 2003; Kauser and Shaw 2004). As 
the need to deal with the complexities of the global market increases, companies all around 
the world are realising that survival alone is no longer an alternative and are finding 
themselves directly or indirectly compelled to collaborate with other companies (Culpan 
2002). In other words, today’s business can be best described as active, synergistic and 
complex, especially international business, while the need to cope with the accelerated rates 
of international negotiation and business, such as through international joint ventures, 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As), licensing agreements, distribution agreements, 
production agreements and seller–buyer agreements, as markets and business scope 
become more globalised and the world becomes smaller, boosts the chances of cross-
cultural negotiations taking place. However, since everybody expects to maximise their 
share of resources that are mostly limited, parties tend to show enhanced competitive and 
opportunistic behaviours (Ghauri and Usunier 2003; Williamson 1979) through cost 
leadership, differentiation or sharing resources in order to achieve sustained competitive 
advantage mainly through collaboration (Das and Teng 2000).  
 
As M&As became popular initially during the 1970s and 1980s (Lamont and Anderson 
1985; Porter 1987), the growth strategy of M&As has been the subject of a significant 
number of research studies in finance and economics (Auerbach 1988; Jensen and Ruback 
1983; Roll 1986; Varian 1988) and strategic management (Barney 1988; Chatterjee 1990) 
over the past decades. Following the increasing popularity of M&A and alliance research 
over the past decade, scholars have studied various topics focused on post-acquisition 
integration (Homburg and Bucerius 2006; Teerikangas 2012), pre-emptive M&As (Carow, 
Heron and Saxton 2004), the impact of M&As or alliance experience on performance 
(Haleblian and Finkelstein 1999), M&As and alliances as learning and synergy tools 
(Hamel 1991; Harrison et al. 1991) and the sequence patterns of M&As and alliances (Shi 
and Prescott 2011; Seo and Hill 2005). M&A activity has been highlighted in terms of 
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maximising a firm’s value (Salter and Weinhold 1979), and creating efficiency through the 
synergy effect, which enhances market power and competitiveness (Harrison, Hitt, 
Hoskisson and Ireland 1991), as a vehicle for diversifying products and services, innovating 
operational flexibility, new skills, and the labour force, sharing risk, trimming managerial 
deadwood and the fat off of the national economy and finally, increasing global 
competitiveness again (Jensen 1993; Marks and Mirvis 1998; Auster and Sirower 2013). 
The main purpose of M&As and alliances has been viewed as the efforts of a firm to achieve 
improved economies of scale, scope, market share, prestige, survival and other outcomes 
essential to sustained competitive advantage (Shi and Prescott 2012). Therefore, as a 
reaction to the highly turbulent and complex business environment, and through the 
motivation to attain economies of scale, reduce inefficiency, increase access to resources, 
promote risk reduction, increase the return on shares, increase the market share and market 
power and profitability, the term ‘merger mania’ was introduced by Buono and Bowditch 
(1989).  
 
As a result, international firms of all sizes are prone to joining the trend in M&As in an 
attempt to fulfil growth objectives, synergy and competitive advantages from the synergetic 
new entity through combining a multitude of assets and strengths (Buono and Bowditch 
1990; Cartwright and Cooper 1993; Patrick and McCoy 2003; Marks and Mirvis 1992; 
Manzizni and Gridley 1986). This new collaborative entity is expected to be more 
productive, competitive, efficient and have more market share and a stronger financial 
standing than both of the individual companies concerned. However, since every 
collaboration between firms includes two or more different entities, mindsets, cultures and 
sets of financial statements (Patrick and McCoy 2003), M&As are not always successful 
for a number of reasons. Failures are attributed to reasons such as weakly envisioned 
business strategies, cultural differences (Hofstede 2001; Kogut and Singh 1988; Very and 
Schweiger 2001), changes in the economic and competitive environment as well as a lack 
of proper consideration regarding the human resources involved (Marmenout 2010; Baytos 
1986). There is considerable evidence from business practice that many M&A activities 
remain unsuccessful. Estimated failure rates are typically between 60 and 80 percent 
(Marks and Mirvis 2001:80; Tetenbaum 1999:22).  
 
M&As are beset by numerous problems in terms of strategic market-entry choice (Hennart 
and Park 1993), market valuations (Jensen and Ruback 1983), value creation (Haspeslagh 
and Jemison 1991) and firm performance (Galbraith and Stiles 1984; Chatterjee 1986; 
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Blackburn and Lang 1989), and the key finding is that difficulties in M&As can be traced 
to a lack of a compelling strategic rationale, unrealistic expectations of the possible 
synergies and to paying too much for acquired firms (Aguilera and Dencker 2004).  
 
Meanwhile, Perlmutter1 estimates that over 50% of an international manager’s time is 
spent negotiating (Adler and Graham 1989). To manage these negotiations successfully, 
business people need to know how to influence and communicate with members of cultures 
other than their own in cross-border M&As. Buckley and Ghauri (2002) suggest three 
particular problems, such as inspection, negotiation and integration problems, which might 
be responsible for such a high failure rate (i.e., 50–60%) of M&As. Concerning the problem 
of negotiation, this highlights the importance of having high-quality information and the 
need to cater for cultural differences being specified in any regulatory requirements. Visible 
failures such as the AT&T purchase of NCR, or challenges faced by the Damiler-Benz 
merger with Chrysler, highlight the potential difficulties inherent in acquisitions (The 
Economist July 22, 2000; Motoramic May 7, 2014). As the proportion of foreign-to-
domestic trade increases, so does the frequency of business negotiations between people 
from different countries and cultures. Scholars have also analysed the relevance to the inter-
corporate level of thinking about how M&As, in the case of cross-cultural ones, can be 
made more successful by efficient communication and information exchange between 
corporations, thus defining a strategy of negotiation. Regarding negotiation problems and 
issues, face-to-face meetings and a conducive atmosphere have been emphasised (Ting-
Toomey 2003) in both the research and suggested future research. Thus, it is crucial that 
we highlight the critical issue as one of communication and information sharing in face-to-
face negotiation situations, which especially links to win–win negotiations or cooperative 
negotiation processes.  
 
In planning for negotiated M&As, many elements require preparation regarding one’s own 
company and the other company. A multi-dimensional audit must be conducted to learn 
more about each other. Large numbers of research papers assert that many M&A failures 
have their root cause in a lack of fruitful contacts and information exchange between the 
two sides at various stages; hence, many opportunities for companies to learn about each 
                                            
1 Alder and Graham (1989) cite Professor Haward Perlmutter of the Wharton School, University 
of Pennsylvania, and “More than 50% of international managers’ time is spent in negotiating – in 
interpersonal transaction time influencing other managers.” Stated at the Academy of Management 
Meetings, Dallas, Texas, August 1983. 
13 
 
other, prepare and implement a deal-making strategy together are needed in the absence of 
cooperative negotiations. This is especially true when integrative negotiations are 
considered as a valuable solution in achieving long-term relationship value versus one-shot 
negotiation success. Moreover, satisfaction that the counterparts have perceived each other 
well is a factor that increases the possibility of a cooperative or ‘win–win’ solution, and 
one that helps maintain both positive current and future relationships (Ma 2007). 
 
1.2 The trend for mergers and acquisitions, and the research context 
 
Joint ventures, M&As, licensing and distribution agreements and sales of products and 
services – crucial aspects of all such inter-organisational relationships – are always related 
to face-to-face negotiations between two parties, especially to cross-border M&As. These 
aspects are the main vehicle leading to the surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) and are 
a major part of the corporate finance world, particularly of its role during corporate 
restructuring. Wall Street or London investment bankers might arrange M&A transactions 
every day, thus bringing two separate companies together to produce larger ones for the 
reasons mentioned above, such as scales of economies and scope, risk reduction, an 
increase in market share and power, resource accessibility and so forth. Deals can be worth 
hundreds of millions, or even billions of dollars, which can dictate the fortunes of the 
companies involved for years to come. As understood and mentioned by Saorin-Iborra 
(2008), M&A negotiations are distinguished from negotiations for joint ventures, sales of 
products and services or licensing agreements in terms of the range of considerations and 
even by the volume of the M&As. 
 
The statistics of cross-border M&As in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2, compiled from the annual 
world investment reports from the 2006 and 2012 United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), showed the value by region (e.g., developing, developed and 
world) of both sellers and purchases from 1991 to 2011. The graph showed that the value 
and volume of cross-border M&As dramatically rose by 93% from 1991 to 2000, reaching 
US $1,144 billion. After experiencing a drop to 73% as part of the decreasing trend from 
2000 to 2003, it rapidly increased from 2003 to 2007 by 71%, accounting for US $1,023 
billion in 2007. Again, it dropped by 76% for two years from 2007 to 2009 and then 
proceeded to recover by 53% in 2011. According to the recent Global Investment Trends 
Monitor from UNCTAD (2011), developed countries are moderately recovering mainly due 
to higher cross-border M&A deals by the United Kingdom and United States. The 
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developed economies’ cross-border M&A activity as both seller and purchaser still 
dominate, comprising more than 76% of overall value in 2011. For instance, the United 
States registered the highest volume of cross-border M&As by country of purchaser in 2011, 
while the European Union led as a seller. Within the EU, France had the most activity in 
both aspects, followed by the Netherlands as a top-ranking purchaser and Switzerland as a 
top-ranking seller. Meanwhile, cross-border M&A sales in developing countries fell in 
1999 because of fewer privatisations in Latin America, where the value of cross-border 
M&As fell from US $64 billion in 1998 to US $37 billion in 1999, while in developing 
Asia, cross-border M&As continued to grow in 1999. Interestingly, cross-border M&As in 
the five Asian countries most affected by the financial crisis, including countries such as 
South Korea, were still on the rise, growing in value from US $11 billion in 1998 to US 
$15 billion in 1999. The value of cross-border M&A sales in Central and Eastern Europe 
also doubled between 1998 and 1999 from US $5 billion to US $10 billion. Overall, the 
Thomson Financial 2001 Report showed that on a worldwide basis, international firms 
spent over US $3.4 trillion on M&As in 2000, with the majority of transactions being 
horizontal M&As, which take place within one industry. Even in a ‘down’ year such as 
2001, totals for 2001 were estimated at nearly US $2 trillion worldwide (The Economist 
2002). Recently, developing countries have presented with a strong recovery in value, with 
Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia as the focal points. Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico, which are considered as large investor countries, also registered 
increases in both their outward FDI flows and cross-border M&A purchases in 2011. 
Additionally, cross-border M&A activities were monopolised by Asia among the 
developing economies, with over 60% of volume in both purchaser and seller activity. In 
2001, Japan topped the list for Asia, followed by China, with the Asia cross-border M&A 
activity valued globally at US $ 2.6 trillion in 2011 (Thomson Reuters 2011). Cross-border 
M&As are continuously adapting quickly to changing economic conditions. They jumped 
by 53% in 2011 compared to the lowest point in 2009 (shown in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2), 
reflecting both the growing value of assets on the stock market and the increased financial 
capability of potential buyers to carry out such operations. However, they still need to 
overcome some weaknesses, such as the impending tightening of fiscal policy, regional 
conflicts and the recent sovereign debt crises of some European countries (UNCTAD 2011).  
 
After experiencing global cross-border M&As, international firms have a better 
understanding and often prioritise M&As as their focal competitive strategy for foreign 
investment to enhance the core competences of their corporate systems and value. As a 
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result, the issue of cross-border M&As has raised significant concerns in both developed 
and developing countries in terms of their process and synergy. It is true that M&As are 
important strategic activities for firms (Saxton and Dollinger 2004), and cross-border 
M&As have become the dominant mode of growth for a firm for foreign expansion when 
seeking competitive advantage in an increasingly complex and global business economy in 
recent years (Neary 2007; 2009; Deng 2010; Angwin 2004; Franck 1990; Adler 1997). 
Obviously, the important reason behind M&As is the synergy, which takes the form of 
revenue enhancement and cost savings in general. By collaborating, the companies 
definitely expect benefits such as staff reductions, economies of scale, the acquisition of 
new technology, or improved market reach and industry visibility. In a nutshell, the various 
complicated aspects of the investigation on the overall process of M&As have been 
fundamental to both the practitioners and researchers to achieve the goals and objectives 




Figure1. 1 Value of cross-border M&As, by region (world, developed and developing countries) of seller, 1991-2011 
 















Figure1. 2 Value of cross-border M&As, by region (world, developed and developing countries) of purchase, 1991-2011 
 















1.3 M&A trend in The Republic of Korea 
 
Cross-border M&As increased dramatically in East Asia following the financial crisis of 
1997. As shown in Figure 1.3, using Thomson Financial Securities Data 20012, cross-
border M&As in East Asia’s crisis countries such as Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand sharply rose in value from US $3 billion in 1996 to US $22 billion in 1999, before 
falling slightly to US $18 billion in 2000.  
 
Figure1. 3 Cross-border mergers and acquisitions in crisis countries, 1995-2000 
 
 
Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data 2001, billions of dollars 
 
Compared with other East Asian countries, in Malaysian firms, a large number of cross-
border M&A deals were made prior to the crisis, but since then, the volume of such 
transactions has not increased following the crisis. Malaysia has become a less significant 
M&A competitor. In Indonesia, where cross-border M&As have traditionally been 
restricted, the value doubled between 1998 and 1999 to reach US $2.7 billion. On the other 
hand, Korea and Thailand are distinguished in having the largest increase in M&A activity, 
as defined by their values, which rose to US $ 13 billion and US $ 4 billion, respectively, 
in 1999.  
 
This wave of M&As was triggered by important policy changes following the crisis, 
particularly in Korea and Thailand. Since their crises in 1997, both Korea and Thailand 
have introduced various measures to encourage business consolidations through M&As, as 
                                            
2 The statistical references to cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) define acquisitions of 




well as to liberalise foreign investments based on critical policy changes in corporate 
governance, competition policy, and bank privatisation and regulation, which sharply 
increased the value of cross-border M&As (Mody and Negishi 2001). In fact, the rise in 
M&As in East Asia, particularly in the Republic of Korea right after the economic crisis, 
stemmed largely from the policy changes that facilitated foreign investments. For instance, 
liberalisation of foreign entry and ownership restrictions and the introduction of 
international accounting standards and shareholding systems have exponentially increased 
the accessibility and ability of foreign investors to acquire assets in local markets. The 
experience of the Republic of Korea is interesting, since Korea recorded a very low level 
of inward FDI before the 1997 economic crisis, but Korea’s FDI status has dramatically 
upturned, almost reaching US $ 3 billion in 1999 and US $ 4 billion in 2011. As a result, 
the Republic of Korea has become one of the largest recipients of M&A-associated FDI in 
Asia and cross-border M&As are held up as an important part of Korea’s open-door policy 
(UNTCAD 2002; UNTCAD 2012; Moon, Kim and Lee 2003). Following the economic 
crisis and more active cross-border M&A performances in Korea and the Asian countries, 
although the value of cross-border M&As has been fluctuating (as shown in Figure 1.1 and 
Figure 1.2) in terms of the world trend, the overall global value and Korea’s overall cross-
border M&A performance are still rising rapidly, achieving US $ 3 trillion around the world 
and US $ 36 billion in the Republic of Korea in 2011. 
 
Figure1. 4 Value of cross-border M&As in South Korea, 1994-2013 
 
 
Source: IMAA (Institute of Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances), billions of dollars 
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1.4 Research problems and objectives of the study 
 
The definitions and aspects of negotiation have been discussed in various ways. As a basic 
concept, Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) define a negotiation as a discussion between two or 
more parties with the objective of resolving a divergence of interest and as means of 
escaping social conflict. Negotiation is also broadly defined as an interpersonal decision-
making process that includes interactions between two or more parties who deal with 
incompatible interests but cannot achieve objectives without partners (Thompson 2005). 
However, most scholars consider negotiation as a communication process through which 
two or more parties with some apparently conflicting goals seek to find a better solution 
(Liu 2011; Putnam and Roloff 1992). Carnevale and Lawler (1986) suggest negotiation as 
a form of symbolic communication in order to reach agreement on issues where there are 
perceived conflicts of interest.  
 
Regarding the negotiation issues investigated previously, Alfredson and Cungu (2008) 
categorise five approaches to negotiation: structural, strategic, behavioural, process or 
concession-exchange and integrative negotiation. Negotiation issues in an international 
context are even more complicated and diverse, since successful conflict resolution in 
cross-cultural settings requires more knowledge of the similarities and differences between 
the cultures and the cultural behaviours of foreign partners (Pearson and Stephan 1998). 
Thus, the previous studies in cross-cultural negotiation have been categorised by several 
perspectives on the process (Adler, Brahm and Graham 1992; Hall 1985; Davidson 1987), 
cultural behaviour (Metcalf et al. 2006; Brett and Okumura 1998; Ghauri and Fang 2001), 
emotion and behaviour (George, Jones and Gonzalez 1998; Anderson and Kumar 2006), 
tension and complexity control (Lee, Yang and Graham 2006; Ma 2007; Rao and Schmidt 
1998), negotiators’ tendency (Carroll, Bazerman and Maury 1998; Neale and Bazerman 
1992), complexity (Weiss 1993; Wall and Blum 1991), conflict-resolution behaviour that 
favours maximum information sharing (Lewicki, Weiss and Lewin 1992; Wall and Callister 
1995) and negotiation outcomes such as problem-solving behaviour, better profit and 
satisfaction (Dwyer 1980; Graham 1986; Brookmire and Sistrunk 1980; Money 1998; 
Graham, Mintu and Rogers 1994). As the negotiation process includes a high level of 
complexity defined by several steps or characteristics depending on the different scholars, 
who sometimes look into pre-negotiation, face-to-face negotiation or post-negotiation in 
descriptive detail, we need to clarify the definition of the negotiation process and of specific 
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limited areas through this research.  
  
Firstly, we suggest the research framework, filling in the research gaps that we have 
identified as a result of the initial literature review and the review of global and Korean 
M&As as well, as summarised below in Table 1.1.  
 





 Types of negotiation have not been limited and well defined 
 Steps of negotiations have not been clarified  
Theoretical 
gaps 
 No clear relationship or comparison between two different cultural partners with 
generalised model for international negotiation  
 No proper and clear framework during face-to-face negotiation 
Methodological 
gaps 
 Limited use of quantitative survey research in international negotiation studies 
 Most previous studies are descriptive, comparative, or case studies 
 Survey respondents are limited to university students or sometimes MBA 
students, who seldom represent real negotiators and negotiation itself 
 
A. Filling in the contextual gaps 
 
The steps or processes in a negotiation deal have previously been clearly defined. For 
instance, from Galpin and Herndon (2007), in Figure 1.5, a proposal is shown on the deal 
flow model that covers the flow of a negotiation: formulate, locate, investigate, negotiate, 
integrate and motivate. Kersten and Lo (2003) suggest a three-phase model of negotiation 
involving pre-negotiation, conducting the negotiation and post-settlement, as shown in 
Figure 1.6. However, most of the previous research has not defined which step of 
negotiation is mainly discussed in their research, although the ‘negotiation behaviour’ 
would be distinctively recognised depending on the step that it belongs to. Here we sharpen 
the step or context of the negotiation as a face-to-face negotiation context, which means 
conducting the negotiation under the concurrent phase (Kersten and Lo 2003) or the 
negotiation deal being agreed on in terms of a value (Galpin and Herndon 2007), as shown 
in Figure 1.6. 
 
Along the same lines as the context of the negotiation being limited in this research, it is 
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essential that joint ventures, M&As, licensing and distribution agreements and sales of 
products and services are assigned as crucial aspects of all such inter-organisational 
relationships (Adler and Graham 1989). However, negotiators’ behaviour and emotions 
during face-to-face contact would not be uniform across the different types of inter-
organisational relationships, as mentioned above (e.g., joint ventures, M&As, licensing). 
For instance, Zeira and Newburry (1999) proposed time pressure as one of the factors that 
distinguishes between the negotiation process in M&As and joint ventures, arguing that the 
effect of time pressure is only unique to M&A negotiations. As mentioned above, M&As 
are the main method for increasing global FDI, which rose to US $3 trillion in a single year 
(2011), out of which US $36 billion stemmed from the Republic of Korea. Moreover, even 
the value of cross-border M&As dramatically increased right after the economic crisis in 
1997 due to the large policy changes in corporate governance, competition policy and bank 
privatisation and regulation (Mody and Negishi 2001). Therefore, here we focus on the 
negotiator’s behaviour during face-to-face negotiations in cross-border M&A cases 
between Korea and other foreign countries.   
 
Figure1. 5 The deal flow model 
 




Figure1. 6 Negotiation phases and activities supported with inspire 
 
Source: Kersten and Lo (2003)  
 
B. Filling in theoretical gaps 
 
As analysed in Buelens et al.’s (2000) study, most negotiation research has been unequally 
developed with divergent conceptual frames sometimes supported by laboratory 
experiments, experimental simulations, case studies and field studies dominating 94% of 
negotiation research. It is notable that conceptual studies, laboratory simulations and 
observations have contributed massively to the negotiation research (e.g., Ghauri and 
Usunier 2003; Ghauri and Fang 2001; Brooks and Rose 2004; George, Jones and Gonzalez 
1998; Adler, Brahm and Graham 1992; Graham 1985; Greenhalgh, Neslin and Gilkey 
1985). Experimental designs are vital in enabling the recognition of causal relationships 
through accurate measurements; thus, it is necessary to utilise the ‘mirror of science’ by 
examining theoretical models in order to promote new discoveries of truths and objective 
realities, thereby improving existing conceptual knowledge towards causality, explicit 
hypotheses and variables (Buelens et al. 2000). Thus, the existing conceptual and 
theoretical models should be improved as a parsimonious and generalised model with 
variables to be applied across different settings and populations reaching objective reality 
and context realism and systematic divergences in meanings.  
 
Adler (1983b) reported that in top American management journals from 1970–1980, only 
0.9% targeted cross-cultural interaction. The tendency for this research was to convey 
single-culture descriptive studies or multi-culture comparative studies instead of cross-
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cultural interaction studies, since the dominating research was descriptive or comparative 
during that period. For instance, much of the research introduced describing the negotiation 
behaviour of the French (Dupont 1982; Plantey 1980), Russians (Beliaev, Muller and 
Prunett 1985), Mexicans (Fisher 1980), Brazilians (Graham 1983; 1985a), Middle Eastern 
Arabs (Wright 1981; Muna 1980), Chinese (Tung 1984; Pye 1983) and Japanese (Van 
Zandt 1970; Tung 1984; Graham 1985a), even with a number of multi-cultural studies 
being carried out (Weiss and Stripp 1984; Harnett and Cummings 1980; Adler et al. 1987; 
Campbell et al. 1988; Graham et al. 1988).  
 
Regarding comparative management, it was initiated with earlier studies (Roberts 1970; 
Robers and Snow 1973; Triandis 1972), and more research (Hofstede 1980; Bhagat and 
McQuaid 1982; Sekaran 1983; Roberts and Boyacigiller 1982; Ronen 1986; Adler and 
Doktor 1986) elaborated on within-culture descriptions and comparisons as international 
firms operated multi-domestically rather than operating globally during the era. It is the 
interaction of negotiators within and between organisations, and not their behaviour issues, 
that brings comparative management and description at an organisational, structural and 
financial level, recognising that cross-national interaction brings with it multi-country 
comparisons. Based on that research and understanding, it was suggested that foreign 
counterparts may behave similarly as their domestic partners and colleagues, with 
questions being raised regarding how to negotiate with people from other cultures. 
Therefore, this research contributes to the development of negotiation research, especially 
in the testing of a holistic and realistic research framework. 
 
C. Filling in methodological gaps 
 
The methodological strategy of negotiation research from 1965 to 2004 is analysed through 
theoretical and conceptual articles (22%), laboratory experiments (53%), experimental 
simulations (11%), case studies, interviews, observations and field studies (7%) and sample 
surveys (6%), as indicated by Buelens et al. (2008), which covers all of the focal topics of 
negotiation (e.g., negotiator personality, gender differences, cross-cultural negotiations, 
teaching training, emotions, ethics, communication interaction rationality and bias, 
mathematical and game theory and third-party influence). Buelens et al. (2008) found that 
more than half of the negotiation research published over the past four decades applied 
laboratory experiments, especially between 1997 and 2001. Although experimental 
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research designs are essential for the precision of measurement and the discovery of causal 
effects, the main limitation is that they cannot generalise across different settings, time 
periods and populations due to their lack of context realism and largely simplified 
representations of reality (Buelens et al. 2008). Therefore, this research attempts to utilise 
a survey study with mathematical modelling for the generalisation of international 
negotiation research.  
 
There are two different viewpoints on obtaining the data for the negotiation research. One 
view relies on a large sample size as being reliable, and the easiest access to gaining large 
sample sizes is attributed to students and psychology graduates. However, a more valid 
sample favoured by scholars and practitioners would be actual negotiators dealing with 
negotiations in the real world, but this sample proves difficult due to many factors (Buelens 
et al. 2008; Adair and Brett 2005; Greenhalgh, Neslin and Gilkey 1985; Tinsley and Pillutla 
1998). However, according to the analysis of Buelens et al. (2008), only 3% of negotiation 
research deals with professional negotiators and 56% of it with psychology and other 
students as the main population of negotiation research. Thus, Buelens et al. (2008) strongly 
believe that the growing efforts in international relationships and negotiation are necessary 
due to the potential variety of research traditions, especially in terms of the methodology. 
Thus, it is arguably meaningful for this study to concentrate on both the population of 
professional negotiators and on a quantitative survey questionnaire. As a result, in an 
attempt to overcome the shortcomings in filling the research gap generated from contextual, 
theoretical and methodological perspective components, we aim to suggest a generalised 
empirical model, explicit hypotheses and proper research questions for a survey in the 
context of international M&A face-to-face negotiations. Following on from the research 
objectives outlined and explained above, this study puts forward two specific research 
questions that conceptualise the aims of this study. 
 
What are the most important or prevalent factors and their corresponding sub-variables 
during the process of international face-to-face M&A negotiations? 
 
Which variables have a strong effect on the cooperative process of international M&A 
negotiations in face-to-face situations? 
 
As proposed in the review and hypotheses chapter, according to the conceptual frameworks 
for international business negotiations suggested and developed by scholars (Ghauri and 
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Usunier, 2003; Graham 1983; Brooks and Rose 2004; George, Jones and Gonzalez 1998; 
Adler, Graham and Gehrke 1987), three groups of main components – namely the 
individual component (i.e., personal factors, background characteristics), contextual 
component (i.e., contextual atmosphere factors, situational constraints, environmental 
factors) and the strategic component (i.e., organisational factors, process measures) – have 
been argued to be the broad boundaries of the variables that need to be considered during 
the process of face-to-face negotiations. Although scholars use their own terminologies, 
the main idea of the structure was similar in all of the studies. This holistic frame has been 
descriptively introduced in Ghauri (1996) and Ghauri and Usunier (2003). Therefore, this 
study will attempt to empirically assess this holistic model with broader components 
including specific sub-variables such as attractiveness and personality in the individual 
components; relative power (i.e., legitimate, reputational and informational) and time 
pressure in the contextual components; and tactics (i.e., hard, soft and rational) in the 
strategic components.  
 
However, some limitations and outstanding scopes remain for future research. Firstly, we 
were not able to contact all of the international negotiators participating in the same deal to 
avoid common method variance (CMV). Secondly, since most of the M&A deal 
information is highly confidential, experienced negotiators are extremely sensitive in terms 
of providing feedback, even on general questions and company information; very often, 
their behaviour is highly cautious. Finally, due to the respondents’ accessibility issues, we 
limit the counterpart relationship to that between Korean negotiators and their foreign 
partners. Moreover, it would be interesting to assess the different behaviours and reactions 
of negotiators depending on the partners’ nationality.  
 
The anticipated contribution of this study is critical in terms of the analysis of international 
negotiations, since it provides statistical objectivity for the influencing variables within the 
research models, attaining theoretical knowledge and practical contributions through 
confirming the hypotheses. In particular, the holistic and generalised research model and 
questions have actually been discovered and empirically tested, especially with actual and 
practiced managers who are experienced in cross-border M&A negotiations, so it can be 
given and suggested as a realistic and practical solution for practitioners and international 
companies who are planning to negotiate in the matter of cross-border M&As. Particularly, 
the generalised research model based on the previous conceptual models and research could 
be applied and could contribute to other future international negotiations. It would be 
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interesting to note which connotative components and variables have a massive effect on 
the cooperative atmosphere or process of negotiations, as they represent a win–win 
relationship and ensure the future of the relationship as well (Ma 2007).  
 
Regarding proposals for future research, it would be fascinating to diversify the population 
and the cultural context or to attempt a paired construct. To elaborate further on the paired 
construct, since the perception from both counterparts would always be asymmetric in the 
pair, it would be meaningful to match the perception and behaviour of both parties. The 
survey population for this research is limited to Korean practical negotiators due to the 
accessibility issues of the respondents. Alternatively, other comparisons between different 
cultural groups depending on the culture of the partners (e.g., a high-context culture versus 
a low-context culture;3 individualism versus collectivism) with this research model would 



















                                            
3 ‘The influence of individualism and collectivism on Mexican and U.S. business negotiation’ 
(Heydenfeldt 2000) ; ‘Negotiation behavior when cultures collide: The United States and Japan’ 





































Issues to be researched 
Review literature/theories relating to topic/area 
Formulate research questions 
Consider whether a social survey is appropriate (it not, consider an alternative research design) 
 
Consider what kind of population will be appropriate 
 
Consider what kind of sample design will be employed 
Explore whether there is sampling frame that can be employed 
 
Decide on mode of administration (face-to-face, telephone, postal, e-mail, Web) 
 
Develop questions (and devise answer alternatives for closed questions) 
 
Review questions and assess face validity 
 
Pilot questions and revise questions 
Finalize questionnaire/ schedule to sample 
 
Follow up non-respondents at least once 
 
Transform completed questionnaires/ schedules into computer readable data (coding) 
 





Consider implications of findings for research questions 
 





Basically, this study has been conducted as a social survey with the overall research 
structure and procedure shown in Figure 1.7. In addition, this thesis is constructed as six 
chapters, starting with an introduction and ending with a discussion and conclusion. Figure 
1.8 shows an outline of the study with the key components described in each chapter. In 
the first chapter, the M&A trend and the choice of the context limits are described, including 
the research questions and objectives, followed by the scope and the structure of the thesis.  
 
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature and gives a general overview based on the previous 
research. In addition, all of the relevant theories on international negotiation have been 
considered in order to discover an appropriate theoretical background to clarify the 
hypotheses and the suggested research framework. Moreover, the determinants of 
cooperativeness for international negotiations have been explored and described in order 
to approach the main argument of this study.  
 
Following the literature review chapter, Chapter 3 draws up the conceptual framework and 
hypotheses. This chapter specifies the aim of the research in detail and proposes hypotheses 
on the relationships between the three main components – individual, strategic and 
contextual – and the cooperative process of international negotiation based on the review 
of the relevant literature. Subsequently, a conceptual model for the research is suggested in 
developing the hypotheses. 
 
Chapter 4 draws on the research method and strategy, the characteristics of the sample and 
the description of the data collection. After the questionnaire design and primary data 
collection are described, the process for and responses from the mailed online survey are 
detailed. In particular, the adequacy of the methodology is discussed in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 5 reports on the descriptive statistics and the results of the validity and reliability 
tests of the measurements using CFA. Finally, the SPSS technique performed for the study 
is discussed with its model fit. Consequently, the results of testing the proposed model and 
the hypotheses are justified and discovered through multiple regressions in SPSS.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses the findings revealed and the significance of the hypothesised 
relationships between variables in the previous chapter in light of existing studies. The 
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chapter also explores the theoretical contributions and practical implications of the study. 
Within this chapter, the limitations of the study and suggestions for further research are 
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Figure1. 8 Structure of thesis 
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Chapter2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Negotiation research issues 
 
Theorists differ on the question of how to categorise the main schools of thought on 
negotiation. For example, Druckman (1997) points out four main perspectives in 
negotiation studies: negotiation as puzzle solving, the bargaining game, organisational 
management and diplomatic politics. Zartman (1988) also introduces an overview of 
approaches to negotiation or schools of thought, as presented in Table 2.1, based on a 
summary offered in Alfedson and Cungu (2008). It comprises five different levels of 
analysis, or core approaches. These are the structural, the strategic, the processual (i.e., 
concession-exchange), the behavioural and the integrative approaches.  
 
Thus, we broadly review and categorise the previous studies on international business-
negotiation issues regarding process, culture, emotion and behaviour, tension control and 
relationship building, complexity, negotiators’ tendency, and conflict and behaviours that 
favourably presume and convey to the maximum information sharing, problem-solving 


















Table2. 1 Five approach of negotiation 
 
Approach Basic features Assumption Limitation 
Structural 




 Lock into positions might 
lead to lost opportunity for 
mutually beneficial 
agreement. 







of optimal solutions 
and rationality of 
player 
 Excludes use of power, 
players undifferentiated 
(apart from differences in the 























 Emphasis on positions  
 Lack of predictiveness 
Integrative 
regarding 







 Parties should still recognize 




Source: Alfredson and Cungu (2008); Zartman (1988) 
 
2.1.1 Process orientation  
 
While many scholars have stressed the importance of relational processes between parties 
for maintaining the goodwill and teamwork vital to the success of cooperative ventures, 
particularly when the national cultures of the participating firms significantly differ 
(Davidson 1987; Graham 1987; Hall 1985; Koot 1988; Lorange 1987), the processes 
themselves have received little empirical examination (Adler, Brahm and Graham 1992). 
In addition, the process measures, defined as qualitative and quantitative descriptions of 
the activities involved in business negotiations (Graham 1983), have received relatively 
little attention in terms of the strategies or behaviours of negotiators (Pruitt and Lewis 1975; 
Lewis and Fry 1977). The relationship between process measures and the outcome of 
negotiations has not been clearly deduced, since scholars have paid attention to process 
measures, their concepts and operational definitions, which have not been specified and 
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remain vague (Graham 1983). 
 
According to Pervez and Usunier (2003), conceptually, the process of face-to-face business 
negotiations can best be represented in four stages as: (1) non-task sounding, (2) the task-
related exchange of information, (3) persuasion and (4) concessions and agreement. In 
addition, Ghauri and Fang (2001) specifically categorised four variables based on the 
process concept (i.e., pre-negotiation, face-to-face negotiation and post-negotiation), 
background factors (i.e., objective, environment, third parties and negotiators), atmosphere 
(i.e., conflict/cooperation, power/dependence and expectations), strategic factors (i.e., 
presentation, strategies, decision-making and the need for an agent) and cultural factors 
(i.e., time, individualism/collectivism, pattern of communication and emphasis on personal 
relationships). In international business negotiations, all of the factors of strategy and the 
cultural dimensions are always at play in the three different stages of pre-negotiation, face-
to-face negotiation and post-negotiation. This huge conceptual frame is devoted to 
understanding the obscure structure and process of the negotiation itself.  
 
In line with this process perspective of negotiation, Brooks and Rose (2004) proposed the 
antecedents of negotiation orientation through different individual factors (i.e., 
Machiavellianism, compliance, aggression and detachment and motivational orientation), 
contextual determinants (i.e., expectation of future negotiations, reward structure, personal 
accountability to constituents or supervisors, relative power and time pressures), negotiator 
knowledge and corporate philosophy and objectives. This frame had a similar main 
structure for the negotiation process, but was slightly more developed than that of George, 
Jones and Gonzales (1998), who centred on the role of affect in connecting cross-cultural 
negotiation processes by proposing the incorporation of individual differences, cross-
cultural differences and the context condition. They described how these factors mostly 
lead to distributive/aggressive bargaining behaviour or to a positive/negative spiral.  
 
Using a similar process frame for a holistic picture of negotiations, Graham (1983) 
investigated the operational definitions of process measures and the relationships among 
the process measure-related variables in terms of the negotiation outcome in three different 
cultures. The main categories are composed of process measures (i.e., strategy, 
attractiveness, power, credibility and impression-formation accuracy), situation constraints 
(i.e., culture and role of the negotiator) and individual characteristics (i.e., self-esteem, 
extroversion/introversion and the experience of the negotiators). These categories may 
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have a relationship to the outcome of a negotiation (i.e., level of profit). Similarly, Graham 
(1985) comparatively and contrastively studied the process of business negotiations across 
three countries (the United States, Japan and Brazil), focusing on both verbal and nonverbal 
behaviours during negotiations.  
 
Adler, Graham and Gehrke (1987) investigated the determinants of business negotiations 
in three countries through a laboratory simulation4. The negotiation process in terms of 
problem-solving behaviours in Francophone Canadian and Mexican businesspeople was 
found to be significantly different from both the American and Anglophone Canadian styles. 
Crucial to every business negotiation is the face-to-face negotiations that occur during the 
formulation and maintenance of the commercial relationship, which is drawn from social 
psychological and exchange theories in most of the psychological and management 
research (Adler 1983). One interesting development in Adler, Brahm and Graham (1992) 
was a comparison between American and Chinese businesspeople during simulated intra-
cultural negotiations, suggesting both similarities and differences in style. For example, 
negotiators in both cultures were more successful when taking a problem-solving approach. 
Alternatively, the Chinese negotiators tended to ask many more questions and to interrupt 
one another more frequently than their American counterparts did. Such subtle differences 
in style may cause problems in Sino–American negotiations, which may, in turn, sour 
otherwise fruitful commercial alliances.  
 
Recently, Adair and Brett (2005) proposed a normative model of transactional negotiation 
including cooperative and competitive behaviours across four stages of negotiation: 
relational positioning, identifying the problem, generating solutions and reaching 
agreement. Based on the difference in communicative flexibility between high- and low-
context cultures, they demonstrated cultural-specific dyadic movements and hypotheses 
within and across the four stages. As they predicted, the use of cooperative and competitive 
strategies throughout the four stages of negotiation reveal cultural elements of the evolution 
of negotiations across the four stages and cultural differences in how negotiators interpret 
information during the negotiations. Thus, both the negotiation process and relationship 
building are fundamental to successful long-term business relationships; Sharland (2001) 
                                            
4 138 businesspeople from the U.S., 68 from Mexico, and 148 from Canada (74 Anglophones and 




combines reliable relationship measures with the findings from the negotiation literature in 
determining the extent to which negotiation process variables are predictors of past, present 
and future relationship outcomes.  
 
Ghauri and Fang (2001) present the analysis of the Sino–Western business-negotiation 
process with a ‘ping-pong’ model. They clearly put forward their understanding of the 
negotiation process, which is that the negotiating parties interact with each other to reach 
mutual agreements on the terms, conditions and guidelines for future behaviour, and they 
divided this into several states. Based on the international business-negotiation process 
regarding pre-negotiation including lobbying, presentation, informal discussion and trust 
building, formal negotiation including the task-related exchange of information, persuasion, 
concession or agreement, and post-negotiation including implementation and new rounds 
of negotiations, Fang’s (1999) culture framework was combined into a ping-pong metaphor 
due to the complexity of the international negotiation process.  
 
2.1.2 Cultural considerations  
 
Among the issues on negotiation between foreign partners, the cultural issue has been 
investigated over the last three decades through cultural comparisons or through the 
examination of the specificity of negotiation behaviours or processes (Pye 1982; Graham 
1985; Adler, Brahm and Graham 1992; Adair, Okumura and Brett 2001). Metcalf et al. 
(2006) unreservedly investigated the utility of the ten dimensions of cultural tendencies, 
which are goals, attitudes, personal styles, communication, time sensitivity, emotionalism, 
agreement forms, agreement building, team organisation and risk taking, in identifying 
country differences and the specific dimensions in which country differences are likely to 
be found from among five distinctive countries. In the same vein as the cultural scope, Brett 
and Okumura (1998) impressively compared and discussed inter- and intra-cultural values 
in terms of individualism/collectivism and hierarchy/egalitarianism considering both the 
American and Japanese context, proposing a joint gain as a consequence. Tung (1982) also 
sought to identify the mechanics of USA–China negotiations, suggesting the reasons for 
the failure of business negotiations as being due to the cultural differences such as 
communication breakdown, differences in business practices, negotiation styles, social 




The general pitfalls of attempting to generalise negotiation theory were put forward by 
Gelfand and Dyer (2000); it is not possible to specify the aspects of culture that account for 
any differences, although much of the research uses geographical location as an alternative 
for culture, rather than theoretical accounts of culture, as previously discussed (Hofstede 
1980; Schwartz 1994). Since every behaviour and symptom may often be related to the 
cultural effect, culture has been a difficult concept to deal with in any consistent manner in 
the research (Graham 1985). Although anthropologists and sociologists have been debating 
definitions of culture in negotiation for many years, the operational definitions have been 
varied in many international negotiation studies, and Linton’s (1945) definition as ‘a 
configuration of learned behaviours and results of behaviour whose component parts are 
shared and transmitted by members of a particular society’ has been broadly applied in 
negotiation research. Based on that idea, Spiro (1950) noted how ‘members of a given 
society behave in uniform and predictable ways’ and Hall’s (1976) high/low-context culture 
distinction and individualism/collectivism have been widely utilised for the comparison of 
cultural responses when international negotiation issues arise (Adair and Brett 2005; Brett 
and Okumura 1998).  
 
In the international context of negotiation, a society’s characteristics regarding values, 
norms and institutions, which represent culture, provide an understanding of the different 
solutions that each cultural group develops to manage social exchanges such as negotiations 
(Brett and Okumura 1998). Although every single behaviour cannot be explained by culture, 
it is true that cultural values and norms offer a perception of negotiation to the members of 
a cultural group in order for them to interpret the situation and their partners’ behaviour, 
and that negotiation schemas provide for a cognitive storage of information and 
expectations regarding negotiation, as argued in Brett and Okumura (1988) and Thompson 
(2005).  
 
According to Usunier (1996), cultural behaviour varies according to the time orientation of 
negotiators in several ways. For example, ‘Is time money?’, ‘How should we schedule 
tasks?’, ‘Is time a continuous line?’ or ‘Is past, present or future emphasised?’ Thus, in Ang 
and Teo’s (1997) study, time-processing orientation, which relates to the patterns of time 
use for tasks and communication, is specified in two ways (i.e., monochromic time-
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processing orientation and polychromic time-processing orientation5) and this is referred 
to by Hall (1983). Differences in the time-processing orientation among cultures can also 
cause misunderstandings between partners and impede business negotiations (Usunier 
1996; Lane and DiStefano 1992). For instance, Chikudate (1991) suggested that Japanese 
executives do not limit the time spent on socialising with organisational members to the 
workplace, but have a high level of sensitivity and concerns about developing relationships, 
although Americans are different.  
 
2.1.3 Emotion and behaviour 
 
The interest in studying the effects of cross-cultural differences in terms of negotiation 
behaviour has been growing (Tung 1984; Tse, Francis and Walls 1994) and has focused on 
the cultural issues, as discussed above. Ting-Toomey (1998) and Tse, Francis and Walls 
(1994) suggested that a collectivist cultural group expresses a different set of attitudes and 
values than an individualistic cultural group does, resulting in a different negotiation 
approach as a result, since cultural differences influence the manner in which people 
cognitively respond to situations and behave in negotiating situations, as Abramson, Lane, 
Nagai and Takagi (1993) proposed.  
 
While the study into the effects of cultural differences on negotiators’ cognitions and 
attitudes has been developed, feelings, such as the negotiators’ experiences or their moods 
and emotions, are activated and discovered when processing information during 
international negotiations. Anderson and Kumar (2006) examined emotions by reviewing 
the existing literature on buyer–seller relationships and then articulating the role played by 
emotions. They pointed out how significant the concept of emotions is, which has an impact 
on both judgments of trustworthiness and behaviours, while they recognised the emotions 
that emerge in a buyer–seller relationship and introduced a model with propositions 
highlighting the impact of emotions on interpersonal relationships. In the same vein, 
                                            
5 Monochronic tiem processing orientation (M-time; e.g., American) is a tendency of one where 
individuals perform one thing at a time and adhere to preset schedules, while polychromic time 
processing orientation (P-time; e.g., Eastern cultures, Arabic, Japanese, and Chinese) is defined by 
the importance placed on the involvement of people in a task performing several things at the same 




George, Jones and Gonzalez (1998) highlighted the determinants and consequences of 
negotiator positive and negative affect during the negotiations based on the affective 
disposition of the negotiators: A negotiator in a state of positive affectivity often tends to 
feel good, have a generalised sense of well-being, is enthusiastic, excited and active, and 
positively understands their achievement, situation and social interaction (Tellegen 1982; 
1985), while a negotiator in a state of negative affectivity is prone to experience negative 
moods and emotions, including nervousness, distress and hostility (Watson and Clark 1984; 
Tellegen 1985; Watson et al. 1988).  
 
Negotiation practitioners and scholars might be confused about the role of emotions in 
negotiation. For instance, the anger of negotiators is utilised as a tactic to make their 
counterparts yield (Sinaceur and Tiedens 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead 2004), 
and negotiators should try not to negotiate when feeling angry, as this can bring about 
poorer outcomes (Allred 1999). In addition, happiness may be useful when engaging in 
more creative thinking (Lyubomirsky, King and Diener 2005) or harmful when making 
smaller concessions (Van Kleef et al. 2004). Sinaceur and Tiedens (2001) clearly found that 
angry negotiators tend to gain concessions from their counterparts, especially when the 
counterpart had poor alternatives or less power (Kim, Pinkley and Fragale 2005), while 
Van Kleef et al. (2004) found that concessions are poor for happy negotiators and good for 
angry negotiators. Thus, Overbeck, Neale and Govan (2010) recently investigated how 
emotions (i.e., anger and happiness) affect negotiations. They explicitly examined the 
complex interpersonal and intrapersonal effects of emotion, asking whether angry 
negotiators recognise themselves as being tougher, and whether negotiators’ toughness 
affects the negotiation. The result was that powerful negotiators seem to benefit from anger 
during the negotiation, since negotiators become more cognitively focused and 
behaviourally tough, and claim more value with anger.  
 
As mentioned in Wall and Callister (1995), among the emotions manifested in a number of 
ways such as anger, feelings of hostility, social-emotional separation, tension, anxiety and 
stress, negative emotions may lead to personal frustrations, low satisfaction, reduced 
motivation and, in turn, reduced performance (Thomas 1976; Bergman and Volkema 1989; 
Tobbins 1978). Thus, the emotional issues in a negotiation are suggested as a critical stream 





2.1.4 Tension and conflict 
 
Regarding tension in negotiations, Lee, Yang and Graham (2006) recently identified that 
tension plays important, but somewhat different roles for the American and Chinese groups. 
For example, it is interesting that for the Chinese, greater levels of tension led to an 
increased likelihood of agreement, while for the Americans, tension decreased the 
likelihood of an agreement. In particular, the matter of the degree of tension felt and the 
attitude from a cultural-discrepancy viewpoint (which should be levelled out) has been 
emphasised in terms of the negotiation table, while most authors emphasise the negative 
consequences of tension and emotions in negotiations, due to decreased and ineffective 
communication (Verbeke and Bagozzi 2000), rigidity of thinking, reduced problem-solving 
activities, further escalation of emotions and worse negotiation outcomes as a result of these 
emotions (Lee, Yang and Graham 2006).  
 
Conflict experienced during an international negotiation is a culturally defined event and 
resolution styles in different cultures are expected to differ. Thus, different conflict-
resolution styles lead to different behaviours in the process, which further lead to different 
outcomes for the negotiations (Ma 2007). Ma (2007) attempts to investigate the distinctness 
in Chinese negotiations and the respective conflict-management styles employed (i.e., 
competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding and accommodating), and illustrates 
how Chinese people approach conflicts, and thus how this affects their negotiation 
behaviours during business negotiations, which provides an empirical test of Chinese 
conflict-management styles and their impact on negotiation outcomes. Tse, Trancis and 
Walls (1994) also conducted a study on the conflict-resolution strategies of Canadian and 
Chinese executives, since handling conflict is critical to any effective cross-cultural 
negotiations in spite of the lack of attention on this area. In particular, they specified types 
of conflict during the negotiation, such as task-related and person-related conflicts, 
investigating how person-related and task-related conflicts generate different resolution 
styles (i.e., compromising, obliging, avoiding, integrating and domineering) by executives 
of collective and individualistic cultures.  
 
Managing conflict is critical for supporting the efficiency and effectiveness of organisations 
in both negotiations and ordinal situations (McCann and Galbraith 1981) due to the growth 
in international alliances and multinational organisations (Kanter and Corn 1994). The 
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conflict-management literature (e.g., Wall and Callister 1995; Rubin and Brown 1975; 
Rahim 1990; Tjosvold 1991; Thomas 1976) identified conflict-resolution strategies as 
compromising, obliging, avoiding, integrating and domineering, which are based on the 
level of concern the partner perceives for himself or for others. Wall and Callister (1995) 
proposed resolution types in the form of an explicit or tacit agreement, and an integrative 
resolution with both parties benefiting or a distributive resolution with one party benefiting. 
Tinsley and Brett (2001) presented five types of resolution outcomes when negotiators 
confront a conflict: integrative, distributive, compromise outcomes, going to higher 
management or no resolution behaviour. Interestingly, they proposed that different conflict 
norms across cultures many be associated with the different conflict outcomes suggested 
above, since norms lead behaviour (Katz and Kahn 1966), and negotiators are prone to 
enact conflict-resolution behaviour that reflects their own normative ideas in their own 




International negotiation over types, trade or the environment is increasingly complex 
(Kumar, Rangan and Rufin 2005; Weiss 1993). This complexity poses two substantial 
challenges to negotiators in managing vertical and horizontal complexity. The increased 
complexity of international negotiations presents difficulties not just for negotiators, but 
also for the theorists seeking to develop models through which to understand negotiations 
and to predict or explain their outcomes. Understanding complexity management is an 
important dimension for analysing negotiations and one that helps to improve our 
understanding of the overall negotiation process (Crump and Zartman 2003). More 
concretely, it is also critical to consider whether theories of international negotiations could 
be enriched by better connecting with the real-world complexities present in current 
international negotiations. The success or failure of the negotiations is determined by what 
occurs at both tables of negotiation. As Putnam (1988) points out, the political complexities 
for both parties in this game of negotiation are on shaky ground.  
 
In the international context of negotiations, complexity not only encourages inadequate 
informal arrangements, but also suggests the need for flexibility in relations, as it is 
different from the contractual approach that entails understanding all of the contingencies 
in advance (Kumar, Rangan, and Rufin 2005). However, since complexity often hinders 
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being able to specify all of the contingencies in advance, foreign counterparts possibly 
utilise their opportunism (Williamson 1985), which may be diminished by building trust. 
Thus, Kumar, Rangan and Rufin (2005) suggest contract flexibility as the best option for 
dealing with complexity rather than contract legalism. According to them, a relationship-
oriented strategy through trust building with formal contracts is necessary when the 
complexity is highlighted.  
 
The complexity of a negotiation also includes the levels of the partners as company–
company, company–government and interpersonal interactions regarding business types 
such as sales of products, licensing, joint ventures and acquisitions (Weiss 1993). Recently, 
the ‘conceptual paradigm’ of international business negotiation formed by Tung (1988) 
presents the negotiation context, negotiator characteristics, strategic selections and 
processes and the negotiation outcome based on the environmental context (i.e., political, 
economic, institutional-legal and cultural). In terms of the process definition of a 
negotiation, Graham (1987) proposed the process model for all cultural keys based on the 
purpose or nature of the negotiators’ successive interactions, including the four phases of 
non-task sounding, task-related information exchange, persuasion and concessions and 
agreement. The ‘ping-pong’ model (Ghauri and Fang 2001) and the ‘international business 
negotiation framework’ (Ghauri 1996; Ghauri and Usunier 2003) were described as also 
being due to the attributes of complex negotiations.  
 
2.1.6 Individual tendency 
 
As a personality tendency exists depending on the culture of the negotiator, the tendency 
for particular forms of personal behaviour as a pattern has been suggested. People 
sometimes nominate this personality. Brooks and Rose (2004) introduced personality as 
having three different measurements: Machiavellianism; compliance, aggressive, 
detachment (CAD); and motivational orientation. Firstly, individuals with high 
Machiavellianism tend to be manipulative, morally unethical and detached from other 
people and they achieve the desired ends compared to individuals with low 
Machiavellianism (Singhapakdi and Vitell 1991). Secondly, based on the CAD personality 
construct suggested by Horney (1945) as a model of social orientation, Cohen (1967) 
posited how this personality’s variables potentially have a critical influence on diverse 
decision-makings and behaviours in the negotiation context. Thirdly, since motivation 
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orientation is defined as a negotiator behaving ‘in certain ways’, and expecting ‘the other 
to behave in certain ways’ (Lewicki and Litterer 1985), Deutsh (1960) labelled negotiators 
who tend to maximise the joint gains for both negotiating parties as cooperative, and 
negotiators who inherently maximise the difference in outcomes between two parties as 
competitive (Brooks and Rose 2004). Barry and Friedman’s (1998) study supported this 
tendency for a personality trait that either improves or hinders a negotiator’s ability to 
achieve either cooperative or competitive objectives.  
 
Meanwhile, negotiators join the bargaining table from very varied backgrounds, 
experiences, perspectives, with varied risk-taking propensities, personalities, attitudes and 
motivations (Wall and Blum 1991). Due to the impact of the many differences in each 
individual negotiator, Rubin and Brown’s (1975) massive review study showed mixed 
results. Likewise, Graham (1983; 1984) showed no effects in terms of self-esteem or 
extroversion. Fry (1985) found no main effects for the Machiavellianism trait. Carnevale 
and Lawler (1986) and DuBose and Bigoness (1987) found no sex effects as an individual 
variable. Greenhalgh, Neslin and Gilkey (1985) examined the 31 personality variables and 
revealed no significant direct effect of personal characteristics on negotiation outcomes. As 
above, the literature provides minor support for the effect of the tendency for a particular 
personality trait in the negotiator to effect the negotiation.  
 
Nevertheless, since negotiation is a form of social exchange or human interaction, many 
scholars examined individual characteristics for their negotiation research frame as a 
critical variable (Brooks and Rose 2004; Adler, Graham and Gehrke 1989; George, Jones 
and Gonzalez 1987; Adler and Graham 1989; Adler, Braham and Graham 1992). 
Interestingly, Abramson et al. (1993) studied different cognitive styles defined as consistent 
patterns of thought that present systematic preferences for particular information and that 
are utilised for the problem-solving process (Makenny and Keen 1974) based on the 
measurement of the Myers–Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI). Their study attempted to 
professionally measure personality (i.e., cognitive style) as four types (i.e., extrovert, 
sensing person, high in thinking person and high in judging person) in order to broadly 
apply their findings to the cultural behaviours of international interaction. Furthermore, 
beyond the effect of individual characteristics on negotiation outcomes, Evan (1963), Davis 
and Silk (1972) and Bagozzi (1978) discussed the relationship among similarity, attraction 
and negotiation outcomes, based on Evan’s idea, as ‘the more similar the parties in a dyad 
are the more likely a favourable outcome, a sale’ would be. Likewise, Mathews, Wilson 
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and Monoky (1972) concluded that a perceived similarity between counterparts leads to 
more cooperative behaviours and outcomes in negotiations. 
 
2.2 Dimension of influencing factors on negotiation   
 
2.2.1 Three components of influencing negotiations 
 
We have reviewed all of the issues investigated in international negotiation research above, 
such as process, culture, emotion and behaviour, tension control and relationship building, 
complexity, negotiators’ tendency and conflict and behaviours. When we find a research 
gap where no holistic empirical model has been introduced, but where the descriptive and 
anecdotal evidence has been investigated, or the partial frame of the whole negotiation 
process has been empirically tested and confirmed, as mentioned above, we have a research 
gap. Thus, we are challenged to scrutinise the holistic model or structure to understand the 
whole process of international negotiation during face-to-face negotiations by looking into 
the linkages between the predictors and consequences. Strategically, the broad scope of 
international business negotiations involves the three main stages of pre-negotiation, face-
to-face negotiation and post-negotiation (Ghauri 1996), where all of the factors are 
diversified into strategy, culture, personality and situation etc., which leads to us 
understanding and simplifying the obscure process of the negotiation itself. Then, we 
attempt to research the comprehensive factors through classified components that can 
explain the delicate situation during face-to-face international negotiations around the table, 
based on the previous research.  
 
Initially, as shown in Figure 2.1, Ghauri and Usunier (2003) address a range of issues such 
as background factors (i.e., objective, environment, third parties and negotiators), the 
process of negotiations (i.e., pre-negotiation, face-to-face negotiation and post-negotiation), 
the problem of cross-cultural communication (i.e., time, individual vs. collectivism, pattern 
of communication and emphasis on personal relationships), strategies and tactics (i.e., 
presentation, strategies, decision-making and the need for an agent), and atmosphere (i.e., 
conflict/cooperation, power/dependence and expectations), especially in the international 
arena. Their treatment of these topics is supported by reference to real-life experiences, 
examples and cases and is summarised by a theoretical model. In addition, the model 
initially inspires us to understand and simplify face-to-face international negotiations as 
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our model. Their model truly provides us with a stereoscopic and realistic understanding 
of international business negotiations. More specifically, Tung (1998) and Weiss (1993) 
introduce the ‘conceptual paradigm’ of international business negotiations by describing 
the negotiation context, negotiator characteristics, strategic selections and processes and 
the negotiation outcomes as in our framework. Along the same lines, Graham (1983) 
suggested the three categories of theoretical constructs as individual characteristics, 
situational constraints and process measures, which have a critical impact on the outcome 
of a negotiation. According to Adler, Graham and Gehrke’s (1987) laboratory simulation 
with business people from the United States, Mexico and Canada, three classes of 
constructs exist that determine the outcomes of negotiations: bargainer characteristics, 
situational constraints and the process of bargaining. The last construct (the process of 
bargaining) includes the strategies and behaviours negotiators use during the bargaining 
process itself. Recently, Brooks and Rose (2004) have attempted to discuss clearly and 
descriptively the antecedents and consequences of the process, representing families of 
constructs and their relationships among groups of constructs. Their model consists of 
personal factors (i.e., Machiavellianism, compliance, aggression and detachment, 
motivational orientation and negotiator’s knowledge), contextual factors (i.e., expectation 
of future negotiations, reward structure, personal accountability to constituents or 
supervisors, relative power and time pressures), organisational factors (i.e., corporate 
philosophy and objectives) as determinants, collaborative or competitive negotiation 
orientations as a focal construct and finally, aggressive or problem-solving behaviours as 
consequences. Since the cultural effect is critical in the international arena, George, Jones 
and Gonzales (1998) newly include the cross-cultural difference variables (i.e. internalised 
cultural values and norms, emotional expression and linguistic style), with individual and 
contextual factors. Mostly, since there is always a thread of connection between the 
strategies and cultural manipulations during the negotiation, it is desirable to consider the 
cultural manipulations in the research as part of a strategic effort. In addition, it is true that 
the diverse perspectives, characteristics, behaviours and atmosphere reflected in prior 
research during the negotiation have created a need for a conceptual synthesis that is refined 
to describe the stereoscopic antecedents and consequences during face-to-face negotiations. 
Therefore, we extract the individual, strategic and contextual components as determinants 
of our research on international negotiations. Then, we discuss and refine the sub-variables 
as the representatives of each component to describe and understand the process and 




Figure2. 1 Framework of international business negotiation 
 
Source: Ghauri 1996; Ghauri and Usunier 2003 
 
2.2.2 Individual dimension 
 
Negotiators approach the bargaining table from considerably diverse backgrounds, 
indicating that their experiences and perspectives are highly differentiated. In addition, 
negotiation is clearly an interpersonal activity; thus, it may logical that the negotiators’ 
dispositions will exert a significant influence on the process and outcomes of negotiations 
(Bazerman et al. 1987). Thus, both demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, race and age) 
and personality variables (e.g., Machiavellianism, authoritarianism, self-esteem, cognitive 
complexity and tolerance of ambiguity) have been suggested (Rubin and Brown 1975; 
Neale and Bazerman 1992; Lewicki et al. 2006). Personality (Rubin and Brown 1975), 
conflict-resolution orientation (Thomas 1992), gender (Pinckley 1990), individual 
experience (Graham 1983), Hofstede’s cultural dimension and language similarity (Adler 
and Graham 1989) are some of the proposed ways through which the characteristics of the 
individual negotiator have an effect on the process of coalition (Money 1998). According 
to the viewpoint of Staw and Kramer (2005), men and women innately differ in how they 
handle conflict and negotiations and, broadly speaking, psychological and biological 
factors can affect negotiation performance, such as gender, for instance. However, many 
negotiation theorists have stated that for research into the ‘black box’ of the negotiation 
process, the vast majority of studies on negotiation have ignored the element of 




Despite the majority of research on gender differences in negotiation attempting to find 
individual characteristics that can be distinguished in terms of negotiator behaviour, there 
has been no consistent evidence to verify a main effect from gender differences in 
negotiator performance across hundreds of studies (Lewicki et al. 1994). Thompson (1990) 
argued that the findings of gender effects have been inconsistently reported and have been 
viewed sceptically. Therefore, we consider and focus more on the personality effect in this 
study. Moreover, the propensity, risk taking, personality type, attitude and motivation of 
each negotiator in each case definitely differs. These individual differences of negotiators 
must have a substantial impact on the process and outcome of a negotiation (Wall and 
Callister 1995). Rubin and Brown (1975) indicate that many personal characteristics, at one 
time or another, had a critical impact on the negotiation process or its outcome in some 
experiments, reviewing about 200 studies in an attempt to summarise the findings of this 
flow and relationship.  
 
In particular, in more complex international negotiations (e.g., international M&A 
negotiations) where trade-offs among multiple issues are involved, and where there is no 
abstract pay-off matrix favouring mutual cooperation, other individual differences may 
produce a negotiating advantage (Greenhalgh, Neslin and Gilkey 1985). For example, 
multi-attribute negotiations require complex trade-off decision-makings based on the 
cognitive skills of negotiators. Thus, the characteristics of cognitive individuals such as 
intelligence, logical thought patterns, mental flexibility and the ability to control an 
opponent’s opinion and lead the negotiation along a favourable track should improve the 
chance of successful outcomes. In addition, even the pursuit of self-interest is prone to 
being influenced by an individual’s tendency to persist in interpersonal interactions, so that 
a more assertive negotiator may tend to have an advantage as a negotiator.  
 
Although the negotiator’s personality has been particularly recognised as having a 
significant impact on negotiations, mostly only one or two factors have been explored at 
any one time (Greenhalgh, Neslin and Gilkey 1985). Moreover, in the international 
negotiation context, the issues of personality or individual behaviour are often associated 
with cultural behaviour patterns (Tung 1982; Adair and Brett 2005), since a negotiator 
definitely has a certain kind of tendency to behave in a particular manner depending on his 
or her culture. For example, Morris at al. (1998) explore further how personality determines 
the type of conflict resolution employed, which is affected by culture, as culture has 
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practical implications during international negotiations across countries. Apart from this 
cultural consideration, Wall and Callister (1995) suggest that there is again some evidence 
that personality characteristics generate conflict, as Baron (1989) found that individuals 
with a Type-A personality report a higher frequency of conflict than those with the Type-B 
personality do. In addition, reviews of the negotiation literature by Thompson (1990) and 
Wall Blum (1991) revealed that personality and other individual differences had an impact 
on the outcomes of negotiations. Graham (1983) also proposes the effect of self-esteem and 
extroversion/introversion on negotiation outcomes. Approaching the international 
negotiation process as being between cooperative and competitive in nature, Brook and 
Rose (2004) describe negotiator personality, suggesting the three types of personality 
measurement paradigm as Machiavellianism (Ghristie and Geis 1970), the social-
orientation trait (Horney 1945) and motivational orientation (Deutsch 1960)6.  
 
With respect to international negotiators’ influencing factors, many researchers also suggest 
their working experience in international negotiations as a factor. Adler, Graham and 
Gehrke (1987) suggest the characteristics of negotiators should incorporate their 
experience, which is measured by their number of years of work experience, age and 
partner contacts outside of the company, indicating that negotiation experience has a 
positive effect on the performance of it based on the mechanism of learning theory (Graham 
1983; 1985a). George, Jones and Gonzalez’s (1998) model introduces the extent and nature 
of negotiators’ past experience in cross-cultural negotiations as a second individual 
difference factor that has significant effects on the ways in which they cognitively process 
information surrounding the negotiation itself. In the context of cross-cultural negotiations, 
negotiators will rely on their pre-existing schemas to make sense of and process 
information during current negotiations.  
 
Interestingly, George, Jones and Gonzalez (1998) suggest affective disposition and 
experience in cross-cultural settings as individual differences. Basically, they emphasise 
how the feelings that the negotiator experiences or their emotions and mood act in 
information processing during cross-cultural negotiations. In other words, according to the 
personality theories, humans behave in a certain way depending on the type of personality 
                                            
6 Horney’s (1945) social orientation trait is composed of compliance, aggression and detachment 
(CAD). Deutsch’s (1960) motivational orientation is comprised of cooperative, individualistic, and 
competitive as a personality variable in Lewicki and Litterer 1985 and Rubin and Brown 1975). 
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that they were born with. For example, a person with high positive affectivity is likely to 
perceive others in a positive light, and enjoy social interaction with positive feelings and 
moods, even during the negotiation process, while a person with negative affectivity is 
likely to be stressed by their thoughts and behaviours, with negative feelings and moods 
arising, such as being nervous, fearful and hostile, even across negotiation situations over 
time (George 1996; Tellegen 1982; 1985; Watson and Clark 1984). Given that negotiators’ 
behaviour is as affected by their moods and emotions (i.e., affective processes) as it is by 
their attitudes and values (i.e., cognitive processes), it is important that a model of the cross-
cultural negotiation process takes into account the role of affect (Barry and Oliver 1996; 
George 1996). Additionally, positive or negative affectivity (Watson and Clark 1984; 
Tellegen 1982; 1985) is ultimately related to the five-factor model of personality being 
empirically supported (Church and Burke 1994; Digman 1990; McCrae 1989), meaning 
that the affective trait might be decided by a personality domain.  
 
In Adler and Graham (1989), negotiator similarity is emphasised, which is associated with 
the attractiveness of negotiators, then joint outcomes. In other words, Evan (1963), Dvis 
and Silk (1972) and Bagozzi (1978) introduce the relationship between similarity, attraction 
and outcomes. According to Evan’s (1963) work, the three constructs form a causal 
relationship with attraction in the middle. Thus, negotiators from the same culture with a 
high level of similarity are expected to be more attracted to each other and achieve higher 
negotiation outcomes, proposed as profits and satisfaction. Especially, this perceived 
similarity between counterparts that leads to attraction elicits behaviours that are more 
cooperative during face-to-face negotiations (Mathew, Wilson and Monoky 1972). 
However, Simons, Berkowitz and Moyer (1970:9) note that ‘the relationship between 
attraction to a source (like-dislike, friendly feeling, etc.) and attitude change has received 
scant attention’. For instance, Graham et al. (1988) have shown that a negotiator’s 
attractiveness positively influences their partner’s satisfaction in simulated negotiations. 
Rubin and Brown (1975), in their review of the negotiation literature, conclude that 
interpersonal attraction generally enhances bargaining outcomes. Therefore, to the extent 
that a person receives rewards from a relationship with a negotiator whom he or she 
perceives as attractive, that person will be more satisfied even with the negotiation outcome. 
In terms of the psychological process of negotiators in face-to-face scenarios, McGuire 
(1968) explains that when people are attracted to each other, they will even make sacrifices 
(i.e., concessions in a negotiation) to preserve the gratifying personal relationship. Thus, 
an individual bargainer may give up economic rewards for the social rewards of a 
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relationship with an attractive partner. To the extent that one receives rewards from the 
relationship with an attractive partner, the person will be more satisfied with the 
relationship (or in this case, with the negotiated agreement). Moreover, Zunin and Zunin 
suggest that during the first few minutes of a conversation, ‘decisions’ are made about 
interpersonal attractiveness and whether to continue with the interaction or not, and they 
confirmed this across cultural groups. Therefore, in this research, we try to scrutinise the 
negotiators’ characteristics that have a dramatic influence during face-to-face negotiations, 
such as attractiveness and their personality.  
 
2.2.3 Strategic dimension 
 
It is extremely important that the negotiators thoroughly build up how to present their idea; 
negotiators need to determine which type of strategy or decision-making process should be 
used during the negotiation (Ghauri and Usunier 2003). Adler, Graham and Gehrke (1987) 
propose that bargaining strategies are understood to follow a representational and 
instrumental continuum7 (Angelmar and Stern 1978). Especially, the relationship between 
representational bargaining strategies and negotiation outcomes has been investigated 
frequently over the last few decades (Adler et al. 1987), and Angelmar and Stern (1978) 
actually assumed an intimate relationship between psychological states (i.e., cooperative or 
individualistic orientation) and behaviours (Copeland and Griggs 1985; Rubin and Brown 
1975), noting that cooperative negotiators are prone to using representational 
communications and individualistic bargainers are prone to using instrumental 
communication. Regarding the strategic perspective of negotiation, Pruitt’s (1981) strategic 
choice model suggests three basic strategies used by negotiators: unilateral concession, 
contentious behaviour and coordinative behaviour. In detail, contentiousness involves 
competitive tactics with contrived arguments, which highlights the degree to which a 
negotiator’s objective is to reach an agreement, despite asymmetrical satisfaction and non-
agreement risks; coordinative behaviour involves the exchange of information that satisfies 
both parties; and a unilateral concession occurs primarily when a negotiator expects to get 
an agreement at any cost. Tinsley (2001) explains how persuasion is more or less a universal 
and useful strategy, although it might differ across cultures. Then, the range of different 
                                            
7 Angelmar and Stern (1978) proposed and defined representational communication behaviours 
involve the transmission of information, and instrumental communication behaviours involve 
influencing another party. 
 50 
 
conflict strategies such as integrating interests, applying regulations and deferring to status 
power were introduced, and these may be used to negotiate a conflict arising from the 
negotiation, since the negotiation is dependent on strategically managing the conflict 
between two parties during the whole journey. In addition, since negotiators’ behaviour is 
tactical and strategic, negotiator influence tactics have been investigated in diverse contexts 
(e.g. simulations, interpersonal bargaining within firms, international business and 
marketing channels) (Adler and Graham 1989; Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Deluga 1991; 
Frazier and Summers 1984; Kale 1989; Kipnis and Schmidt 1983; Roering 1977; Rubin 
and Brown 1985). Rao and Schmidt (1998) employ Kipnis and Schmidt’s (1985) 
parsimonious classification of influence tactics through the three categories of hard, soft 
and rational tactics to explain negotiator influence tactics in the international arena. Their 
theoretical category includes how the negotiators digest all of the factors encountered 
during the negotiation such as power culture, conflict, trust, individual characteristics and 
time perception. These aspects might act to moderate manipulation in both expected and 
unexpected situations. More specifically, Adair et al. (2004) emphasise the communication 
and power strategies distinguished across cultures, since the literature on cross-cultural 
communication and information sharing suggests dealing with a customised strategy 
depending on the cultures involved in international negotiations, sometimes even through 
high- or low-context cultures (Hall 1976). Ganesan (1993) defines how negotiation 
strategies are interaction patterns that are managed by both parties in a conflict situation to 
accomplish the resolution of the conflict, while suggesting five types of relevant strategies: 
(1) competing or aggressive strategy, (2) collaborating or problem-solving strategy, (3) 
compromising strategy, (4) avoiding strategy and (5) accommodating strategy.  
 
Most strategy-oriented research considers negotiations as transaction costs (Williamson 
1979; Kogut 1988) or estimates that they are profitable methods in the core strategies of 
firms, which are significantly related to the outcome of the negotiation. However, it is true 
that everything could be a strategy, depending on the researcher’s perspective and research 
goal. For instance, most of the cultural behaviour exhibited by negotiators might be a 
strategy of communication and a power strategy, as introduced in Adair et al. (2004), 
meaning that the manner of communicating and of perceiving the power are definitely 
differentiated by different cultures. In addition, cooperativeness and competitiveness are 
introduced as a negotiator’s general strategy or conflict frame (Rao and Schmidt 1998), or 
often as an outcome or process variable of negotiation (Brett, Shapiro et al. 1998; Books 
and Rose 2004). On the other hand, Rao and Schmidt (1998) suggest such a persuasive 
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strategic frame as comprising hard, rational and soft tactics, which is effectively used 
regardless of any other factors or strategies that are affected during the negotiation. That is 
to say, all kinds of strategies and environmental situations should be skilfully filtered by 
this category of tactics. In addition, since multi-attribute negotiations that require complex 
trade-off decisions between individual cognitive skills, intelligence, logical thought 
patterns, mental flexibility, and the ability to steer an opponent’s thinking and keep the 
negotiation on track, the negotiation might be strategically enhanced for the likelihood of 
successful outcomes by these three meta-categories, for example.  
 
2.2.4 Contextual component 
 
Tung (1998) and Weiss (1993) state that the ‘conceptual paradigm’ of international business 
negotiation explains the environmental factors as antecedents. This environmental context 
including the political, economic, institutional-legal and cultural aspects is part of the 
overall negotiation paradigm alongside the negotiator’s characteristics, strategic selections 
and processes and the negotiation outcome. Examining the larger picture, Ghauri and 
Usunier (2003) describe how a fundamental element of negotiations is the atmosphere 
surrounding the talks as a part of the negotiation. They define atmosphere as ‘the perceived 
“milieu” around the interaction, how the parties consider each other’s behaviour, and the 
properties of the process’. They also make the point that the atmosphere and the negotiation 
process ‘affect each other through interaction at each stage’. Their notion of atmosphere is 
conceptually analogous to Amir’s (1969) social climate and Baron’s (1990) environment. 
All of these authors emphasise how the atmosphere often affects the negotiation process, 
including the tension levels that are experienced during the process (Lee, Yang and Graham 
2006).  
 
However, regarding this overwhelming variable of negotiation, some researchers have 
simply defined the situational constraint as a part of the different negotiator roles of seller 
and buyer across several cultures (Adler, Brahm and Graham 1992; Adler, Graham and 
Gehrke 1987). Brooks and Rose (2004) define the negotiation atmosphere as competitive 
or cooperative, and in the long run, it is often a difficult scenario, and circumstances or the 
situational context during the negotiation may govern the negotiators’ behaviour in 
unnatural ways outside of their usual personality traits. In other words, it is important to 
highlight that these contextual determinants of the negotiation process may sometimes 
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overpower individual dispositions in some negotiation contexts (Donohue 1978).  
 
While researchers have been studying the dynamics of negotiation processes, particularly 
the study of dyadic negotiations, for years (Thompson 2005; Pruitt 1981; Pruitt and 
Carnevale 1993), many of the contextual components that influence negotiation outcomes 
have been elaborated on by relying primarily on lab experiments, such as whether people 
negotiate individually or in groups (Kramer 1991), the number of issues in dispute (Yukl 
1974; Pruitt and Lewis 1975), the presence of time deadlines (Carnevale and Lawler 1986) 
and the presence of power differences (Bachrach and Lawler 1981). This previous research 
also broadly indicates such contextual determinants as expectations of future negotiations, 
reward structures, personal accountability to constituents or supervisors, relative power and 
time pressure (Brooks and Rose 2004).  
 
With respect to relative power, many scholars have defined this in various ways. For 
example, in the case of negotiation, power has a role to induct the other party to set an 
agreement and fewer outcomes than one party’s maximum utility through the individual, 
strategic and contextual situations of the negotiation process. This takes the form of 
inducting the other to settle for an outcome of less than his or her maximum utility 
(Greenhalgh, Neslin and Gilkey 1985). This result can be achieved through tactical skill or 
situational power. Asymmetrical situational power has been manipulated in the laboratory, 
with the observed result being that the more powerful party used that power that they had 
in general (Rubin and Brown, 1975) and, as a result, they had a better outcome than the 
weaker party did. In an exchange relationship, the counterpart’s potential power exists in 
the perceived dependence of the other party (Emerson, 1962). When two parties expect to 
collaborate, they intend to gain and access their partner’s resources, even when taking into 
account the risk involved in sharing their own resources with the other party. Thus, as 
Chamberlain (1950) argues on the importance of relative power, the negotiator’s relative 
power lies in, and is considered only in terms of the relationship with the other partner in 
the negotiation. However, there are two different streams of thought that explain about the 
behaviour or the outcome of the party who has relative power over the other. Some scholars 
insist that negotiators with more power do not reciprocate concessions (Michner, Vaske, 
Schleifer, Plazewski and Chapman 1975), meaning that negotiators perceiving themselves 
to be in a relatively low position or position of power, due to a limited number of valued 
resources or alternatives, tend to use ‘weapons of the weak’ (Rubin and Zartman 1995), 
including information exchange, forming coalitions with secondary parties or friendliness. 
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Therefore, dependent negotiators usually use fewer threats and are more willing to comply 
with their counterpart’s requests (Dwyer and Walker 1981; Rubin and Brown, 1975), 
expecting a cooperative atmosphere between the two parties.  
 
Regarding the effect of time pressure during the face-to-face negotiation, Carnevale and 
Lawler (1986) found that time pressure (telling negotiators they had 5 minutes versus 25 
minutes to negotiate) increased the use of contentious tactics by negotiators and negatively 
impacted outcomes, as negotiators under high time pressure achieved fewer valuable 
outcomes than negotiators under low time pressure.  
 
Conversely, since the time-pressure effect during the negotiation is controversial, many 
scholars support the positive effect of time pressure on joint outcomes, cooperativeness or 
even the concession rate (Smith, Pruitt and Carnevale 1982). For instance, Pruitt and 
Johnson (1970) found that time pressure generates a faster concession rate, as Smith, Pruitt 
and Carnevale (1982) also found. That is to say, in general, a deadline reduces demands, 
enlarges the possibility of concessions, induces negotiators to reach an agreement and 
assures the negotiators’ move towards flexible and concessionary behaviours (Lewicki and 
Litterer 1985). As a result, it is strongly supported that time pressure may accelerate 
cooperative behaviour and stimulate mutual agreements through harmonious 
communication and collaboration. Among those contextual determinants considered 
previously, we re-categorise based on the main structure in the individual, strategic and 
contextual frame. Therefore, we recognise time pressure and relative power as the critical 
factors, as in the contextual frame. 
 
2.3 Outcomes of negotiations 
 
Researchers often discover that the outcomes of business negotiations are difficult to 
measure and compare, although different studies have operationalised negotiation 
outcomes in a number of ways. Much of the negotiation research is mostly operationalised 
with simulations and experiments measuring the negotiation behaviour and its performance 
as outcome variables, which are analytically measured from two perspectives (i.e., 
economic and social psychological measures). Economic measures primarily deal with the 
outcomes or products of the negotiation and are based on the normative perspective of 
negotiation behaviour and on the principle of individual rationality, although that does not 
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enumerate the process or method necessary sufficiently enough to yield such outcomes 
(Nash 1953). However, economic measures of performance in negotiation are specifically 
categorised into the three measures of mutual agreement, integrative bargaining (i.e., 
creating resources) and distributive bargaining (i.e., claiming resources), but they are 
always assessed and decided upon based on the negotiators’ reservation prices, efficiency 
or pareto optimal (Thompson 1990b; Raiffa 1982). Regarding the social psychological 
perspective, the measures of negotiation performance are obviously grounded on social 
perception as perceived by the negotiators, when considering the bargaining situation and 
behaviour of their counterparts (Allport 1955; Thompson and Hastie 1990). Negotiators’ 
perceptions of the bargaining situation are often excessively inconsistent with an objective 
economic analysis and even in terms of the perception of the partner (Baserman and Carroll 
1987; Thompson and Hastie 1990), since both parties in the same conflict situation may 
have asymmetrical perceptions about the issue or conflict depending on their situation or 
power position (Hammond et al 1975; Pinkley 1990).  
 
According to the review of the previous research on the outcomes of negotiations, there are 
some streams of research such as profit (i.e., individual profit and joint profit) (Dwyer and 
Walker 1981; Clopton 1984), satisfaction (Dwyer 1980; Ma 2007), the integrative and 
distributive continuum (Lewicki et al. 1994; Walton and McKersie 1965) and the problem-
solving approach (cooperative or integrative approach) (Money 1998). However, most of 
them are generally viewed as a joint outcome of negotiation belonging to a psychological 
measure or to the affective status itself. For instance, Ganesan (1993) suggested three 
categories or strategies for negotiation: problem solving, compromise and an aggressive 
strategy. Conlon and Hunt (2002) extend the affective aspects of negotiations by examining 
the effects of defining negotiation outcomes in four different ways as happy faces, unhappy 
faces, positive numbers and negative numbers, which lead to longer negotiation times and 
higher impasse rates. Various studies have also used sale versus no sale, an obvious measure 
of bargaining effectiveness (Pennington 1968), profits obtained by bargainers (Rubin and 
Brown 1975) and a combination of individual and joint profits (Dwyer and Walker 1981; 
Clopton 1984). In the negotiation experiments that have been conducted by social 
psychologists, one of the measures used is the profit achieved by the negotiators in 
negotiation simulations (cf. Rubin and Brown 1975). Both individual and joint profit in 
negotiation simulations have been used as a dependent measure in business studies 
(Clopton 1984; Dwyer and Walker 1981: Graham 1983). For instance, in the hundreds of 
bargaining experiments previously conducted, a commonly used measure of negotiation 
 55 
 
outcomes is both the individual and joint profit attained by negotiators in negotiation 
simulations (Rubin and Brown 1975; Clopton 1984; Dwyer and Walker 1981). Beyond 
profits that have been used as dependent measures in business studies (Clopton 1984; 
Dwyer and Walker 1981; Graham 1983), negotiator satisfaction is an important 
psychological measure of success, especially if the partners desire a continued relationship 
in the future. Dwyer (1980) has developed and tested the reliability of a scale for measuring 
the satisfaction of bargainers in three dimensions: (1) satisfaction with one’s own rewards, 
(2) satisfaction with one’s partner’s rewards and (3) satisfaction with one’s own 
performance. Given the dual importance of profit as a project achievement and satisfaction 
as relationship building, especially in international negotiations (Laurent 1983), some 
research has focused on employing both as outcomes (Adler and Graham 1989; Graham 
1986; Rubin and Brown 1975). For example, Graham (1986) investigated relationships 
between the problem-solving approach and a negotiator’s individual profit and their 
bargaining partner’s satisfaction. This view finds that negotiators usually try to maximise 
their own economic rewards, while attempting to keep partners satisfied. That is, 
negotiators really are involved in a difficult balancing act between maximising their own 
profits and the satisfaction of their clients. Brookmire and Sistrunk (1980) also measured 
the satisfaction with the outcomes of negotiation in terms of the number of settled contracts 
and the total amount of dyadic money gained. Consistent with several studies reviewed by 
Rubin and Brown (1975), statistically significant relationships were discovered between a 
negotiator’s problem-solving approach from a psychological perspective and the 
negotiator’s own profit from an economic perspective. That is to say, in the previous 
research on international negotiation issues, both economic and psychological measures 
have been employed as a dependent variable. Graham has mostly manipulated joint and 
individual profit in his research. Meanwhile, most research has employed satisfaction, the 
problem-solving approach, cooperativeness or the integrative/distributive process as 
dependent variables or outcomes of the negotiation. As above, the outcome variables are 
inclined to be focused more on the psychological measures, since the perceived outcome 
in terms of the atmosphere felt during the face-to-face negotiation or even after the table 
negotiation may have a critical effect on further relationship building.  
 
Interestingly, apart from profit and satisfaction as outcomes of negotiations, integrative and 
distributive processes or behavioural strategies during the negotiation have been introduced 
in order to measure the success or failure of negotiations. As similar terms, a cooperative 
or a competitive atmosphere or behaviour have also been introduced with the problem-
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solving approach. Cooperativeness (i.e., the problem-solving approach) and 
competitiveness during the process of negotiation have also been emphasised as an 
atmosphere or process variable, corresponding to the integrative and distributive approach. 
For instance, Rao and Schmidt (1998) define and explore a cooperative or competitive 
atmosphere, considering it as a strategic dimension in the behaviour perspective, while it 
is assumed as an outcome or atmosphere variable of negotiation in the process perspective. 
Especially, Money (1998) repeats the concept of the problem-solving approach in 
negotiations, which is defined as the degree to which bargainers use cooperation, 
collaboration and information exchange in arriving at a solution (Graham, Mintu and 
Rodgers 1994), or what Lewicki et al. (1994) describes as ‘integrative negotiation’. In 
contrast, the lack of a problem-solving approach (or ‘distributive’ bargaining) would be 
characterised by a win–lose or zero-sum approach. There are a number of research papers 
on interactive and distributive communication in terms of the process or strategy focus, and 
sometimes this is employed using slightly different terminology instead. In other words, 
different researchers have used various labels such as integrative bargaining strategies 
(Walton and McKersie 1965), cooperative orientation (Rubin and Brown 1975; Williams 
1983), problem-solving orientation (Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Menkel-Meadow 1984; 
Murray 1986), representational bargaining strategies (Angelmar and Stern 1978) and 
direct/open influence tactics (Weitz 1981), yet the findings and the basic concept have been 
relatively consistent. For example, the relationship regarding a problem-solving approach 
to negotiation outcomes has been investigated frequently for more than three decades, 
although researchers have used different labels for the problem-solving approach concept, 
but the findings have highlighted how the problem-solving approach positively influences 
joint negotiation outcomes. Graham, Mintu and Rogers (1994) even explored the 
universality of a problem-solving model of business negotiations using 700 business people 
from 11 cultures as participants in a bargaining simulation. In essence, the problem-solving 
approach to business negotiations is defined as a set of negotiation behaviours that are 
cooperative, integrative and information exchange-oriented. Even as a strategy perspective, 
this tends to maximise the number of alternative solutions considered, thus allowing 
negotiators to optimise outcomes. In general, the problem-solving approach has been found 
to influence negotiation outcomes positively in various ways. For instance, the problem-
solving approach to negotiations initially involves an emphasis on questions and on getting 
information from the counterpart about their needs and preferences. Then, once the 
counterpart’s requirements and circumstances are completely comprehended, the 
negotiator accommodates the offering for their counterpart. The focus is on cooperation 
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and an integrative approach, wherein the needs and goals of both parties are honestly 
discussed and eventually satisfied (Pruitt 1981; Pruitt and Rubin 1986). In the same vein, 
as Pruitt (1981) notes, an agreement is ‘integrative’ when it reconciles (i.e., integrates) the 
negotiator’s interests and yields benefits to both at the end of the process. This concept 
emphasises that an increase in one party’s benefits need not create a reduction for the other.  
 
Since Walton and McKersie (1965) first distinguished between integrative and distributive 
negotiations, these two types of negotiation have been the focus of much research (Barry 
and Friedman 1998; Lax and Sebenius 1986; Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). Integrative 
behaviours generate joint gains and distributive behaviours lead to conflicts initially (Brett, 
Shapiro et al. 1998; Olekalns and Smith 2000; Putnam and Jones 1982; Weingart et al. 1999; 
Wall and Callister 1995) – a robust finding in the previous negotiation literature. Relative 
to distributive negotiations, the characteristics of integrative negotiations provide a greater 
opportunity for more trust and openness between negotiating parties, the exchange of 
accurate information, predictability and the abandonment of negative images of the other 
side (DeRue et al. 2009). In general, during the negotiation, if one party achieves its goals, 
the other party is not precluded from also achieving its goals, although the essential concept 
of an integrative negotiation is that it allows both sides to achieve their objectives (Walton 
and McKersie 1965). Therefore, the relationship or terminology of integrativeness during 
the negotiation has been investigated frequently because of its ideal attributes.  
 
After browsing the integrative negotiation literature, we proposed to employ the problem-
solving approach, which is the same as cooperativeness or integrativeness, during the face-
to-face negotiation as an outcome variable of this research. It is true that the practicing 
negotiators are not fully expected to search futilely for a ‘win–win’ agreement in every 
negotiation and researchers cannot anticipate that their findings in integrative experiments 
can be applied to all negotiating situations. In a practical world, when it comes `to 
negotiation, there are two schools of thought (e.g., win–lose and win–win negotiations). 
Win–lose negotiations are and always will be an uphill battle. Although the relationship in 
negotiations is very naturally adversarial, the goal of a win–win negotiation is to reach an 
agreement that satisfies both parties, who can then feel happy that the negotiation has been 
fair and that they have improved in their respective positions at the conclusion of the 
negotiation. The true test of a win–win outcome is whether each of the negotiators would 
want to enter into another negotiation with the partner in the future, thus maintaining their 




Regarding the other stream for the negotiation process, Walton and McKersie (1965) 
suggest that the opposite of problem-solving strategies is distributive bargaining strategies, 
wherein the goal is to change a negotiating partner’s attitudes, attributions or actions. This 
type of negotiation can be expected to achieve individual reward or profit, but not 
cooperativeness between partners in a positive way and is confined to negotiators from 
Germany, the United Kingdom, Mexico and Canada (Graham et al. 1988; Campbell et al. 
1988; Adler et al. 1987). DeRue et al. (2009) also anticipate that the deleterious effects of 
trust and openness between negotiating parties, leading to the exchange of accurate 
information, predictability and concessions may be worse in distributive negotiations than 
in integrative negotiations. This is because the straightforward and honest characteristics 
are inconsistent with the demands that are placed on a negotiator in a distributive bargaining 
context. Lewicki, Saunders and Minton (1999) stated that ‘distributive bargaining is 
basically a conflict situation, wherein parties seek their own advantage – in part through 
concealing information, attempting to mislead, or using manipulative actions’ (DeRue et al. 
2009:106). As the goals maintained by the negotiating parties are usually in fundamental 
and direct conflict with one another and resources are fixed and limited, each party in a 
distributive negotiation engages in behaviour directed at maximising its share of the 
outcomes to be obtained (Lewicki et al. 2006). Others (Johnston 1982) have also suggested 
that distributive negotiations lead to the use of unpredictability, surprise, threats, bluffs, 
hostility and the creation of negative images of the other side. Therefore, again we propose 
and confirm the cooperative process of negotiation as an outcome variable of our research 
even for future relationships and the win–win perspective, which will improve the joint 
outcome in the end. Moreover, according to the previous research, negotiators in both 
cultures are more successful when taking a problem-solving approach, employing an 
integrative continuum or cooperativeness. 
 
2.4 Theories explaining negotiations    
 
2.4.1 Transaction cost theory 
 
If the negotiation process and behaviour are interpreted based on the transaction cost theory, 
the behaviours in negotiating, contracting, implementing and monitoring an agreement can 
be explained as transaction costs. Since negotiation is generally defined as a process by 
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which people or firms attempt to establish what each party may give and take or perform 
and receive in a transaction between them (Rubin and Brown 1975), the attempt to 
minimise their collective sum of production and transaction costs, mentioned by 
Williamson (1975; 1979), is critical in both win–lose and win–win frames of negotiation.  
 
The transaction cost occurs when formulating a collaboration, which is manipulated by 
humans (e.g., negotiators). Due to the human factors including opportunism and bounded 
rationality (Williamson 1975; 1979), we emphasise the importance of the negotiators’ 
characteristics and the attractiveness between them. The contextual components composed 
of perceived time pressure and relative power can be proposed based on the environmental 
factors including uncertainty and a small number of negotiating partners, as in Williamson 
(1975; 1979) and Parkhe (1993). Opportunism is both a central concept of transaction cost 
studies and a part of the important economic activities of transaction-specific investments 
performed during negotiations (e.g., Williamson 1975; 1979). Based on the transaction 
value perspective proposed in Zajac and Olsen (1993), a firm’s tendency towards 
opportunism with a small number of negotiation partners, which causes a transaction cost 
problem, is often dominated by the firm’s estimate of the negative impact. In other words, 
the purpose is to minimise the transaction costs and increase the benefits associated with 
pre-empting the opportunistic behaviour of negotiators, while maximising the net value and 
benefit in the exchange relationship (e.g., negotiation). Moreover, the maximisation of 
benefits requires recognition of the interdependence of the exchange partners (Zajac and 
Olsen 1993) as a perceived relative power frame, as suggested in this study.  
 
During the collaboration process, performance may be hindered by the opportunistic 
behaviour of firms or negotiators. Negotiators may believe that their firms can achieve 
benefits through collaboration (e.g., cooperativeness), while one party unilaterally obtains 
a competitive advantage (e.g., competitiveness) (Fang 1997).The cooperativeness between 
partners that this study focuses on as a joint value is ignored by the transaction cost 
approach to inter-organisational strategies created for competitive and strategic value, and 
they also have significant transaction costs (e.g., Zajac and Olsen 1993). The examples 
presented by Zajac and Olsen (1993) are resources at risk and inter-firm coordination 
efforts (e.g., negotiation), which may be highly inefficient in terms of the transaction cost 
perspective.  
 




In explaining social power, the concept of social power is viewed as having three major 
theoretical orientations: field theory (Cartwright 1959; French and Snyder 1959), social-
exchange theory (Emerson 1962) and political science theory (Dahl 1957; Kornberg and 
Perry 1966). It is true that many scholars define power in various ways, and in general, it 
is broadly accepted that ‘A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something 
that B would not otherwise do’ (Dahl 1957). However, more importantly, power is 
conceptualised as a relationship between two parties. That is to say, a number of power 
theoreticians (Dahl 1959; Emerson 1962; Kornberg and Perry 1966; Wrong 1968) have 
emphasised the significance of managing power as a relationship instead of an attribute in 
itself.  
 
Studies of power in negotiation are typically based on the theory of power dependence 
(Gerhart and Rynes 1991; Mannix, Thompson and Bazerman 1989). Power-dependence 
theory states that ‘the power of A over B is equal to and based upon the dependence of B 
upon A’ (Emerson, 1962:32–33). Dependence, in turn, is based on two dimensions: (a) It is 
directly proportional to the value attributed to the outcome at stake and (b) it is inversely 
proportional to the availability of this outcome through alternative sources. Thus, given any 
two parties, Alpha and Beta, Alpha’s power is directly related to the degree to which Beta 
can receive greater benefit from the relationship with Alpha than Beta can get from 
alternative relationships. Similarly, Beta’s power is directly related to the degree to which 
Alpha can receive greater benefit from the relationship with Beta than Alpha can get from 
alternative relationships. 
 
Basically, this power dependence is a property of the relationship in balance if both parties 
perceive that they have equal power. However, it is unbalanced if one of the parties 
perceives itself as having more power, or if one party is dependent on the other, as in many 
cases of negotiation. Negotiators have power when they have ‘the ability to bring outcomes 
they desire’ or ‘the ability to get things done the way them to be done’ (Salancik and Pfeffer 
1977). It can be assumed that a party with power can entice another party to do what the 
counterpart otherwise would not do, thereby influencing the process of the negotiation 
(Dhal 1957; Kotter 1979). When two parties do not hold an equal position of power in a 
negotiation, the one with the higher relative power will tend to approach the negotiation 
more competitively than the other does. The party with greater power has the opportunity 
to exploit this advantage by demanding more concessions from the other party and yielding 
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fewer concessions of their own than would otherwise be the case (Boster and Kazoleas 
1995; Dwyer and Walker 1981; MaAlister et al. 1986; Pruitt 1981).  
 
Power-dependence theory (Blau 1964; Emerson 1962) provides a framework for 
conceptualising relative and total power. Brooks and Rose (2004) state that negotiation 
processes are influenced by power relations within the negotiation setting. If there is a big 
difference between two parties’ perceptions of the power situation, there will be no deal 
because a deal can only be made if this situation is acceptable to both parties (Ghauri and 
Usunier 2003). For instance, if one of the parties perceives more dependence, the other 
party is most likely to perceive more power. Most negotiators thus actively seek power, as 
it gives them an advantage over the more dependent party. In the meantime, power has been 
defined in different ways by different authors (Salancik and Pfeffer 1977; Emerson 1962). 
 
2.4.3 Conflict resolution theory 
 
Conflict is defined as “The perceived or/and actual incompatibility of values, expectations, 
processes, or outcomes between two or/and more parties over substantive or relational 
issues” (Ting-Toomey 1994, p. 360). Conflict can be either an individual or social approach 
Schellenberg 1996; Jensen-Campbell and Granziano (2005). According to Jensen-
Campbell and Granziano (2005), the interpersonal conflict stems from three apparently-
panhauman psychological dispositions: 1) people differ in their attitudes, beliefs, 
knowledge, and life experiences; 2) Such differences induce people to egocentric, and often 
to have difficulty perceiving the perspectives of others; and 3) People are generally 
motivated to protect and promote their own self-interests. However, conflict-resolution 
theory is mainly discussed as a social conflict instead of individual conflict, since groups 
of people compete their interests, identities, or attitues (Schellenberg 1996). Lewicki, Barry 
and Saunders (2006) proposed two levels of conflict-resolution theory as a micro approach 
in a country level, or macro approach in a global level (e.g., cross-border activities) through 
social exchange process in order to understand conflicts and resolve them. Therefore, the 
conflict-resolution perspective can be defined as a social conflict to reduce it for purposeful 
settlement if topic in dispute.  
 
Meanwhile, Conflict resolution is defined in abstract terms as behaviors aimed at resolving 
perceived incompatibilities (Boulding 1963; Thomas 1976). Yet, the particular method by 
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which a manager resolves incompatibilities may differ across cultures, since conflicts and 
misunderstandings are inevitable consequence of increasing intercultural interactions. Thus, 
the need to understand differences in how the peoples of the world approach resolving these 
conflicts is greater than ever before. (Peason and Stephan 1998). Therefore, managing 
conflict is critical for sustaining organizational efficiency and effectiveness (McCann and 
Galbraith 1981) especially between two foreign partners. Growth in multinational 
companies and international alliances (Kanter and Corn 1994), as well as increased 
diversity within a country’s workforce (Jackson, Stone, and Alvarez 1992), suggests that 
individuals from diverse backgrounds will be working together in organizations. An 
increase in diversity is often associated with an increase in conflict (e.g., Jehn, Northcraft, 
and Neale 1999). In other words, when two foreign partners negotiate in a joint project, 
buyer/seller relationship or any other business context, conflict inevitably arises (Habib 
1987). It may arise because of differences in the perceptions of the decision-making 
environment, or preferences for a particular action, behavioural styles and/or goals between 
parties (Fisher 1974).  Increased chances of conflict suggest that partners should be aware 
of the conflict management strategies used by colleagues or partners from other cultures so 
as to avoid misunderstanding their counterpart and further exacerbating the conflict 
(Tinsley 2001). Thus, how the foreign partners respond to conflict also depends on a 
number of factors, including the nature of the conflict, the cultural orientation of the 
individuals and the affiliation of the partners (Tse, Francis and Walls 1994). Also, in order 
for successful conflict resolution between two foreign partners, the knowledge of the 
similarities and differences between two cultures  
 
2.4.4 Socio-exchange theory 
 
The basic theoretical perspective underlying all hypotheses in international negotiation 
studies is drawn from social psychological theory (Rubin and Brown 1975; Sawyer and 
Guetzkow 1965; Thibaut and Kelley 1959) and exchange theory (Bagozzi 1978; Homans 
1974). Adler, Brahm and Graham’s (1992) three main constructs of the negotiation process, 
situational constraints and negotiator characteristics are considered as determinants of 
negotiation outcomes. In addition, many scholars have actually suggested that these 
constructs are based on both the social psychological and the exchange theory, since social 
psychology is one of the best-represented disciplines in negotiation research (Druckman 
1977; Pruitt 1981; Rubin and Brown 1975). While Gelfand and Dyer (2000) dispute the 
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difficulty in generalising negotiation theory, much research actually ignores the 
psychological processes such as information processing and the motives that are involved 
in negotiations, especially between two cultures. As such, we rarely understand about the 
psychology of negotiation in different cultures; there is a ‘black box’ that remains unopened 
in the area of culture and negotiation research. Therefore, substantial research is being 
undertaken in the negotiation-theory area that reviews negotiation generally from three 
different viewpoints, focusing on psychology (from a cognitive, social or behavioural 
psychology viewpoint), negotiation analysis (from a game-theoretic and decision analysis 
viewpoint) and game theory (from an economic viewpoint).  
 
According to Emerson (1976), social-exchange theory has emerged and has combined 
sociology and social psychology based on four key historical figures’ work: George 
Homans, John Thibaut, Harold Kelley and Peter Blau8. Social-exchange theory is based on 
social exchanges in economic terms and it suggests that an intervention involves the 
voluntary exchange of resources. Individuals, groups and organisations have resources they 
are willing to exchange for perceived benefits. In other words, through the social-exchange 
theory view, negotiation is essentially a social-exchange process, a human interaction 
involving the ideas of both parties that influence each other in a problem-solving manner 
to reach a win–win agreement in most cases (Bagozzi 1978; Ghauri 1983; McCall and 
Warrington 1984; Fang 1997). The negotiation between parties is thus cooperative rather 
than competitive and there is an attempt to maximise the benefits for everyone and maintain 
a positive relationship (Pruitt 1991).  
 
The study of negotiations in social psychology has considered two issues of research such 
as individual differences among negotiators and situational factors that facilitate or impede 
the negotiation process or outcome of the negotiation. For example, individual difference 
variables including demographic characteristics (e.g., gender and race) or personality (e.g., 
risk-taking tendencies, cognitive complexity, tolerance for ambiguity, Machiavellianism 
and self-esteem) have been proposed since the 1960s (Rubin and Brown 1975; Lewicki et 
al. 2006; Neale and Bazerman 1992). 
 
                                            
8 Homans (1958) identify and advance ‘Social behaviour as exchange’; Tibaut and Kelley 
(1959)’s compact conceptual scheme in ‘The social psychology of groups’; Blau (1964)’s 
‘Exchange and power’. 
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An article by Pennington (1968) was influential for the theory of social exchange and 
involved subjects that were salespeople and shoppers. Experiments were carried out in 
department stores where face-to-face social exchanges were observed. Mathews et al. 
(1972) studied the effect of perceived similarity or dissimilarity on sales interactions, using 
students in a prisoner’s dilemma game. Culture and communication have been key 
variables in the literature leading towards negotiation and social exchange. However, it is 
more useful to observe the socio-exchange theory as a theoretical standpoint and not as a 
strict theory as such (i.e., the point of approaching the subject). The complex nature of 
negotiation studies fuses many paradigms, and a cross-fertilisation of ideas exists within 
many disciplines, combining strategy and behavioural perspectives (Rao and Schmidt 
1998). This socio-exchange approach has taken the form of extensive case-study research 
and is one of, if not the most frequently used methods for conducting research on 
negotiation (Zartman 2005). Yet the balance of advantages and weaknesses inevitable in 
any method of analysis places case studies in the midst of a search for breadth and depth, 
for data and theory (case studies being acknowledged as subjective and situation-specific, 
as suggested by Kidder 1981).  
 
Much of the greater understanding of the negotiation process made available over the past 
four decades involves case studies (Druckman 2002) and largely experimental studies (for 
example, John Graham 1987 utilises simulations, while Ghauri 1983; Zartman 2005; and 
Crump 2006 utilise case studies) that have been used to generate conceptual and theoretical 
generalisations (Druckman 2002; Zartman 2005). There have also been ethnographic 
research methods that have provided insights into the way negotiations and dispute 
resolution occur (Friedman 2004). It was through the use of ethnographic methods that 
Walton and McKersie (1965) developed their insight that there are four dimensions to 
labour-management negotiations: integrative bargaining, distributive bargaining, 










Chapter3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES 
 
3.1 Understanding the nature of research  
 
Many view negotiation as a central aspect of organisational life being able to survive 
successfully. The growing complexities of work relationships, the increased reliance on 
teams to make decisions and the rise of new organisational forms have placed 
unprecedented pressure on managers to become effective negotiators. Thus, scholars and 
practitioners alike have focused on identifying mechanisms or determinants that can 
improve negotiator performance (Lewicki, Saunders and Minton 1999).  
 
3.2 Conceptual framework and hypothesis building 
 
3.2.1 Individual dimension 
 
All negotiators encounter the negotiating place from expansively various propensities or 
risk-taking tendencies, personalities, attitudes, motivations, experiences and perspectives 
based on their backgrounds, so that these individual differences of negotiators must have a 
substantial impact on the process and outcome of negotiation (Wall and Callister 1995). 
Thus, Rubin and Brown (1975) initially reviewed about 200 studies in an attempt to 
summarise the findings of this relationship between the fundamental traits of negotiators 
and the outcome of the negotiation based on extensive experiments. In addition, scholars 
have investigated several characteristics of the individual negotiators that have influenced 
the process of the coalition of negotiations (Money 1998), such as personality (Rubin and 
Brown 1975), working experience (Graham 1983), conflict-resolution orientation (Thomas 
1992), gender (Pinckley 1990) and Hofstede’s masculinity/femininity dimension. Even the 
individual tendency including cognitive features such as intelligence, mental flexibility, 
logical thinking patterns, the ability to control the opinions of others and keep the 
negotiation on track and self-interest have been suggested (Greenhalgh, Neslin and Gilkey 
1985). Especially, the hundreds of studies on individual differences in terms of both 
demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, race and age) and personality variables (e.g., 
Machiavellianism, authoritarianism, self-esteem, cognitive complexity and tolerance of 
ambiguity) have been suggested and broadly investigated (Rubin and Brown 1975; Neale 
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and Bazerman 1992; Lewicki et al. 2006). However, research on the gender effect in 
negotiation has failed in its attempt to find individual characteristics in negotiator behaviour 
through a lack of consistent support and a sceptical effect on the performance of negotiators 
(Thompson 1990; Lewicki et al. 2006).  
 
Among several studies that have attempted to identify personal characteristics that may 
distinguish between effective and ineffective factors on the joint outcome of negotiations 
as above, we have finally extracted the two significant variables of personality and the 
attractiveness of a negotiator. As in the review of Rubin and Brown (1975), when the 
interpersonal attraction which enhances negotiating outcomes is perceived, the negotiators 
will be more satisfied and will even make sacrifices (i.e., concessions) during negotiations 
(McGuire 1968). According to the personality theories, the personality that human 
behaviour is driven by and that humans are born with has been investigated as an 
influencing factor on the international negotiation process and outcomes, even between 




We are more easily influenced by those we like, as in the saying, ‘people buy people’, as 
any salesperson should know. If we like someone, we are more inclined to buy from or to 
cooperate with him or her. This emphasises how important the people themselves are and 
this is even discussed in the previous negotiation research. Graham et al. (1994) suggest 
that a strong relationship exists between interpersonal attraction and negotiator satisfaction 
across several cultural groups including Americans and Chinese. Rubin and Brown (1975) 
likewise conclude that, generally, interpersonal attraction enhances bargaining outcomes. 
Lewicki et al. (1994) specifically mention the causal relationship between interpersonal 
attraction and trust. Finally, Rempel et al. (1985) report connections between interpersonal 
attraction and trust again.  
 
The important construct is the attractiveness of the negotiator. Graham et al. (1988) have 
shown that a negotiator’s attractiveness positively influences the partner’s satisfaction in 
simulated negotiations, similar to Graham et al. (1994). Simons, Berkowitz and Moyer 
(1970:9) note that ‘the relationship between attraction to a source (like-dislike, friendly 
feelings, etc.) and attitude change has received scant attention’, although Rubin and Brown 
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(1975), in their review of the negotiation literature, conclude that interpersonal attraction 
generally enhances bargaining outcomes (Berscheid and Walster 1978; Bnton 1971; 
Morgan and Sawyer 1967; Swingle 1966). Moreover, some researchers mentioned the 
causal relationship between interpersonal attraction (i.e., love) and feelings of trust 
(Lewicki et al. 1994; Rempel et al. 1985). Therefore, to the extent that a person receives 
rewards from a relationship with a negotiator whom the counterpart perceives as attractive, 
that person will be more satisfied with the negotiation outcome. Broad support for the 
positive relationship between the negotiator’s attractiveness and the negotiation outcome 
or satisfaction have been found across cultural groups.  
 
It is also an interesting effect or the result of attraction between two parties. For instance, a 
bargaining partner’s satisfaction has been found to be positively related to the negotiator’s 
attractiveness for business people from France and Germany (Campbell et al. 1988), from 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the United States (Graham et al. 1988), and from Canada 
(Anglophones only) and Mexico (Adler et al. 1987). Moreover, McGuire (1968) explains 
that when people are attracted to each other they will even make sacrifices (i.e., concessions 
in a negotiation) to preserve the gratifying personal relationship. As a result, an individual 
negotiator may expect social rewards from a relationship with an attractive partner instead 
of economic rewards. To the extent that one receives rewards from a relationship with an 
attractive partner, the person will be more satisfied with the relationship and the negotiated 
agreement.  
 
Meanwhile, there is an argument about different ideas of attractiveness in the negotiation 
frame or process. For instance, it should be noted that interpersonal attraction might be 
conceived as an exogenous construct determined before negotiations begin, as a part of the 
combination of the negotiator’s characteristics. It may also be argued that attraction is a 
consequence of the negotiation, an outcome construct (Lee, Yang and Graham 2006). 
However, according to Lee, Yang and Graham (2006), attractiveness is considered as a 
process-related construct and as a focused process variable. This is consistent with the 
views of Evans (1963) and Zunin and Zunin (1972). In particular, Evans (1963) suggests 
that similarity between the negotiators leads to more favourable negotiation outcomes. 
Zunin and Zunin (1972) also suggest that during the first few minutes of a conversation, 
‘decisions’ are made about interpersonal attractiveness and about whether to continue the 
interaction. Interestingly, this perspective of attractiveness as a critical factor during face-




Hypothesis 1 stated, ‘Attractiveness has a positive effect on the cooperative negotiation 
process’ 
 
3.2.1.2 Personality  
 
In general, in more complex negotiations such as international M&As in which trade-offs 
among multiple issues are involved, and in which there is no abstract pay-off matrix 
favouring mutual cooperation, other individual differences may produce a negotiating 
advantage. Because of the complexity of real-world negotiations, it is necessary to measure 
a broad range of dimensions on which individuals can differ. However, those individual 
factors are often controlled and expressed by the individual’s basic personality.  
 
Psychologists articulate personality as ‘a collection of emotional, thought and behavioural 
patterns unique to a person that is consistent over time’. Although many investigators have 
proposed various theories of personality, no objectively testable model has emerged, 
especially in the negotiation context. Thus, the present study focuses on determining the 
influence of negotiators’ dispositional characteristics on the face-to-face negotiation 
process or on the outcomes of business negotiations, and this has been investigated by 
several researchers. It is true that the differences in individual characteristics among people 
have long been shown to influence the process or outcomes of negotiation (Lewicki et al. 
1994). For example, according to US diplomat Elliot Richardson in the five-year Law of 
the Sea Conference, the talks were influenced much more by the personalities of head 
delegates than by the economic power of the country that they represented (Graham and 
Sano 1989). In other words, as individual differences in negotiators can also be expected 
to affect the outcomes of negotiations, Rubin and Brown (1975) also summarise and 
attempt to synthesise an extensive experimental literature by using interpersonal 
orientation as a basic trait underlying individuals’ approaches to negotiation. Briefly, their 
interpersonal orientation dimension ‘distinguishes negotiators on the basis of their 
sensitivity and reactivity to variations in the other’s behaviour’ (1975:294). Rubin and 
Brown make a conclusive case for interpersonal orientation as a construct that is useful 
within a paradigm in which bargaining effectiveness is defined in terms of cooperation in 
simplified unattributed negotiations (Swap and Rubin 1983). Meanwhile, scholars have 




Firstly, based on Horney’s (1945) model of social orientation, in this construct, an 
individual’s predisposition consists of three dimensions of compliance, aggressiveness and 
detachment when relating to other individuals. The dimensions are assumed to be mutually 
exclusive such that when one is high on one of the three dimensions, it is unlikely to be 
characterised strongly by either of the other two (Cohen 1967). Among other distinctions, 
a compliant individual is concerned about the needs of others and will tend to be very 
sensitive and very generous. An aggressive individual strives for personal success and will 
tend to be manipulative of others. A detached individual desires maintaining a distance 
from others and tends to rely on self-sufficiency. Although empirical tests of CAD’s 
usefulness in a marketing context have provided mixed results (Kassarjian 1971; Noerager 
1979), Cohen (1967) argues that this personality variable potentially affects a wide range 
of decisions and behaviours within a negotiation. As such, the negotiators’ characteristics 
as CAD would be likely to have a similar influence on the negotiators’ approach and 
therefore on their behaviour within a negotiation.  
 
Secondly, the five-factor model, the most popular model, suggests that personality is 
hierarchically structured with five general and broad traits at the top of the hierarchy – 
extraversion, neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness and openness to experience. A 
growing body of literature suggests that the five-factor model also generalises to other 
cultures and languages, such as Russian (Digman and Shmelyov 1996; Shmelyov and 
Phkhil’ko 1993), Dutch (Hofstee, deRaad and Goldberg 1992), Japanese (Bond, Nakazato 
and Shiraishi 1975), German (Ostendorf 1990) and Tagalog (Church and Kratigbak 1989). 
Georges et al. (1998) suggest that the five-factor model in general may actually be a 
universal model of personality applicable across cultures and languages (Digman and 
Shmelyov 1996), even including the traits of positive and negative affectivity. Thirdly, 
another popular paradigm of research on the determinants of affective states, such as moods 
and emotions, has identified two general and independent personality traits, positive 
affectivity and negative affectivity, which predispose people to experience certain kinds of 
affective states over time and across situations (George 1996; Georges et al. 1998). Positive 
affectivity predisposes people to experience positive moods and emotions (Tellegen 1985). 
People high in positive affectivity tend to feel good about themselves, have a generalised 
sense of well-being and feel positively engaged in both achievement and interpersonal 
contexts such as feeling enthusiastic, active, peppy, strong and excited (Watson, Clark and 
Tellegen 1988; Watson and Pennebaker 1989; Tellegen 1982; 1985). In contrast, those with 
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high negative affectivities tend to be distressed by their own thoughts and by the actions of 
others and, more generally, to experience distress over time and across situations (George 
1996; Tellegen 1982; 1985; Watson and Clark 1984). The negative affective states that 
high-negative affectivity individuals are prone to, involve them having negative feelings, a 
sense of being non-pleasurably engaged, behaving and acting in ways that tend to promote 
negative affect, and having a generalised negative orientation, being nervous, scornful, 
distressed, hostile and fearful towards themselves and others (Tellegen 1982; 1985; Watson 
and Clark 1984; Watson et al. 1988; Watson and Tellegen 1985). However, positive and 
negative affectivity eventually correspond to the extraversion and neuroticism factors, 
respectively, in the robust and empirically supported five-factor model of personality 
(Church and Burke 1994; Digman 1990; McCrae 1989). 
 
Fourthly, while Adler, Graham and Gehrke (1987) found what the shared behaviours were 
that negotiators manifest in themselves during business negotiations in different countries, 
four other individual characteristics were considered in this study: generalised self-esteem 
and task-specific self-esteem with years of work experience and the percentage of work 
involving contact outside one’s firm. The operational measures of these variables and the 
hypothesised relationships with negotiation outcomes are identical to those in Graham 
(1983), although the four bargainer characteristics were found to be unrelated to negotiation 
outcomes for all four cultural groups in their study as a result. Fifthly, Yukl and Falbe (1991) 
suggest two skills that are likely to be sources of personal power or characteristics: 
persuasiveness and charisma. Research on leader traits has identified persuasiveness as one 
of the skills associated with managerial effectiveness and advancement (Yukl 1989a). 
Rational persuasion has been found to be an important influence technique (Kipnis, 
Schmidt and Wilkinson 1980; Yukl and Falbe 1990), and skill in making rational appeals 
helps to determine whether the appeals will be successful. Charisma involves the 
perception by others that a person is extraordinary and can be trusted to lead a group or 
organisation. Although the determinants of charisma are not very well understood, 
leadership theorists contend that charisma can be a source of great influence for managers 
to control their performance (Bass 1985; Conger and Kanungo, 1987; House 1977). Sixthly, 
the study of Machiavellianism suggests that people high in Machiavellianism behave more 
competitively and strategically than people low in Machiavellianism (Rubin and Brown 
1975). However, in terms of negotiated outcomes, Fry (1985) found that high 
Machiavellianism outperforms low Machiavellianism, whereas Greenhalgh and Neslin 




Among the paradigms of personality introduced above, we employed CAD, which was 
originally introduced into the marketing literature by Cohen (1967), to operate as the 
negotiators’ characteristics in this research. This category of personality is considerably 
similar to the one by Marston (1926) relating to dominant, interactive, steady and compliant 
characteristics9. Briefly, the different types of personality identified by Marston (1926) are 
dominance – people who are results oriented, direct and decisive; influence – people who 
are interactive, influencing and sociable; steadiness – people who are stable, steady and 
secure; and compliance – people who are compliant, correct and controlled. However, as 
Brooks and Rose (2004) mention, CAD would likely have a similar influence on the 
behaviour of the negotiators’ approach in a negotiation, and we attempt to employ this 
personality model for international negotiators in this international M&A negotiation 
context.  
 
A compliant individual has been defined as sensitive, generous and considerate towards 
others (Brooks and Rose 2004). According to the research of compliant personality based 
on the theory of William M. Marston, the compliant personality, which represents 17 
percent of the population, is task-oriented, systematic, analytical, detail-oriented, self-
sacrificing and serious. This type of individual can also sometimes be moody, negative, 
critical, revengeful and unsociable. They are prone to setting high standards and checking 
that everything is done right. They like to comply with the rules and regulations. On the 
other hand, an aggressive individual who strives for personal success and prefers to be 
manipulative of others, or a detached individual who desires maintaining a distance from 
others and relies on self-sufficiency, may not be appropriate as international negotiators in 
cooperative face-to-face negotiation processes. Although the overall legacy of research on 
the relationship between personality and negotiation is inconsistent and confusing (Pruitt 
and Carnevale 1993), Barry and Friedman (1998) found that certain personality traits either 
enhanced or inhibited a negotiator’s ability to achieve either collaborative or competitive 
                                            
9 Initially, Carl Gustav Jung introduced 4 different types of psychological types of personality in 
1921 such as Thinking, Feeling, Sensation and Intuition, that affects a person’s behaviour. Then, 
William M. Marston invented the Dominance, Influence, Steadiness and Compliance (DISC) 
personality paradigm in 1926, which has provided lots of practical benefits to understand their 
precious asset such as their ‘people’ or employers in organizations. The terminology has been 
slightly modified in many introduction of this model. For example, ‘dominant, interactive, steady 
and compliant’ or ‘dominant, social, measured and compliant’ 
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objectives. Thus, we propose three hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 2a stated, ‘Negotiators’ aggressive personality has a negative effect on the 
cooperative negotiation process’  
Hypothesis 2b stated, ‘Negotiators’ compliant personality has a positive effect on the 
cooperative negotiation process’  
Hypothesis 2c stated, ‘Negotiators’ detached personality has a negative effect on the 
cooperative negotiation process’ 
 
 
3.2.2 Strategic dimension 
 
To build a detailed understanding of the current idea of negotiators through a particular 
type of strategy and decision-making process used during the negotiation is extremely 
important (Ghauri and Usunier 2003). Thus, many researchers have theoretically explored 
and set up structured strategic methods in various ways, since negotiator behaviour is 
originally tactical and strategic (Rao and Schmidt 1998).  
 
Adair et al. (2004) introduce the manner of communication and power as a strategy that is 
managed differently across cultures, while Ganesan (1993) defined a negotiation strategy 
as the interaction pattern controlled by both parties beyond the cultural conflicts, suggesting 
five types of strategy: a competing or aggressive strategy, a collaborating or problem-
solving strategy, a compromising strategy, an avoiding strategy and an accommodating 
strategy.  
 
In complex international negotiations, interest in studying the effects of cross-cultural 
differences on negotiation style and strategy is increasing (Tse, Francis and Walls 1994; 
Tung 1984). However, in this research, the persuasion employed in the cultural behaviour 
of the negotiators depending on the culture that they belong to is also defined as a strategic 
action during face-to-face negotiations. Importantly, negotiators are surrounded by not only 
a national culture, but also by an organisational or professional culture (Helmreich and 
Merritt 2001; Bloor and Dawson 1994), which moulds their behaviour so that it can be 
controlled during negotiations. For instance, Helmreich and Merritt (2001) introduce a 
complex cultural framework of national, organisational and professional attitudes and value 
within which groups and individuals function. Therefore, here we proposed the 
parsimonious meta-categories of tactical strategy (i.e., hard, soft and rational), which even 
 73 
 




Negotiator behaviour is tactical. Alliance negotiators attempt to achieve their firms’ goals 
by gaining their counterparts’ reconciliation through using influencing tactical strategies. 
An array of behavioural tactics is used during negotiations to achieve the negotiators’ 
general performance such as through a cooperative or competitive process. Negotiator 
influence tactics have been studied in varied contexts, such as simulations, interpersonal 
bargaining within firms, international business and marketing channels (Alder and Graham 
1989; Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Deluga 1991; Kipnis and Schmidt 1983; Roering 1977; 
Rubin and Brown 1975). Kipnis et al. (1980), with subsequent extensions by Kipnis and 
Schmidt (1983) and Yukl and Tracey (1992), focus on identifying and categorising the 
tactics commonly used by managers when attempting to get others to comply with a request. 
Taken together, these programs of research basically identify nine dimensions of influence 
– pressure, legitimation, exchange, coalition, ingratiation, rational persuasion, inspirational 
appeal, consultation and personal appeal, as shown in Table 3.1. This describes and 
considers how one’s power relationship with others can influence the likelihood that these 
different influence tactics will be used, leading to a distinguished atmosphere of negotiation. 
In particular, in Yukl and Falbe (1990), two studies were conducted to replicate and extend 
previous exploratory research by Kipnis, Schmidt and Wilkinson (1980) on influence 
tactics and objectives in organisations. They developed a new questionnaire including 
measures of important influence tactics and objectives omitted in the earlier research. The 
differences in downward, lateral and upward influence attempts were replicated and the 
direction of influence had a stronger effect on influence objectives than on influence tactics 
in that study case. Considering some differences due to data sources and the direction of 
influence, the relative frequency of use for the eight influence tactics was remarkably 
similar across conditions, as Table 3.1 again shows. However, Kipnis and Schmidt’s (1985) 
classification of influence tactics into the three meta-categories of hard, soft and rational 
provides a parsimonious classification for describing the negotiator’s influence tactics, 
which is more suitable for this study. Their classification was based on earlier inductive 
classification research (Kipnis, Schmidt and Wilkinson, 1980) and has been validated in a 




As Kipnis (1976) demonstrated, individuals employ tactics according to their subjective 
assessment of the probability of the influence target complying. Thus, negotiators using 
hard tactics engage in threats, demands and sanctions, believing that their counterparts face 
high costs for non-compliance and, hence, that they will comply with their demands 
(Frazier and Summers 1984; Kipnis 1976; Kipnis and Schmidt 1988; Kipnis 1984). 
Negotiators may set deadlines, demand concessions, act in an assertive or forceful manner 
and threaten to terminate negotiations. In contrast, negotiators using soft tactics emphasise 
friendliness, believing that their counterparts have the option of non-compliance with little 
cost. Gaining compliance using soft tactics is based on creating interpersonal liking and on 
building a sense of obligation and reciprocity (Kipnis and Schmidt 1988), including the use 
of personal or emotional appeals. Furthermore, indirect tactics, such as mobilising the 
support of suppliers or trade unions, are also soft tactics. However, international M&A 
negotiators are intend to employ rational influence tactics use logic, data and information 
in attempting to gain reconciliation from their counterparts (Kipnis and Schmidt 1983; Ueh 
1986). Typically, data and logic are used to support non-emotional arguments involving the 
process of explaining and discussing. As with soft tactics, expected positive agreement is 
not taken for granted. Meanwhile, Standifird, Pons and Moshavi (2008) support the 
classification as soft, rational and strong in nature for an instructors’ use of influence tactics 
and its impact on student satisfaction. They find that student satisfaction is positively 
influenced by the use of soft and rational tactics, and is uninfluenced by the use of strong 
tactics.  
 
Table3. 1 Category of influence tactics 
 
Tactic Behaviour 
Pressure The person uses demands, threats, or intimidation to convince others to 
comply with a request or to support a proposal (similar to assertiveness) 
Legitimating The person seeks to persuade others that the request is something they 
should comply with given their situation or position 
Exchange The person makes explicit or implicit a promise that others will receive 
rewards or tangible benefits if they comply with a request, or reminds others 
of a favour that should be reciprocated 
Coalition The person seeks the aid of others to persuade them to do something or uses 
the support of others as an argument for them to agree 
Ingratiating The person seeks to get others in a good mood or to think favourably of 





The person uses logical arguments and factual evidence to persuade others 
that a proposal or request is viable and likely to result in task objectives 
Inspirational 
Appeals 
The person makes an emotional request or proposal that arouses enthusiasm 
by appealing to others’ values and ideals, or by increasing their confidence 
that they can succeed 
Consultation The person seeks others’ participation in making a decision or planning how 
to implement a proposed policy, strategy or change 
Personal Appeals The person seeks others’ compliance to their request by asking a “special 
favour for them,” or by relying on interpersonal relationships to influence 
their behaviour. 
Source: Yukl (1998), Yukl and Falbe (1990) 
 
As a result, the parsimonious classification of influence tactics into three categories of hard, 
rational and soft by Kipnis and Schmidt (1985) was employed for this research.  
 
Hypothesis 3a stated, ‘Soft tactics have a negative effect on the cooperative negotiation 
process’  
Hypothesis 3b stated, ‘Rational tactics have a positive effect on the cooperative 
negotiation process’  
Hypothesis 3c stated, ‘Hard tactics have a negative effect on the cooperative negotiation 
process’ 
 
3.2.3 Contextual dimension 
 
When examining the larger picture, Ghauri and Usunier (2003) suggest that a fundamental 
element of negotiations is the atmosphere surrounding the talks. They define atmosphere 
as ‘the perceived “milieu” around the interaction, how the parties regard each other’s 
behaviour, and the properties of the process’ (6). They also make the point that the 
atmosphere and the negotiation process ‘affect each other through interaction at each stage’. 
Their notion of atmosphere is conceptually analogous to Amir’s (1969) social climate and 
Baron’s (1990) environment. All these authors emphasise that the atmosphere often affects 
negotiation processes, including the tension that is felt (Lee, Yang and Graham 2006).  
 
According to Brooks and Rose (2004), as the time for completing a negotiation becomes 
more pressing, the bargainers will want to resolve the negotiation issues more quickly, 
particularly the issues that are perceived to be of less significance. During such time 
pressures, a negotiator will be willing to become more collaborative or cooperative if they 
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believe that such an approach would heighten the chances of concluding the bargaining 
process within the impending deadline (Lewicki and Litterer 1985). When one negotiating 
party faces much tougher time pressures than the other party, an imbalance of relative 
power can also occur if both negotiating parties understand the disadvantaged party’s time 
pressure.  
 
According to Ang and Teo (1997), the desire to reach an agreement and the possibility of 
adapting to the counterpart’s procedures in negotiation are influenced by the level of 
similarity in the time-processing orientation, among other factors. Conflict generated by 
different time systems hinders the recognition of the possibilities and values of future 
business. This negative atmosphere has an impact on strategy and, in particular, on 
negotiation behaviour choice. Competitive behaviour is more likely to be adopted in order 
to achieve an agreement in a party’s own interests, thereby destroying any possibility of 
building a mutual understanding and a relationship of trust.  
 
3.2.3.1 Time pressure 
 
A common feature of negotiation is time pressure, defined as a negotiator’s desire to end 
the negotiation quickly (Pruitt 1981). The study of Carnevale and Lawler (1986) was 
designed to examine the influence of time pressure on the process or outcome of negotiation. 
Several conditions may generate the experience of time pressure as the closeness of a 
perceived deadline or as a specific amount of time available to negotiate. A sense of time 
pressure is also generated by the costs of continued negotiation, such as time lost from other 
pursuits or when the goods being negotiated are deteriorating. For instance, fruit/fish 
beginning of spoil or the continuation of an unpleasant situation such as a war or strike. In 
the real world, virtually all negotiations involve some element of time pressure, and to some 
extent, all negotiations involve time away from other pursuits, and time pressure almost 
always increases as negotiations proceed, especially as negotiators become fatigued or 
frustrated. Thus, according to previous studies, this pressure from some fixed or ambiguous 
deadline may influence the processes or the outcomes of negotiation; Carnevale and Lawler 
(1986) examined the influence of time pressure on the process and outcome of negotiation, 
focusing on many factors that lead negotiators to experience time pressure. Some studies 
also suggest that time pressure affects the formation of intentions and attitudes and, 
consequently, the behaviour displayed by the negotiating parties (George, Jones and 
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Gonzalez 1998; Thomas 1992).  
 
Moreover, few empirical studies analyse these relationships between them. In sum, there 
are two main bodies of literature that can be distinguished between depending on whether 
time pressure is thought to have a positive or negative effect on negotiation behaviour 
choice in terms of cooperativeness or competitiveness between two parties during the actual 
negotiations. Many researchers suggest that time pressure increases the level of 
cooperativeness of negotiators in that it facilitates concession making (Pruitt 1981; Rubin 
and Brown 1975). Brookmire and Sistrunk (1980) revealed how time pressure produced 
more contract settlements in high time-pressure situations than in low time-pressure 
situations. Lewicki and Litterer (1985) simply advocated that deadlines soften demands, 
increase the likelihood of concessions, cause negotiators to move faster to their positions 
and protect the negotiators’ image by providing an external justification for ‘softer’ 
concessionary behaviour. It is argued that time pressure may motivate cooperative 
behaviour and foster agreements by increasing communication and collaboration to reach 
an agreement. In the same vein as this stream, Druckman (1971) concurs that agreements 
are less likely when the opponent is competitive, but argues that as deadlines and the time 
for agreement close in, cooperation is increased. Similarly, Smith et al. (1982) propose that 
unlike under low time pressure, under high time pressure negotiators mismatch their 
opponent’s offers in general. In other words, according to the first stream, under time 
pressure, negotiators make more concessions, reduce their aspirations and display a 
cooperative atmosphere in order to reach an agreement during the face-to-face negotiation 
(Cohen 1980; Robin and Brown 1975). During such time pressures, a negotiator will be 
willing to become more collaborative or cooperative if they believe that such an approach 
would heighten the chances of concluding the bargaining process within the impending 
deadline (Lewicki and Litterer 1985). 
 
On the other hand, the second body of work that focuses on the negative effect of time 
pressure on negotiation is also contentious. Basically, since time pressure hinders reflection, 
basic information collection and option researching (Adler 1997; Maron and VanBremen 
1999; Stuhlmacher and Champagne 2000; Walton and McKersie 1965), even reaching a 
mutual understanding is difficult (Maron and VanBremen 1999) and this is likely to cause 
errors in interpretation (Bazerman and Neale 1983). In other words, the lower the time 
pressure, the higher the possibility of reaching a mutual understanding because the parties 
tend to explore the other’s interests, resources and options more (Adler 1997; Beatty 1994; 
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Stuhlmacher and Champagne 2000), thereby reducing any cognitive mistakes (Pinkley and 
Northcraft 1994). Similarly, Walton and McKersie (1965) highlighted the fact that high 
time pressure inhibits the need to reach integrative agreements. Negotiation acceleration 
under time pressure makes it difficult to establish effective communicative interaction 
because of the treatment of fewer key issues and less information exchange. Esser (1989), 
in particular, argued that time pressure for an agreement decreases integrativeness between 
two parties and places the focus on distributive settlements for conflict resolution. 
Increased pressure has been found to result in less ambitious goals (Pruitt and Drews 1969). 
More specifically, Yukl et al.’s (1976) report shows that negotiators reached agreement 
sooner when there was high time pressure than when there was low time pressure (8.3 
minutes versus 17.4 minutes), made fewer offers when there was high time pressure (11.6 
versus 17.9) and reached poorer joint outcomes when there was high time pressure (95.8 
versus 107.8, where 120 was the maximum possible and where failure to reach agreement 
was 0). In addition, 65% of the dyads under low time pressure disclosed their true issue 
priorities, whereas only 35% did so when there was high time pressure. These findings led 
Yukl et al. to conclude that time pressure interrupts integrative bargaining processes, and 
chiefly the processes of systematic concession making (proposing many offers) and a 
problem-solving orientation (exchanging truthful information). This result is the same as 
Walton and McKersie’s (1965) finding. They argue that time pressure is likely to inhibit 
joint problem solving and, specifically, the search for integrative agreements. An 
integrative agreement is one that reconciles the parties’ divergent interests and provides 
them with high joint benefit (Follett 1940). ‘Joint benefit’ refers to the collective gain of 
the parties in the final agreement. It seems reasonable to suppose that integrative 
agreements require more time to develop, and that high time pressure interferes with their 
development. In short, according to Ghauri (2003), time pressure influences not only the 
atmosphere but also the process as a whole as it has a negative impact on the way 
negotiation parties communicate with each other (Saorin-Iborra 2008). Thus, we clearly 
suggest a hypothesis as outlined below.  
 
Hypothesis 4 stated, ‘High time pressure has a negative effect on the cooperative 
negotiation process’  
 
3.2.3.2 Relative power  
 
One factor that is widely acknowledged to affect such performance is the power perceived 
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between the parties (Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Fisher and Ury 1981). A negotiator’s 
power is critical for performance because it can determine the allocation of resources in an 
agreement (Kim 1997; Mannix 1993a, 1993b; Pinkley, Neale and Bennett 1994). The 
greater one’s power is relative to the power of others, the more resources one is able to 
claim to be cooperative to gain a better outcome from the negotiation. Managers or 
negotiators also use power to achieve both concessions with routine demands and a 
commitment to unusual requests initiatively requiring extra effort from the counterpart. 
Thus, the negotiation literature is replete with recommendations to improve one’s power 
position (Thompson 2005; Fisher and Ury 1981). Moreover, scholars in management 
recognise that power and its influence are important for understanding organisational 
behaviour and even managerial effectiveness (Mintzberg 1983; Pfeffer 1981; Yukl 1989a; 
1989b). Most research on the implications of power for managerial effectiveness or 
organisational behaviour has attempted to associate effectiveness or behaviour with the 
different power sources used by a manager or negotiator.  
 
The concepts of power have received substantial attention in negotiation research on 
organisational behaviour and management and have been referred to as relative power or 
power dependence (Zartman 1978; Bazerman and Neale 1983; 1992; Heiba 1984; Phatak 
and Habib 1996; Ghauri 1983; 1996; McCall and Warrington 1984; Tung 1998; Weiss 1993; 
Morgan 1988; Rahim 1988). Power exists where one party has the potential to influence 
another (Dahl 1957) and influence is the active exercise of power (Mowday 1978). As a 
basic study of power between students and instructors, Standifird, Pons and Moshavi (2008) 
attempted to understand the power bases from which an individual instructor is able to pull 
in order to exercise influence over the satisfaction of students in the classroom. 
 
Although power sources can be conceptualised in a variety of ways, and are widely 
acknowledged as affecting negotiator performance, few efforts have been made to integrate 
the most prominent theories of power into a cohesive framework that can account for the 
results from a broad set of negotiation-related research (Kim, Pinkley and Frangale 2005). 
Most power conceptions are founded on Weber’s (1974) classic definition of power as the 
possibility of a person being able to carry out his or her own intention despite conflict. The 
majority of theorists who have written about power would convey their agreement on this 
broad definition by Weber (1974) (Bacharach and Lawler, 1980). However, there are many 
subtle differences among the various perspectives. Arguably, the most commonly 
referenced appraisals of power are (1) French and Raven’s (1959) five bases of power; (2) 
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Emerson (1962); (3) El-Ansary and Stern (1972); and (4) BATNA (Best Alternative to a 
Negotiated Agreement). Many scholars have reviewed the major characteristics of these 
frameworks.  
  
The popular conceptualisation of power is French and Raven’s (1959) taxonomy, which 
includes legitimate, reward, coercive, expert and referent power (see Table 3.2). This is 
probably the most dominant classification scheme for understanding the bases of power. 
Specifically, they argue that A’s power over B is determined by (1) A’s ability to provide 
benefits to B (reward power); (2) A’s ability to punish B if B does not comply with A’s 
wishes (coercive power); (3) A’s possession of special knowledge or expertise (expert 
power); (4) A’s legitimate right to prescribe behaviour for B (legitimate power); and (5) the 
extent to which B identifies with A (referent power). Moreover, other scholars have 
distinguished between these bases of power, which determine one’s ability to manipulate 
the behaviour of others and even the performance of the negotiation from the sources of 
power (Bacharach and Lawler 1980). The classical piece on the bases of social power 
identified the bases as follows: reward power exists as a result of the perception that the 
influencer has an ability to provide a reward for desired behaviour; coercive power is based 
on the perception that the influencer has an ability to punish in the absence of desired 
behaviour; legitimate power emerges from the belief that the influencer has a legitimate 
right to prescribe and control behaviour; referent power exists as a result of an interpersonal 
attraction to and identification with an influencer; and expert power comes from the 
perception that the influencer has superior expertise and specialised knowledge in a specific 
area (Rahim et al. 2001). For example, in the sales manager–salesperson relationship, a 
salesperson may comply with the manager for one or some combination of the following 
reasons: (1) as a superior, the sales manager has authority (legitimate power) to demand a 
change in the salesperson’s behaviour; (2) the salesperson recognises the manager’s special 
knowledge and skills (expert power); or (3) the salesperson likes the sales manager 
(referent power) and wants to maintain a favourable relationship with him/her.  
 
However, as research on the construct validity of the power categories in French and 
Raven’s taxonomy is very limited but mostly positive (Podsakoff and Schriesheim 1985), 
researchers then identified additional sources of power or simply merged sources of power 
that are likely to be important and plausible because the taxonomy from French and Raven 
(1959) was formulated for the three decades prior to 1959 in a specified context (Yukl and 
Falbe 1991). Firstly, an additional source of power that has been recognised in the 
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theoretical literature for a long time is the possession of information (Mechanic 1962; 
Raven 1974). Then, Raven’s (1974) later versions of the five typologies of power also 
added information power (i.e., knowledge regarding the inner workings of the organisation 
or the relationship between the organisation and the environment) as a sixth base of power. 
As suggested by Rahim, Antonioni and Psenicka (2001), there have also been several 
attempts to expand the French and Ravan (1959) framework by including additional factors 
such as information power, which involve both access to information and control over its 
distribution. Although the possession of information is often mentioned as a source of 
power, there has been little empirical research on information power; one outstanding 
exception is the longitudinal study by Pettigrew (1972). Secondly, as a simply merged 
source of power is position and personal power. In other words, each of the five power 
sources proposed by French and Raven (1959) can sometimes be viewed as components of 
a broader category of position or personal power relationships between an actor and the 
target of the influence attempts (Wexley and Yukl 1977). Rahim et al. (2001) also found 
support for a two-category classification scheme and referred to the two categories of 
influence as position and personal power. Consistent with previous findings, they found 
that coercive, reward and legitimate power represent one cluster of influence identified as 
position power, while expert and referent power represent the second cluster of influence 
identified as personal power. However, a simple two-factor taxonomy of position power 
versus personal power has been used in the organisation behaviour literature in a limited 
study (Bass, 1960), which has not been empirically supported in the power and negotiation 
research (Yukl and Falbe 1991).  
 
Another outstanding scholar in power theory, Emerson (1972), anticipated power as 
emanating from exchange relationships when one actor has the ability to induce a cost for 
the other. He proposed that power stems from the dependence of one actor on another. An 
advantage or imbalance of power emerges when one party is more dependent than the other 
is on the relationship (Cook 1977). According to him, ‘The power of A over B is equal to 
and based upon the dependence of B upon A’ (1962:32–33). More specifically, dependence, 
in turn, is based on two dimensions: (1) it is directly proportional to the value attributed to 
the outcome at stake and (2) it is inversely proportional to the availability of this outcome 
through alternative sources. Thus, A’s power over B is directly related to the degree to 
which B is dependent on A (i.e., the extent to which B receives greater benefit from the 
relationship with A than B can get from alternative relationships). Similarly, B’s power over 
A depends on the degree to which A receives greater benefit from the relationship with B 
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than A can get from alternative relationships. Furthermore, because this framework 
considers power to be non-zero sum in nature, an increase in A’s power does not necessarily 
decrease B’s power, and vice versa. Each party’s power is independently determined by the 
other’s dependence. Thus, power dependence distinguishes relative power from the total 
power (i.e., the sum of each party’s power) in the relationship (Lawler and Bacharach 1987).  
 
Along the same lines, El-Ansary and Stern (1972) defined relative power in terms of the 
extent of one negotiator’s ability to influence the decision of the other party. In any case, 
power is the ability of one party to influence another counterpart in a certain way (Shaw 
1976). Thus, several researchers have studied the effect of the relative power of 
organisations involved in a negotiation (Rubin and Brown 1975). Moreover, the majority 
of international business-negotiation research has considered the concepts and elements of 
power as an important factor within the negotiation process (Ghauri and Usunier 2003; 
Ghauri 1996), which has also been studied extensively by social psychologists in relation 
to negotiations (e.g., Rubin and Brown 1975; Putnam 1990; Pfeffer 1992). Cauvsgil and 
Ghauri (2002), Kotter (1979) and Pfeffer (1992) pointed out that a power relation is a basic 
characteristic of all international negotiation processes, and stated that the ability to control 
this relationship is linked to the perceived power of both parties (i.e., relative power). It is 
closely connected with the actual power relation, which is affected by the value of their 
relationship to the partners and their available alternatives as well.  
 
Therefore, according to the previous research, the need for and use of power have been a 
major theme in social psychology (French and Raven 1959; Raven and Kruglanski 1970), 
marketing (Kale 1986; 1989), leadership (Tjosvold 1989) and in other areas such as all 
international negotiations or businesses (Rubin and Brown 1975). Interestingly, in terms of 
the effectiveness and cooperativeness between two parties during the negotiation, the 
relative power or power symmetry in a negotiation is still controversial. Firstly, regarding 
the effectiveness of gaining profit, as they considered its impact in the negotiator–opponent 
dyad, Rubin and Brown (1975) first proposed that equal power between the two negotiators 
tends to result in more effective bargaining than unequal power does. In reality, powerful 
opponents exploit their strategic advantage so that their power is useful to them, but not 
necessarily damaging to the negotiators. Dwyer (1984), in a simulated consumer 
negotiation, found that powerful opponents did earn more. Specifically, they note that equal 
power negotiators and opponents were effective in that they negotiated final agreements 
near the equal profit point. Secondly, regarding cooperativeness, Wolfe and Mcginn (2005) 
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explored the effect of relative power within a negotiation on both the distribution of 
resources and the integrativeness of the outcomes. Empirical evidence on the effects of 
power asymmetries on the integrativeness of negotiated agreements is actually mixed. 
Some studies confirm the above intuition that equal (relative to unequal) power leads to 
greater integrativeness (Mannix and Neale 1993; McAlister, Bazerman and Fader 1986). 
Other studies find equal power is associated with relatively lower integrativeness (Sondak 
and Baserman 1991), and yet other research finds no effects for power symmetry on 
integrativeness (Pinkley, Neale and Bennett 1994). At the dyadic level of analysis, each 
particular agreement should be integrative so that the interests of the two parties are 
reconciled to create high joint gain (Pruitt 1981; 1983), which means the integrativeness of 
the negotiation, as we see in Lax and Sebenius (1987).10 In particular, according to Sondak 
and Bazerman (1991), he posits that when the power in the alternatives is asymmetrical, 
the disadvantaged party will search for an integrative outcome and agreement in general. 
Moreover, when the two parties have equal power and equally attractive alternatives, joint 
outcomes or cooperativeness is less than when relative power dependence exists between 
the counterparts. Several researchers have argued about the relationship between the power 
position and the cooperative or competitive outcome of a negotiation in the unequal power 
situation. For instance, Fiske (1993) argues that low-power individuals behave in a more 
cooperative and dependent fashion than do high-power individuals. Kramer (1994) disputes 
that high-power persons are more likely to be distrusting and overly pessimistic regarding 
the actions and intentions of others than are low-power persons. Keltner, Gruenfeld and 
Anderson (2003) argue that when individuals are in positions of power, they are more likely 
to seek the attainment of goals actively, whereas individuals in positions lacking in power 
tend to focus their attention and actions in a manner that seeks to avoid punishment. 
Consistent with this finding, Keltner et al. (1998) videotaped high- and low-power persons 
as they teased others and found that low-power persons teased in more pro-social ways than 
high-power persons did. In particular, low-power persons were more likely to tease in such 
a manner that reduced face threat to the teased individual relative to high-power persons.  
 
Contrarily, when individuals have an independent self-construal, they use power to promote 
their own goals and when individuals have and interdependent self-construal, they use 
power to promote others’ goals (Chen and Welland 2002). Additionally, in terms of a direct 
                                            
10 Lax and Sebenius (1987) argue that using total joint outcome as a measure of integrativenss 
confounds notions of efficiency and equity. 
 84 
 
linkage between power and performance, if there is the motivation to maintain the 
relationship, a high-power negotiator might be expected to use their power even to promote 
joint outcomes to maximise individual outcomes as well (Staw and Kramer 2005). 
Meanwhile, in real-world negotiations, equal power based on the options and alternatives 
hardly ever happens, especially in a very complicated international M&A negotiation. Thus, 
we assume when the relative power or power dependence exists with the intention to 
continue the relationship in the future, the atmosphere of negotiation during the face-to-
face negotiation will be more cooperative to increase and maximise both individual and 
joint profit (Staw and Kramer 2005), as hypothesised below.  
 
Hypothesis 5a stated, ‘Relative legitimate power has a positive effect on the cooperative 
negotiation process’  
Hypothesis 5b stated, ‘Relative reputational power has a positive effect on the cooperative 
negotiation process’  
Hypothesis 5c stated, ‘Relative informational power has a positive effect on the 
cooperative negotiation process’ 
  
Table3. 2 French and Raven's (1959) Typology of power bases 
 
French and Raven’s (1959) Typology of Power Bases  
Power Base  Description 
Reward Power - Reward power is based on the perception by one member of the 
relationship that another member has the capacity to provide rewards.  
- A’s power over B is a function of how much B can be rewarded and 
the extent to which B believes that A controls these rewards. 
Coercive Power - Coercive power is based upon the perception by a person in a 
relationship that another person has the capacity to remove rewards or 
administer punishments. The source of coercive power stems from a 
situational advantage of one person over another.  
- A’s power over B is a function of how much B can be punished by B 
and the extent to which B believes that this punishment can be avoided 
if B complies with A’s wishes.  
Expert Power - Expert power is based on the perception that a person in the power 
relationship has valuable knowledge, information, or skills in a 
relevant area. Expertise is a source of influence that must emanate from 
the participant in a relationship and cannot be delegated by a third 
party.  
- A’s power over B is a function of B’s perception that A possesses some 
special knowledge or expertise.  
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Legitimate Power - - Legitimate power is based upon the perception that one person has 
the right to influence and that other members in the relationship have 
and obligation to yield to this influence. A primary source of legitimate 
power is the societal and institutional acceptance of the roles played by 
the participants in a power relationship. The strength of this base is 
jointly determined by the degree of endorsement and the importance 
of the endorser.  
- - A’s power over B is a function of how much B believes that A has the 
lawful authority to influence B. 
Referent Power - Referent power is based on the perceived attraction of members in a 
relationship to one another. The source of this power may arise from 
friendship, identification with a successful model, or feelings of shared 
identity. Studies in marketing suggest that perceived similarities in 
personal goals, interests, or values are sources that increase the 
effectiveness of this power base.  
- A’s power over B is a function of how attracted B is to A and, thus, 
how much A can influence B’s feelings of personal acceptance, 
approval, and self-esteem. 
Source: French and Raven’s (1959); Kim, Pinkley and Fragale (2005) 
 
3.2.4 The integrative bargaining process  
 
We describe and introduce the integrative-distributive approach (e.g., cooperative-
competitive and problem-solving approach) above as a part of the outcome variables 
proposed in the previous research. This continuum is proposed as a social psychological 
perspective outside of the economic measures. These two approaches or continuums (i.e., 
cooperative-competitive or integrative-distributive) have become intrinsic to international 
business negotiations, corresponding to the negotiators’ behaviours during the negotiation 
process (McCall and Warrington 1984). Especially, the competitive or distributive 
approach is utilised by negotiators to pursue personal goals by convincing their 
counterparts to concede to demands. However, it is recognised that competitiveness in 
negotiation is not always negative. For instance, some scholars describe a negative picture 
of competition with negative outcomes and it being ‘illegal, unethical and unpleasant’ 
(Putnam 1990). In a way, competition is one of the critical facets for a functioning capitalist 
society and for the success of firms in the marketing literature. In addition, some scholars 
suggest that not to compete would indicate cooperation as another alternative and that 
cooperation itself may contain implicit elements of competition in general (Fisher and Ury 
1981; Fang 1997) .  
 
The integrative analysis or approach has been considered as a behavioural analysis, which 
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presumes a general understanding of the negotiation process. That is, the integrative 
approach seems to perceive negotiation as a process-oriented activity performed through 
stages where the outcome is explained by the performance of behaviours identified as 
specifically appropriate to each successive stage (Druckman 1986; Gulliver 1979; Saunders 
1985; Zartman and Berman 1982). Rather than considering a process that flows from fixed 
points of discrepancy to a convergent point, the integrative approach emphasises the 
inaccuracy of parties’ interests, since the integrative approach underlines the need to 
manage conceptualisations of the problem into a mutually satisfactory positive outcome. 
Thus, in order to extend the concept of the negotiation process during the initial stage of 
negotiation, the integrative approach not only allows greater positive manipulations to 
occur (Fisher and Ury 1981), but also leads to the convergence of the practitioners’ 
understanding of negotiation by increasing the attention placed on the pre-negotiation stage 
of the process (Bendahmane and McDonald 1984; 1986), heavily focusing on the mutual 
benefit to be gained in the agreement or outcome.  
 
Meanwhile, it has previously been shown that the cooperative approach – referring to 
cooperativeness or a problem-solving approach or behaviour – has a positive relationship 
with the joint outcome in a negotiation. There are two streams of thought: win–win and 
win–lose negotiations. The win–win frame of negotiation refers to a situation in which both 
parties perceive or feel that they have won and that the other party has lost, as a win–win 
frame is not merely about parties negotiating; win–lose competition tactics also have a part 
to play in creating the ultimate cooperative atmosphere.  
 
However, joint problem-solving is recognised as being hard to achieve, and the term 
BATNA has been popular in negotiation management, as opposed to within academia, as 
noted by Fisher and Ury (1981; Weiss 2004). The BATNA is an ideal and practical term 
that may protect negotiators both from accepting suggestions that are unfavourable, and 
from rejecting suggestions that would be favourable and interesting to accept. If the 
proposed agreement is better than one’s BATNA, then the negotiator should accept it. If 
the proposed agreement is worse than one’s BATNA, the negotiator should reorganise 
negotiation meetings. If the negotiator is not able to improve the agreement proposition, 
he/she may consider withdrawing from the negotiation and examining his/her alternatives.  
 
It is true that a win–win situation has to be one in which both counterparts feel that they 
have both won (Fang 1997). The integrative frame or process also has related effects on the 
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tension levels and communication processes (Zartman 1978; Yang et al. 2002; Putnam 
2003), and these are related to the win–win process in the end. Even the socio-exchange 
approach attempts to discover the social interactions and perceptions that lead to a win–
win process and integrativeness for both parties. Raiffa (1997) also suggests that 
negotiators reveal their behaviour to show their cooperativeness, ultimately aiming to 
obtain the desired gains, based on the assumption that humans are rational and opportunistic 
in nature (John Nash and Ronald Coarse). Integrativeness and the win–win frame is based 
on satisfaction as an affective outcome of exchange relationships such as business 
negotiations. This is especially true when integrative negotiations are valued and long-term 
relationships become more important than one-shot negotiation successes. Ma (2007) 
suggests the integrative or win–win solution increases the possibility of satisfaction, which 
helps to maintain positive relationships between the parties. Therefore, we here apply 
integrativeness or cooperativeness during the negotiation process, based on a satisfied and 
successful feeling, since negotiator satisfaction is a critical measure of success, especially 
when partners expect a continued future relationship beyond profits (Adler and Graham 
1989).  
 
3.2.5 Summary of hypotheses 
Table 3.3 presents the summary of hypothesised relationships based on the literature 
followed by a conceptual description of the variables corresponding to the hypotheses’ 
testing procedure. 
 
3.2.6 Corresponding model of this study for testing  
Figure 3.1 is the summary of the overall model of this study, which employed a quantitative 
examination. The measuring instrument for the constructs with sub-variables is detailed in 
the research methodology chapter that follows. 
 
The combined model, developed based on the literature review, will be the basis for the 
empirical investigation in this study. The model includes the three main components and 
presents the hypothesised relationships based on the previous literature. As Remenyi et al. 
(1998) proposed, the structure of the model is consistent with their suggestions. The model 
captures the composition of the three main variables of the study as well as demonstrating 
the hypothesised relationships from the literature. This structure is consistent with the 
suggestions offered by Remenyi et al. (1998), who state that quantitative research should 
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assess established theory and frameworks in order to develop specific models for specific 
research that splits the main constructs further. They go further, saying that this theoretical 
conjecture is necessary to provide a richer distinction and to encapsulate specific sets of 
hypotheses.  
 
3.2.7 Summary of hypothesis 
Table 3.3 presents the summary of hypothesized relationships based on the literature 
followed by a conceptual description of the variables corresponding to the hypotheses 
testing procedure. 
 
Table3. 3 Findings and discussion of hypothesized relationship 
 
Hypotheses Contents 
Hypothesis 1 Attractiveness has a positive effect on the cooperative negotiation process” 
Hypothesis 2a 
Negotiators’ aggressive personality has a negative effect on the cooperative 
negotiation process 
Hypothesis 2b Negotiators’ compliant personality has a positive effect on the cooperative 
negotiation process 
Hypothesis 2c 
Negotiators’ detached personality has a negative effect on the cooperative 
negotiation process 
Hypothesis 3a Soft tactics has a negative effect on the cooperative negotiation process 
Hypothesis 3b Rational tactics has a positive effect on the cooperative negotiation process 
Hypothesis 3c Hard tactics has a negative effect on the cooperative negotiation process 
Hypothesis 4 High time pressure has a negative effect on the cooperative negotiation 
process 
Hypothesis 5a 
Relative Legitimate Power has a positive effect on the cooperative 
negotiation process 
Hypothesis 5b Relative Reputational Power has a positive effect on the cooperative 
negotiation process 
Hypothesis 5c 
Relative Informational Power has a positive effect on the cooperative 
negotiation process 
 
3.2.8 Corresponding model of this study for testing  
 
Figure 3.1 is the summary of the overall model of this study, which employed a quantitative 
examination. The measuring instrument for the constructs with sub-variables is detailed in 
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Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
   Cooperative 
Process  
of Negotiation 
H3c: Hard Tactics 
H3b: Rational Tactics 
H3a: Soft Tactics 
H2c: Detached Personality 
H2b: Compliant Personality 
H2a: Aggressive Personality 
H1: Attractive 
H5c: Informational Power 
H5b: Reputational Power 
H5a: Legitimate Power 





























































Figure3. 1 Findings and discussion of hypothesized relationship 
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The purpose of the study is to investigate the relationships between individual, strategic 
and contextual components and the outcome of negotiation as a cooperative process of 
negotiation that may lead to satisfaction, which encourages future relationships as a result. 
To investigate these linkages, 12 hypotheses were formulated based on the literature that 
was reviewed (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). This present chapter discusses the appropriate 
method to test the hypotheses, and introduces the empirical approach and method adopted 
in the current study to test the overall conceptual framework developed (in Figure 3.1) and 
hypothesised (in Table 3.3). The operational issues of ‘how’ this study will address the 
research objectives will be discussed. The main themes of this chapter cover the following 
five sections: (1) research method selection and strategy, (2) sampling strategy, (3) 
measurement of variables and pre-test, (4) implementing an online mail survey and (5) a 
description of the survey responses. 
 
Initially, the research method discusses and justifies usage of the survey questionnaire to 
collect data with which to test the hypotheses. Secondly, the sampling strategy and data-
collection procedure and selection of respondents are addressed. Thirdly, the questionnaire 
design with its measurements and the pre-testing of the instrument is reported. Following 
that, the whole process of implementing the online mail survey for data analysis is 
explained in detail. Finally, the descriptions of the survey responses including response rate, 
missing data and common method variance (CMV) issues are provided.  
 
4.2 Research method and strategy 
 
4.2.1 Research method selection 
 
Depending on the purpose of research, there are three types of research design – exploratory, 
descriptive and causal research (in Figure 4.1) – and they are compared in terms of 
objectives, characteristics and methods (in Table 4.1). Exploratory research is appropriate 
at the beginning or in the developmental stage to define the sensible nature of the research 
problem and perhaps compose compatible hypotheses for testing in the next step (Chisnall 
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2001). This type of research tends to determine the best research design, data-collection 
method and the selection of the subjects, often concluding that a perceived problem does 
not actually exist. Exploratory research, which is used to discover ideas and insights, often 
relies on secondary data sources such as reviewing the available literature and/or data, 
observation, in-depth interviews with experts, focus groups, projective methods, case 
studies or pilot studies and the use of qualitative approaches instead of specified 
quantitative data. As a result, through exploratory research, hypotheses about what is going 
on in a certain situation have been produced by researchers. Descriptive research is applied 
when the research problem is well structured and distinguished (Ghauri and Gronhang 
2010). An effective descriptive research design is apparent through its clear statement of 
problems, explicit research objectives, detailed information needs and measurements 
(Kinnear and Taylor 1996). Cross-sectional design is popular when making use of 
descriptive research that is observational in nature, not causal or relational, including data 
collection in many cases in order to detect patterns of association based on the quantifiable 
data with numerous variables. Causal research is specifically designed to explore the effect 
of one variable on another. It is appropriate to use to achieve the following results: (a) to 
understand which variables are the cause of what is being predicted and (b) to understand 
the functional relationship between the causal factors and effects (Kinnear and Taylor 1996). 
This study initially uses a deductive approach while inferring the hypotheses and measuring 
instruments, as our research problem is structured and well understood in the academic 
literature; it is clarified by a clear statement of the specific research objectives and detailed 
information and measurement needs (Ghauri and Gronhaug 2010). A causal research 
approach is applied once the objective determines which variable causes a certain behaviour. 
Hence, in relation to the international business negotiations of this research, causal research 
is particularly pertinent in exploring the variables and compositions of individual, strategic 
and contextual components and their corresponding impact on the negotiators’ approach 
towards an integrative, cooperative or problem-solving behaviour.  
 
There are two research methods for exploring the cause-and-effect relationship between 
variables – experimentation and simulation – that are generally used in negotiation research. 
As demonstrated in the review of previous studies, much of the research in negotiations has 
been experimental in nature, relying primarily on students as research subjects. Similarly, 
observations have also been made by others, for example, Famsy (2004) notes that the 





Figure4. 1 Classification of market research designs 
 
 
Source: Bryman (2012); Hair, Money, Samouel, and Page (2007) 
 
Table4. 1 Comparison of basic research designs 
 
 Exploratory Descriptive Causal 
Objective 
Discovery of ideas and 
insights 
Describe market 
characteristics or functions 





*Often the front end of 
total research design 
*Marked by the prior 




*Manipulation of one 
or more independent 
variables 












*Observational and other 
data 
*Experiments 
Source: Bryman (2012); Hair, Money, Samouel, and Page (2007) 
 
It is true that the research design is a comprehensive plan to associate research questions 
with relevant and practicable empirical research (Ghauri and Gronhaugh 2010). It plays a 
prominent role in connecting the subsequent research activities such as data collection and 
its analysis. The choice of research design is conceived as the overall strategy to obtain the 
information expected along with resolving the research problems in the best possible way 
within the given constraints. This choice influences the subsequent research activities. In 
general, the way in which researchers develop research designs is fundamentally affected 
by whether the research question is descriptive or explanatory. It affects what and how 
information is collected. According to the proposed research problems, the three main 





The development stage of the topic is critical when choosing an appropriate research 
methodology because the knowledge-accumulation process usually follows a ‘life-cycle’ 
pattern (Jao 1996). When the level of knowledge is new and elusive, in-depth qualitative 
methods are used to describe the phenomena and to extract research propositions for further 
exploration and testing, as was the case during the development of the model for 
international business negotiations by Ghauri (1983) and Ghauri and Usunier (2003). As 
the level of knowledge-development increases, the research emphasis should shift from 
conceptual development to theory testing, as suggested by many researchers of 
international business-negotiation models (Herbig and Gulbro 1997; Reynolds, Siminitiras 
and Vlachou 2003; Weiss 2004; 2006). Additionally, at this stage, hypothesis-testing 
procedures are generally required (Stobaugh 1984). 
 
A variety of methodologies has been adopted in the research related to international 
business negotiations (Reynolds, Siminitras and Vlachou 2003). A deductive-analytic 
approach is then logically asserted to force the researcher to assume away some of the 
multidimensionality in causal relationships and narrow the scope of the research (Dupont 
1991; McCall and Warrington 1984). An overall survey methodology has only been 
implemented in experimental studies whereby existing different sample groups are used as 
the basis for comparison in simulation settings (Graham 1985; Lituchy 1988; Graham 1997; 
Chan et al. 1994). Most of the negotiation simulations developed by Kelley (1966) and 
used by Pruitt and Lewis (1975), Lewis and Fry (1977), Graham (1983), Clopton (1984) 
and Adler et al. (1987) involve bargaining for the prices of three commodities. In particular, 
Adler et al. (1987) provided each negotiator with an instruction sheet, including a price list 
with associated profits for each price level. Participants are allowed 15 minutes to read the 
instructions and plan their bargaining strategies. Differing amounts and types of 
background information can be included with the basic pay-off matrices, depending on the 
focus of the research. While simple enough to learn quickly, the simulation usually provides 
enough complexity for one hour of substantive interaction. Within the one-hour time limit, 
negotiators use face-to-face free communication. While several other negotiation and 
negotiating simulations have been considered, Kelley’s game was selected primarily 
because it best simulates the essential elements of actual commercial negotiations observed 
in preliminary field research. The case study and simulation approaches have played a 
major role in the study of international business negotiations; however, these approaches 
are limited in addressing the issues of testing the relevant factors in international business-
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negotiation processes (Reynolds, Simintiras and Vlachou 2003), thus highlighting that the 
‘field of study has to move on’ (Weiss 2004). This has hindered the area’s development and 
pushed the field forward conceptually and theoretically, resulting in management-type 
prescriptive guidelines (Acuff 1997). This study therefore uses a deductive frame to gain 
an overall understanding of the complex process-related issues of international negotiations 
in relation to the three components – individual, strategic and contextual – based on survey 
responses with participants who have international M&A experience in order to gain a 
much-needed degree of quantitative objectivity.  
 
4.2.2 Research strategy: the quantitative approach 
 
The focus on qualitative or quantitative methodologies has received considerable attention 
in business and management research (Bryman 2012). According to the research strategy 
and the epistemological foundations, qualitative and quantitative research are the eminent 
strategies to employ (Bryman 2012). Some scholars argue that qualitative research provides 
a more personal and subjective understanding of a particular event by getting ‘inside it’, as 
suggested by Kervin (1992). In other words, it usually focuses on words rather than on 
quantification during the collection and analysis of data while placing the emphasis on an 
inductive approach to the relationship between theory and research for the generation of 
theories. Meanwhile, it rejects the practices and norms of the natural scientific model and 
of positivism in particular, in preference for an emphasis on the ways in which individuals 
interpret their social world and it embodies a view of social reality as a constantly shifting 
emergent property of individuals’ creation (Bryman 2004). Other scholars, however, favour 
the use of quantitative methods because they offer a more scientific approach with regards 
to formal studies as well as to the social sciences in general (Remenyi et al. 1998). Methods 
such as the design of experiments plus the use of statistical techniques, both univariate and 
multivariate, ensure that observations can be made and measures can be attributed to what 
are believed to be the causes (Remenyi et al. 1998), as is the case in this study on the 
associational effect of variables in international business negotiations. The purpose of the 
following is to suggest that both approaches to research are necessary, and that each 
depends upon the other if significant and generalisable additions are to be made to the body 
of knowledge.  
 
In the methodologies of existing research on international business negotiations, the choice 
of research respondents and participants has been criticised and focused on (Angdal 2007). 
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The rationale for selecting students is ease of access. Hence, there have been some 
discussions as to whether the negotiation behaviour of students accurately reflects the 
negotiation behaviour of ‘real’ negotiators. The conclusion is that the negotiating behaviour 
of students has been shown to differ significantly from that of professionals (Zarkada-
Fraser and Fraser 2001). Some scholars thus question the validity of experimental findings 
that rely on students as research subjects, even though this approach is established in 
practice (Zarkada-Fraser and Fraser 2001). Therefore, in order to counter this, actual 
international negotiators who are experienced in international M&A negotiations will be 
utilised in this research.  
 
Table4. 2 Methodology of previous research in international negotiation 
 
Type of research References 
Review/ Essay/ Descriptive research 
George, Jones, & Gonzalez (1998); Korsgaard, 
Jeong et al. (2008); Leung, Bhagat et al.  
(2005); Sebenuis (1992); Torre (1981); Wall & 
Blum (1991); Wall & Callister (1995); Weiss 
(1993); Brooks and Rose (2004); Gelfand and 
Dyer (2000); Fayerweather & Kapoor (1972) 
Case research 
Brouthers & Bamossy (1997); Yan & Gray 
(1994) 
Scenario /simulation/ interview 
Adler, Brahm & Graham(1992); Adler, 
Graham & Gehrke (1987); Gelfand at al. 
(2002); Graham (1983; 1985); Malhotra & 
Bazerman (2008); Neale & Bazerman (1985); 
Tinsley (2001); Tinsley and  Brett (2001); 
Bacon & Blyton (2007); Francis (1991) 
Quantitative method  
(regression, ANOVA, MANOVA, T-test) 
Brett & Okumura (1998); Morris at al. (1998); 
Rao & Schmidt (1998); Abramson, Lane et al 
(1993); Adair & Brett (2005); Adler & 
Graham(1989); Adair, Okumura and Brett 
(2001) 
 
4.3 Sampling strategy 
 
The sampling strategy is equally significant in both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods, especially since the strategy selected can have a critical impact on the quality of 
the research findings by ensuring which units are able to be representative of the broader 
population. Once we understand the research gaps based on the previous research and 
research questions, we attempt to manipulate the overall sampling strategy that is utilised 
for the required data collection.  
 
Fink (1995) described surveys as ways of generating information to describe, compare and 
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predict attitudes, opinions, values and behaviour based on what people say or see and what 
is contained in records about them and their activities. The survey methodology used in 
this research is a large-sample survey involving data collection from international 
negotiators in Korea who have actually experienced negotiating with foreign partners in 
the area of M&As.  
 
The sampling approach can be divided into two broad categories: probability and non-
probability samples. Probability sampling has been distinguished as a sample in which each 
unit in the population has a known chance (probability) of being selected, while in a non-
probability sample, some units have a greater, but unknown chance (probability) of being 
selected than others do (De Vaus 1996; Bryman 2012). We chose to implement the non-
probability sampling approach, even though we can generalise the results derived from the 
sample to the population by using probability sampling. It also requires dealing with precise 
data regarding international M&A negotiators in Korea, which requires time, effort and 
cost, leading to uneconomic propositions and affecting the sample size as well. 
 
4.3.1 Population definition and sampling method 
 
A population is used in a statistical sense and refers to any group of people or objects that 
are similar in one or more ways, thereby forming the basis for the subject of study in a 
particular survey (Chisnall 2001:68). In order for the rigorous external validity of this study 
relating to the generalisation of the degree to which the conclusions would hold for other 
respondents in other places and at other times to hold true, we specify the criteria of the 
population and randomly select respondents. We clearly define the criteria for the 
population as practical Korean negotiators who have experience in international M&A 
negotiations with foreign partners and who specifically understand this type of negotiation.  
 
Business surveys at a firm level are usually confronted with more difficulties compared to 
other types of surveys (Dillman 2000). The population is too large for researchers to attempt 
to survey all of the people within the population. Carefully or randomly selected samples 
that reflect the characteristics of the population to be drawn from can be used to represent 
the population in a survey. Obtaining survey responses from Korean managers experienced 
in cross-border M&A negotiations is actually assumed to be complicated, since the 
response rate is particularly low. In order to prevent a low response rate from the survey, 
data is generated through key-informant techniques among Korean international 
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negotiators. This technique defines populations and response rates based on those who will 
pre-commit to responding (Poppo and Zenger 1998). Thus, the key informants in this 
research are defined as managers who are knowledgeable about cross-border M&As and 
negotiations with foreign partners. 
 
We adopt two selection criteria for the key informants in this research. The first criterion is 
the informant’s working experience. The experience refers to the length of time the 
informant has been involved in multilateral negotiations, since those who are more familiar 
with the complexities in multilateral negotiations seem better equipped to deal with their 
counterparts in such negotiations (Devine 1990). The working experience of the 
respondents in this research are as described in Table 5.3; 32.8% of the respondents have 0 
to 2 years of experience in international negotiation, 22.1% of them have 3 to 5 years, 7.4% 
of them have 6 to 10 years and 16.4% of them have more than 10 years of working 
experience in international negotiation, while the remaining 21.3% is unaccounted for, 
unfortunately.  
 
The second criterion is knowledge, whereby the question here is: Was the informant 
familiar with the collaborative negotiation phenomenon? People responding to the survey 
should have been formally involved in the decision-making processes during international 
M&A negotiations, thus having sufficient knowledge to answer the questionnaire items. 
The considerable time and effort involved should be highlighted, whereby pre-contact with 
the respondents was undertaken to identify their levels of knowledge and experience before 
confirming eligibility in order for them to be effective informants for this research.  
 
Since the names and the telephone numbers of the contact people could not be obtained 
from the directory, we directly called the companies that were on the list of international 
M&A experienced companies on the Thompson database, and we pursued the key 
informants. First of all, we contacted the potential department, such as the strategy or 
international business departments that the managers might belong to, and requested 
personal contact numbers and the names of key personnel who were then currently in 
charge or were previously in charge of international M&A negotiations. Subsequently, we 
contacted the key personnel again (the experienced international negotiators) and 
introduced the objective of our research and the reasons for asking them to participate in 
the questionnaire survey. Furthermore, we contacted the dean of an M&A training centre, 
and he helped to distribute our research introduction while asking for volunteers to 
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complete the survey through the intranet, since the centre could not provide us with a 
contact list.  
 
4.3.2 Selection of respondents 
 
The research respondents consisted primarily of Korean international M&A negotiators. In 
order to obtain the sampling list from a variety of sources, we first inspected a list of around 
2500 Korean companies who had completed M&A negotiations with foreign companies 
after the year 2000 in the Thompson database. However, since it did not offer the company 
or personal contact points, addresses, emails, capital, employee numbers or product 
categories, we searched each company’s website from the list through the Google search 
engine. Furthermore, we checked the availability of the M&A history of the companies 
along with the phone numbers, and the potential respondents who actually operated or 
participated in the M&A negotiations, principally in the international strategy or business 
departments.  
 
There were three main criteria for selecting the companies from the databases: (1) the 
majority of the sample companies for international M&As should have more than 10% 
equity, since 10% ownership is the minimum to be considered as independent as an 
acquired company or an acquiring company; (2) most of the chosen Korean companies 
should have an obvious history and experience in international M&As; and (3) the size of 
companies were asked about, pertaining to the number of employees or the total sales in 
2009 in order to be acknowledged as an available and independent organisation. According 
to Ali (2004), firm size is measured by assets, annual sales and the number of employees 
as the determinants of a firm’s core competence. We generally did background checks with 
the respondents in order to ensure the company complied with the minimum 
standards/criteria before filling in the survey questionnaire, since that information was 
confidential in many cases.  
 
We only obtained 573 contact details of international negotiators experienced in M&As. 
However, most of them declined to respond to the survey with various reasons, such as 
domestic negotiation experience instead of international, small product selling–buying type 
of negotiation experience, high confidentiality in their company, intensive workloads or 
time restrictions, non-core member of the previous M&A negotiations and resignation. As 




In the interim, we contacted the President of the M&A Specialist Academy in Korea. He 
kindly helped to distribute the survey questionnaire through emails to the members who 
were normally practical negotiators, due to the email listing of the members being 
confidential. Moreover, we used personal contacts and sometimes, respondents introduced 
us to other international negotiators who used to be their colleagues. Ultimately, we 
received 82 completed survey questionnaires. This, along with the 43 questionnaires 
obtained from online surveys, meant that we had 125 completed survey forms. Regrettably, 
we had to discard three of them because of numerous missing items. 
 
4.4 Questionnaire design 
 
Questionnaire surveys are a good method of researching negotiations if the objective of the 
study is to find answers to questions regarding attitudes, opinions, motivation or intentions, 
since these are factors that are not amenable to direct observation. They also assess the 
distribution of those answers among the population. The advantages and disadvantages of 
questionnaire surveys are summarised in Table 4. 3. Arbitrarily, survey questionnaires are 
an appropriate way of investigating the conceptual phenomenon of this study 
 

























 Large amounts of information can be collected from a large number of people in a short period of 
time and in a relatively cost effective way 
 Can be carried out by the re7searcher of by any number of people with limited affect to its 
validity and reliability 
 The results of the questionnaires can usually be quickly and easily quantified by either a 
researcher or through the use of a software package  
 Can be analysed more scientifically and objectively than other forms of research 
 When data has been quantified, it can be used to compare and contrast other research and may be 
used to measure change 




























 Is argued to be inadequate to understand some forms of information – i.e. changes of emotions, 
behaviour, feelings etc.  
 Phenomenologists state that quantitative research is simply an artificial creation by the 
researcher, as it is asking only a limited amount of information without explanation 
 Lacks validity 
 There is no way to tell how truthful a respondent is being 
 There is no way of telling how much thought a respondent has put in 
 The respondent may be forgetful or not thinking within the full context of the situation 
 People may read differently into each question and therefore relply based on their own 
interpretation of question – i.e.  what is ‘good’ to someone may be ‘poor’ to someone else, 
therefore there is a level of subjectivity that is not acknowledged 
 There is a level of researcher imposition, meaning that when developing the questionnaire, the 
researcher is making their own decision and assumptions as to what is not important…therefore 
they may be missing something that is of importance.  
Source: Popper (2004); Ackroyd and Hughes (1981)  
 
The framework presented in Chapter 3 (shown in Figure 3.1) clearly specifies which 
hypothesised relationships shall be investigated in this research. These constructs and 
hypotheses of interest help researchers to determine what type of questions should be asked 
in the development of the questionnaire. The abstract and subjective nature of concepts in 
international business negotiations have to be defined with care. The operationalisation of 
concepts is often used to denote the procedure whereby concepts are given particular 
measures (Bryman 2010). Multi-item and multiple-variable measures of indicators are 
widely implemented for various reasons. Firstly, a single variable for each factor is 
inadequate for reflecting broad concepts in international business negotiations, and is thus 
split into ‘sub-variables’. Secondly, regarding the questionnaire, a poor question can be 
offset by the use of multiple items and by reducing the levels of inappropriate data for a 
variable. Finally and most importantly, more than one indicator can offer a much finer 
distinction (Bryman 2010), as reflected in this research, whereby each factor is split into 
sub-variables, with each having its own multiple questionnaire items. 
 
Regarding the development of measures for these scales, Kim (2004) indicates that 
researchers have a few options when designing individual questions: (1) adopting questions 
employed by other questionnaires, (2) adapting questions employed by other questionnaires 
and (3) creating one’s own questions. He points out that the first and second option provide 
many advantages compared to the third option, such as securing the validity as well as the 
reliability of the questions. Extant empirics were basically adapted to select individual 
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items. This research uses a seven-point Likert scale to ask participants to indicate the extent 
to which he/she perceives a certain variable that closely reflects the situation in their 
international M&A negotiations. 1 is denoted as a very small extent, whereas 7 indicates a 
very large extent. This will be further discussed in detail in the following sections. The 
items were generated with guidelines suggested by Churchill (1979), summarised in Table 
4.4. 
 
Table4. 4 Paradigm for the development of questionnaire 
Source: Churchill (1979) 
 
The wording in each question item has been carefully polished. The literature about 
questionnaire design was taken seriously in an effort to employ clear, simple and 
unambiguous language and to avoid double-barrelled, negative and leading questions 
(Oppenheim 2000; Dillman 2000; Churchill and Iacobucci 2004; Bryman 2010). In the 
meantime, the ordering and length of the questionnaire was also another critical point. The 
questionnaire layout and appearance may also influence the participation of respondents. 
A vertical flow when answering questions was created to prevent intentional omission. Sub-
headings were also provided to support the connection to and continuity in the 
questionnaire. All these issues were addressed during the pre-test of the questionnaire.  
 
Questionnaire items were generated from a comprehensive literature search pertaining to 
the factors in international business negotiations. A process, recommended by prominent 
scholars such as Churchill and Iacobucci (2004), Nunnally (1978) and Churchill (1979), 
among others, was used. The starting point involves the development and usage of new, 
conceptually consistent, theoretical definitions of the various constructs and converges on 
developing scales that describe these constructs. One goal of this research was to develop 
sound scales that were both parsimonious and as simple in structure as possible. To begin 
the construction of the scales, theoretical definitions were needed to enable the assessment 
Scale development steps Recommended coefficients of techniques 
1. Specify domain of construct 
2. Specify list of hypotheses 
Literature search 
Domain specification 
Dimension and variables identification 
3. Generate sample of items 
Literature search  
4. Data collection 
Pre-testing 





of scale content validity as well as to provide a starting point for the generation of items 
(Nunnally 1978). Here, the prime concern was to create a consistent set of definitions that 
would remain compatible with the theory regarding international business negotiations. 
The generated lists of potential scale items were gathered based on established definitions 
and were evaluated for conformity to the theoretical definitions by the pre-test. 
 
4.4.1 Variable measurement: Likert-type scale 
 
The variables are measured by employing a seven-point Likert scale in this research. 
Generally, the most widely used method of estimation in a quantitative study is probably a 
simple proportional transformation, which would be the easiest and the most obvious 
method of estimation (Colman, Norris and Preston 1997). Additionally, 5- or 7-point-scale 
formats are the most popular and common, though 10- or 11-point scales are also used 
sometimes (Loken et al. 1987). For instance, according to Dawes (2008), the 7-point format 
is lengthier whereas the 10-point format is quite impractical as the scales of agreement are 
too fine to be easily expressed in words. Numerous studies have focused on this issue of 
how scale format affects scale reliability and validity and how many choices should be 
offered (Dawes 2008). Measuring variables is a complicated task and a debatable one, since 
there is no clear and easy way to estimate through objective criteria (Lane et al. 2001). For 
instance, psychologically, an odd number of choices may allow respondents to sit on the 
fence, while an even number forces respondents to make a choice. Some respondents are 
also prone to not making extreme choices, as this may make them appear as if they are 
totally sure, as they realise that there are always valid opposing views to many questions. 
Respondents generally prefer to be thought of as moderate rather than extremist, so much 
so that they are much less likely to choose extreme options. Thus, one of the ways to counter 
this issue in this research is to offer seven choices rather than five. Simultaneously, both 
simulation and empirical studies have generally considered that reliability and validity are 
increased by using 5- to 7-point scales compared to any other scale points, as more finely 
graded scale points do not further encourage either reliability or validity (Dawes 2008). 
 
Concurrently, there are some disadvantages discovered in the Likert scale for surveys 
(Bryman 2010; Churchill and Iacobucci 2004). The first problem of Likert scales is that 
they can hinder the respondents’ opportunities for self-expression and that there can be a 
distinctive tendency for the respondents to estimate ‘appropriate’ answers, since only a few 
options are offered and the respondents may not fully agree with the simple questions. 
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Secondly, numeric scales are sometimes impractical due to the possibility of differences in 
interpretation (Bailey 1987). In other words, there is no guarantee that ticking ‘2’ by one 
person is cognitively equal to another’s ‘2’. Thirdly, the choice of an odd or even number 
of response options and the number of items asked need to be carefully considered in terms 
of question construction and design. There is an argument that the middle alternative is 
often selected inappropriately by the majority of respondents ticking the option without 
careful thought (Kull 2000). However, others contend that not including a middle 
alternative means forcing respondents to choose a dichotomised option one way or another 
through their judgment (Saunders et al. 2003).  
 
Despite these disadvantages, Kwon (2005) explains the validity and the reason why many 
scholars use the method practically, by asserting that the Likert-type scale provides a very 
useful and uncomplicated method of obtaining data on personal judgments and attitudes. 
Saunders et al. (2003) also confirm that the response to the Likert-type items is useful when 
the objective is to ask respondents about their opinions, beliefs or attitudes regarding 
specified topics and questions. In addition, a clear answer to the question on how to 
measure variables in international negotiation research is given in the Appendix. All of the 
previous research on international negotiation associated with the problem-solving 
approach has predominantly employed Likert-type rating scales. Most notably, all of the 
items are measured using 7-point Likert scales, which is the most widely used response 
scale featured in survey methodologies within business research. A number of studies 
currently use the Likert-type scale questionnaires when measuring individuals’ perceptions 
of the relative value of the variables within the context of negotiation (e.g. Adler and 
Graham 1989). The examples of such variables typically may involve personal intent or 
experience (Hitt et al. 2000; 2004), assessment of relationships (Glaister and Buckley 1997; 
Lane et al. 2001), cultural issues (Lane et al. 2001; Lyles and Salk 1996) and so on. 
Consequently, usage of the Likert-type scale can be contented to be appropriate for this 
study, since the suggested dependent and independent variables are related to the opinions 
or attitudes of individuals participating in international negotiation.  
 
4.4.2 Demographic questions 
 
Basic demographic factors, such as gender, age, international business experience, 
educational level and role/job responsibility are mainly employed in the literature 
concerning the research on international business negotiations (Graham et al. 1992; Herbig 
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and Gulbro 1997; Volkema 2004; Volkema and Tereza 2002; Agndal 2007). In order to 
understand the size of acquiring and acquired firms and the length or success of M&A 
relationships, background checking is required regarding the amount of sales, number of 
employees and year of the M&A negotiation. In particular, a firm’s position as acquiring or 
acquired was considered with the amount of equity stake of a respondent’s company, since 
negotiation behaviour and considerations might be distinguishable depending on their 
economic and strategic positions. However, some demographic questions were deleted, as 
they might have reduced the response rate and they might also have been related to 
confidential company information, as demonstrated in the pre-test experience with the 
practical negotiators. 
 
4.4.3 Dependent variable 
 
In general, much research focuses on the profits and satisfaction level as an outcome of 
negotiation, indicating the balance between the economic and psychological perspectives 
(Adler and Graham 1989; Adler, Brahm and Graham 1992; Adler, Graham and Gehrke 
1987; Ma 2007). However, as mentioned above in Chapters 2 and 3, in terms of the 
integrative process as an outcome of negotiation, we hereby engage and focus on the 
integrativeness during the process of face-to-face negotiations.  
 
This measurement chooses to extend beyond profit and satisfaction as an economic view 
and a psychological view, respectively, which has been emphasised previously in many 
past research studies (Rubin and Brown 1975; Money 1998; Graham, Mintu and Rogers 
1994). In Adler and Graham (1989), cooperativeness is measured with five items in a 5-
point Likert-scale rating: (1) solving a mutual problem to self-interested, (2) exploitative 
to accommodating, (3) honest to deceptive, (4) informative to persuasive and (5) unbiased 
to biased. In addition, satisfaction with the final agreement, individual profit and 
performance during the negotiation have been measured as well. Ergo, we employed two 
items for the integrativeness during the negotiation process in this research with two items 
in the 7-point Likert-scale rating: (1) cooperativeness to competitiveness and (2) overall 
satisfaction with the success of the negotiation.  
 
4.4.4 Independent variables 
 
The independent variables that are expected to influence the atmosphere of the negotiation, 
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which the negotiators perceived, are categorised into three dimensions (see the research 
framework): ‘individual components’, ‘strategic components’ and ‘contextual components’. 
This research will later illustrate the step-by-step measurements of the variables. The first 
of the components is related to the personal attractiveness between two parties and the 
personality of the negotiator himself/herself. The second set of components is mainly 
comprised of factors explaining the strategic management or skills such as soft, hard and 
rational, which significantly affect the mood and results of negotiation. The last 
components are the applications of time pressure and relative power (i.e., legitimate, 
reputational and informational) in face-to-face negotiations.  
 
We have previously reviewed the research design hypotheses in Chapter 3. Herein, we 
explain the operationalisation of all the variables employed in this research, based on the 
previous survey questionnaire items, which are slightly revised in order to improve the 
questionnaire, based on the pre-test comments and specified conditions and limitations of 
using Korean M&As with foreign partners. All of the dependent variables are measured 
with 7-point Likert scales, as described above.  
 
Interpersonal attraction has been confirmed to have a strong influence on the negotiation 
outcome and even on the success of future transactions. McGuire (1968) indicates that 
when negotiators are attracted to each other, they are prone to making sacrifices, giving 
concessions in order to preserve gratifying individual relationships. That means an 
individual negotiator is likely to give up economic rewards for the social rewards of a 
relationship with an attractive counterpart. This powerful variable used to be simply 
measured by like–dislike and friendly–unfriendly feelings (Simons, Berkowitz and Moyer 
1970), or love and trust feelings (Lewicki et al. 1994; Rempel et al. 1985) as personal 
attraction measures. Adler and Graham (1989), however, used three items in their survey 
questionnaire, and we employed those items in this research by asking ‘To what extent were 
you satisfied with your partner after the M&A negotiation?’ while presenting the three 
following items as: (1) we felt comfortable with the particular people with whom we were 
paired with, (2) we were interested in the people with whom we were paired with and (3) 
we are interested in seeing the people with whom we were paired with again. 
 
Personality has been measured in various ways in accordance with the theoretical concept 
and its definition. Abramson et al. (1993) used the MBTI (i.e., extrovert, sensing person, 
high in thinking and high in judging) as a measurement of the personal cognitive type, 
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which is described in Myers and McCaulley (1986). The popular five-factor model that 
includes extraversion, neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness and openness to 
experience has been applied across cultures (Digman and Shmelyov 1996). George et al. 
(1998) introduced positive and negative affectivity as a personal disposition, which are 
crucial to information processing during cross-cultural negotiations. Moreover, in the 
international business-negotiation context, Adler, Graham and Gehrke (1987) discovered 
four other individual negotiators’ characteristics: generalised self-esteem, task-specific 
self-esteem, years’ work experience and percentage of work involving contact outside one’s 
firm. Rubin and Brown (1975), Fry (1985) and Greehalgh and Neslin (1983) proposed the 
study of the Machiavellianism effect on the negotiation outcome. Finally, Brooks and Rose 
(2004) posit three CAD personality categories (i.e., compliant, aggressive and detached), 
which were originally suggested in the negotiation marketing research by Cohen (1967) in 
order to operationalise negotiators’ characteristics based on Horney’s (1945) social-
orientation trait. In this manner, we apply this concept for this negotiation study. Cohen 
(1967) actually introduced 24 questionnaire items; however, we refined and reduced them 
to 10 items to increase reliability and validity, since a number of the items were manifold 
and repetitive. Thus, we asked ‘to what extent were you satisfied with your partner after 
the M&A negotiation?’ with the following10 items as: (1) giving comfort to those in need 
of friends is, (2) for me to pay little attention to what others think of me seems, (3) to feel 
that I like everyone I know would be, (4) if I could live all alone in a cabin in the woods or 
mountains it would be, (5) to give aid to the poor and underprivileged is, (6) telling a waiter 
when you have received inferior food is, (7) planning to get along without others is, (8) a 
strong desire to surpass others’ achievements seems, (9) to have the ability to blame others 
for their mistakes is and (10) having to compete with others for various rewards is. 
 
In relation to tactics, Rao and Schmidt (1998) introduced negotiator influence tactics in 
their structural model, which is driven by Kipnis and Schmidt’s (1985) parsimonious 
classification of hard, soft and rational frames. These categories are based on earlier 
inductive classification research, with assertiveness (i.e., strong tactics), rationality (i.e., 
rational tactics) and ingratiation (i.e., soft or weak tactics) as part of the 29 items introduced 
by Kipnis, Schmidt and Wilkinson (1980). Here we utilise 12 out of those 29 items in our 
questionnaire by diverging it into 4 items per observable variable (soft, hard and rational 
tactics) in order to increase reliability and validity while negating repetitive and confusing 
items. Thus, we asked ‘how frequently each reason had been the cause of their trying to 
influence the target person to something’ with the following 12 items. Each tactic (i.e., hard, 
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soft and rational) includes 4 items, respectively, with hard tactics as: (1) we became a 
nuisance (kept bugging our partner until our partner did what we wanted); (2) we repeatedly 
reminded our partner about what we wanted; (3) we expressed our anger verbally; and (4) 
we pointed out that the rules required that our partner comply. The soft tactics were (1) we 
acted very humbly to our partner while making our request, (2) we acted in a friendly 
manner prior to asking for what we wanted, (3) we made our partner feel good about us 
before making our request and (4) we asked in a polite way. The rational tactics were (1) 
we wrote a detailed plan that justified our ideas, (2) we presented our partner with 
information in support of our point of view, (3) we explained the reasons for our request 
and (4) we used logic to convince our partner. 
 
Relative power and the effects of power have been argued about and developed in French 
and Raven (1959), Emerson (1962) and El-Ansary and Stern (1972). Reward, coercive, 
referent, legitimate, expert, information and departmental power are broadly introduced in 
Kohli (1989). However, since the M&A negotiators are all experts and, furthermore, by 
excluding rewards and individual profits, we therefore employ only three relative power 
factors – legitimate, reputational and informational power – based on the questionnaire 
items from Kohli (1989) by entreating ‘to what extent do you agree with each of the 
following about your partner, relative to your party based on the recent M&A negotiation?’ 
with the following 12 items. Each relative power factor (i.e., legitimate, reputational and 
informational) includes 4 items respectively, with legitimate power as: (1) we felt our 
partner is entitled to direct our actions on the job; (2) because of our partner’s position, our 
partner had the right to influence our behaviour; (3) we felt our partner had the authority to 
ask for the compliance; and (4) we felt our partner in his job position had a legitimate right 
to influence the decision making. For the reputational power factor we used: (1) we admired 
our partner as a reputable company, (2) we identified our partner because of their reputation, 
(3) we respected our partner for their high qualities and (4) we liked our partner as a 
negotiation party. For informational power: (1) our partner had access to the very 
convincing information not available to us, (2) our partner had sufficient information to 
effectively negotiate with us, (3) the information our partner provided was logical and 
makes sense and (4) our partner held independent discussions with us based on sufficient 
information. 
 
Time pressure has been controversial in terms of the positive or negative effect on the 
outcome of a negotiation, especially regarding the integrative process surrounding it 
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(Walton and McKersie 1965; Pruitt 1981; Carnevale and Lawler 1986; Stuhlmacher and 
Champagne). Saorin-Iborra (2008) proposed interview guidelines regarding questions 
pertaining to time pressure, such as ‘how long has the process lasted?’, ‘was there sufficient 
time to negotiate?’ and ‘how was the time available managed?’ The interview also reveals 
that the need for secrecy and the perception of time availability are the main determining 
factors of time pressure. Kohli (1989) suggests that time pressure refers to the extent to 
which buying centre members feel pressured to make a decision quickly, with the three 
questionnaire items pitched as ‘they felt pressure to reach a decision quickly’, ‘the decision-
making process was rushed’ and ‘they had ample time to consider the various options 
carefully’. Thus, here we utilise and refine those items into 4 items in this research as: (1) 
we perceived there was sufficient time available to negotiate, (2) we perceived the high 
level of secrecy required as important, (3) we perceived the preparation for negotiation 
before face-to-face meetings as important and (4) we perceived any internal or external 
pressures to reach the final agreement. 
 
4.4.5 Pre-test of survey administration 
 
Basically, the aim of piloting is to evaluate the appropriateness of questions and to improve 
them so that respondents will not have any problems in understanding and answering 
questions. Moreover, the validity of the research instrument is confirmed and subsequently, 
the reliability of measurements can be improved through the process of pre-testing 
(Saunders et al. 2003). Hunt, Sparkman and Wilcox (1982) offered five fundamental 
principles of pre-testing: (1) what specific items should be pre-tested?, (2) what method 
should be used to conduct the pre-test?, (3) who should do the pre-testing?, (4) who should 
be the subjects in the pre-test? and (5) how large a sample is needed for the pre-test? Thus, 
the need for the pre-test is not only to ensure that the survey questions operate well, but 
also to confirm that the research instrument as a whole functions well (Bryman 2010). 
Hence, prior to conducting the questionnaire survey, assessing a primary version of the 
questionnaire, also known as pre-testing, is always judicious.  
 
Based on the various expectations of pre-testing, we performed it with a clear objective to 
correct poor wording, fix confusing positioning and the design of the questionnaire with 
regards to appropriateness of interpretation, to ensure adequate scale items, amend reluctant 
or missing questions, establish the questionnaire length and the order of the questions and 
to elect the best font size for printing. According to Baker (1994), preliminary and formal 
 110 
 
pre-tests need to be performed in steps. Thus, several Korean and foreign PhD students at 
Manchester Business School and Kings College London were approached to provide 
feedback on all aspects of the questionnaire, such as the overall design, wording and ease 
of understanding of the questionnaire as a first step, since it can be conducted among friends 
and acquaintances who are able to participate in the preliminary pre-test. During the formal 
pre-test as a second step, it was also given to several middle managers who were 
experienced in international negotiations and understood them practically based on their 
experience, as a way to ask for suggestions and comments. To maintain consistency with 
the actual survey administration, we mailed the pre-test survey questionnaires to a small 
sample of selected individuals in the Samsung, Posco and LG companies11. When the 
respondents received the questionnaire, they were asked to complete it and to write 
comments on it. The second revision of the questionnaire was implemented based on their 
suggestions.  
 
4.4.6 Final questionnaire 
 
It was decided that the questionnaire would be presented in the Korean language. The 
Korean translation was prepared for the experienced Korean M&A negotiators. The 
thinking behind addressing Korean negotiators in their native language was an informed 
decision, alluding to practical considerations and courtesy, although they were able to 
communicate in English at an appropriate level generally. At a practical level, it was 
thought that Korean M&A negotiators would find it easier to complete the questionnaire in 
their native language and that this might encourage strong participation in the survey. To 
this end, the questionnaire was translated into a Hanguel (Korean alphabet) version. I 
approached a Korean PhD holder in the area of management at the University of 
Manchester along with another bilingual student proficient in both English and Korean to 
translate the questionnaire, who also further contributed by confirming the explicitness and 
appropriateness of the questions as well as introducing more suitable words and sentences, 




                                            




Table4. 5 The questionnaire items 
 
Variables 



















 1. Gender and Age 
2. Contact information 
3. Foreign languages 
4. Level of English speaking 
5. Level of management 
6. Company name 
7. Company main product 
8. Total sales  
9. Total number of employees 
10. Year of experience in negotiation 
11. Company name of M&A partner 
12. Year held M&A negotiation 
13. Acquired or acquiring position 
14. Equity stake of the company 
15. Overall deal success 
16. Overall negotiation atmosphere  
























I.Attractiveness To what extent were you satisfied with your partner after the M&A negotiation? Adler and Graham (1989) 
 1. We felt comfortable with the particular people with whom we were paired 
2. We were interested in the people with whom we were paired  
3. We are interested in seeing the people with whom you were paired again 
II.Personality To what extent were you satisfied with your partner after the M&A negotiation? Cohen (1967); Horney 






9) Giving comfort to those in need of friends is: 
10) For me to pay little attention to what others think of me seems: 
11) To feel that I like everyone I know would be: 
12) If I could live all alone in a cabin in the woods or mountains it would be: 
13) To give aid to the poor and underprivileged is: 
14) Telling a waiter when you have received inferior food is: 
15) Planning to get along without others is: 
16) A strong desire to surpass others’ achievements seems: 
17) To have the ability to blame others for their mistakes is: 


























 To what extent do you agree with each of the following about your partner, relative to your party based on the recent 
M&A negotiation? 
 
I.Legitimate  1. We felt our partner is entitled to direct our actions on the job 
2. Because of our partner’s position, our partner had the right to influence our behaviour 
3. We felt our partner had the authority to ask for the compliance  
4. We felt our partner in his job position had a legitimate right to influence the decision making  
Kohli (1989) 
II.Reputational 1. We admired our partner as a reputable company 
2. We identified our partner because of the reputation 
3. We respected our partner for the high qualities  
4. We liked our partner as a negotiation party 
III.Informational 1. Our partner had access to the very convincing information not available to us 
2. Our partner had sufficient information to effectively negotiate with us 
3. The information our partner provided was logical and makes sense 
4. Our partner held independent discussions with us based on the sufficient information  
IV. Time pressure 1. We perceived it was sufficient time available to negotiate 
2. We perceived the high level of secrecy need was important 
3. We perceived the preparation for negotiation before face to face was important 
4. We perceived any internal or external pressures to reach the final agreement 
























 How frequently each reason had been the cause of their trying to influence the target person to do something?  Rao and Schmidt (1998); 
Kipnis and Schmidt’s 
(1985); Kipnis, Schmidt, 
and Wilkinson (1980) 
I. Hard tactics 1. We became a nuisance (kept bugging our partner until our partner did what we wanted) 
2. We repeatedly reminded our partner about what we wanted 
3. We expressed our anger verbally 
4. We pointed out that the rules required that our partner comply 
II.Soft tactics 1. We acted very humbly to our partner while making our request. 
2. We acted in a friendly manner prior to asking for what we wanted 
3. We made our partner feel good about us before making our request 
4. We asked in a polite way 
III.Rational tactics 1. We wrote a detailed plan that justified our ideas 
2. We presented our partner with information in support of our point of view 
3. We explained the reasons for our request 




4.5 Primary data collection 
 
4.5.1 Implementing online mail survey 
 
As indicated in the previous section, the data for this study was collected mainly by means 
of a mailed online questionnaire, although a mixed mode to enable collecting the survey 
through survey websites, emails, faxes and visitations was adopted in this research. The 
paper questionnaire was created on the survey website including an introduction page as 
its front page, as shown in Appendix A. We added a picture of the researcher on the 
introduction page in order to ensure that respondents trusted our research and researchers 
in terms of both using the survey data and the purpose of research. Most of the electronic 
format questionnaires were sent to both the people on the network-sampling list along with 
those who had agreed to answer the survey (which we had confirmed earlier over the phone 
in a previous contact). The method of mass messaging, that is, showing many recipients’ 
names in the email address area, was intentionally avoided because personalisation is 
crucial in increasing the response rate from an email or online survey (Dillman 2000). 
Whenever the respondents expected to have a hard copy of the survey questionnaire, either 
a self-addressed, pre-paid envelope was carefully folded in the package or the hard copy 
was faxed as per their preference. Alternatively, we confidentially visited them in their 
office to encourage the replies.  
 
4.6 Description of survey responses 
 
4.6.1 Response rate 
 
A mixed mode to collect the survey through website links, emails, faxes and visitations 
with a hard copy was adopted in this research, as described above. As shown in Table 4.6 
(the steps of data collection), to set up the list of respondents, we initially examined around 
2500 Korean companies who had completed M&A negotiations with foreign companies 
after 1997 listed in the Thompson database. However, since the company contact numbers 
were not provided by the database, we searched for them on the Google website one by 
one, with company names and histories in terms of M&A experience. After I individually 
called companies and researched the availability of their M&A history, their phone number 
and the potential respondents who actually operated or participated in the M&A 
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negotiations, we managed to obtain 573 contact details for international negotiators. Most 
of them refused to respond to the survey with various reasons such as domestic negotiation 
experience, other types of negotiation experience, high confidentiality levels in their 
company, intensive workloads or time restrictions, being a non-core member of the 
previous M&A negotiations or resignation. Thus, we sent 111 people a personalised email 
with the survey website link and the introduction to our research and received 43 completed 
final survey questionnaires. Since most of respondents had a high workload, we sent 
reminder emails or made calls a few times to increase the response rate.  
 
Nevertheless, 43 samples were not enough for data analysis; thereupon, we contacted the 
President of the M&A Specialist Academy. He kindly distributed the proposal emails for 
the survey questionnaire to members who were then current practical negotiators. 
Supplementarily, we used personal contacts and often, the respondents introduced other 
international negotiators to us who used to be their colleagues. Resultantly, we set up a new 
list of 148 potential respondents who promised to complete the survey questionnaire. In the 
end, we received 125 completed survey questionnaires, 82 of which were from the second 
phase, wherein we were forced to eliminate 3 of them because of numerous missing items.  
 
In the first phase of this survey process with the Thompson database, the response rate was 
39%, as 43 questionnaires were returned out of 111 potential respondents who initially 
promised to complete the survey. In the second follow-up phase, the response rate was 55%, 
as 82 questionnaires were completed out of the pool of 148 potential respondents who were 
individually requested to participate in this survey via email. Much of the published 
research on inter-organisational relationships reported a low response rate of around 15–
20% and, as shown in Table 4.7, our response rate (e.g., 39% and 55%, respectively, for 
each phase) does not indicate low levels compared to other survey response rates in journals. 
The response rate in this study can be attributed to the continuous effort and repeated 
contacts with the non-respondents, such as personalised emails, follow-up phone calls and 
visiting their offices over a five-month period.  
 
Following the procedure suggested by Armstrong and Overton (1977), we conducted two 
tests to examine the possibility of non-response bias, which usually occurs in a statistical 
survey if those who responded to the survey differ in outcome variables from those who do 
not respond. The demographic differences such as race, gender or socioeconomic status are 
frequently reported and accounted for through statistical modelling in market research. 
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Firstly, we scrutinised the companies and respondents’ characteristics (e.g., number of 
employees, annual sales revenue, position, main product and English-speaking level) from 
the original population sample. Secondly, we compared early against late responses. The 
first phase of the returned questionnaires (34%) was defined as an early response while the 
second phase of collected questionnaires (66%) was regarded as a late response. No 
significant differences were observed when comparing the means of the research constructs 
within the two groups. Therefore, we assume that non-response bias was not a significant 
issue in the data analysis of this research. The data collection started at 15 October, 2009 
and finished at 9 September, 2010. This long journey of the data collection takes more than 
a year total.  
 
Table4. 6 Steps of data collection 
 
Steps of data collection 
Preparation of respondents’ list 
Inspection of a list of 2500 M&As between Korean and foreign 
firms after 1997 through the Thompson database 
Checked availability of companies through the company 
websites by calling them 
573 companies and negotiators were suitable; talked to them 
individually, requesting a response to the survey questionnaire 
1st phase (39%) 
111 negotiators accepted responding to the survey 
questionnaires  
43 survey questionnaires were completed and returned  
2nd phase (55%) 
A list of 148 negotiators was prepared via the M&A Specialist 
Academy, via personal contacts and through recommendations 
from previous respondents  
82 survey questionnaires were completed and returned 
Post-data collection 
Survey questionnaires were removed due to the massive 
number of missing items and 122 data samples were finally 
ready to be analysed  
 
Table4. 7 Mail survey response rate on quantitative researches 
 
References Final response rate 
Pak and Park (2004) 47.7% 
Lyles and Salk (1996) 25% 
Norman (2004) 13.6% 
Minbaeva et al (2003) 27% (USA); 28% (Russia); 33% (Finland) 




4.6.2 Missing data 
 
Missing-data analysis was undertaken to evaluate any severe issues from missing data, as 
well as the presence of missing-data patterns. Such patterns have implications for the data-
analysis approach used in the current study. This examination found that there were 
variables with more than 23% of missing values in the data set. The most common missing-
value patterns were for the descriptive items such as information and expert power. 
 
This issue of missing values and whether they are missing at random (MAR) or are 
systematically related to demographics can reduce the reliability and validity of the findings 
(Hertel 1979; Peters and Enders 2002). Hertel (1979) suggests that variables should be 
eliminated if they contain more than 15% of missing data. When the percentage of missing 
data is high, any other missing-data options (likewise, pairwise or imputation from the 
remaining data) may not be satisfactory and should be viewed with caution (Nunnally and 
Bernstein 1994). Examination of the data set for this study revealed that several variables 
were missing 23% of the response data. We commenced an analysis to determine if the 
missing data was MAR, or, the stricter form, missing completely at random (MCAR), using 
the SPSS missing-value analysis (MVA) module, which is specifically designed to reveal 
underlying trends.  
 
Little’s test (chi-square = 1416.214, df = 1364, P = 0.158) suggested that the missing data 
was MCAR. Likewise and pairwise estimation techniques may be used with data that is 
MCAR (the pattern of missing values does not depend on the data values). Violation of this 
assumption can lead to biased estimates. Missing values may also be imputed using the 
mean or the expectation algorithm. However, imputation can distort coefficients of 
association and the correlation relating to variables (Kalton and Kasprzyk 1982). Hence, 
list wise deletion was utilised, leading to the final sample size of 122. The descriptive 
statistics are shown in Table 5.4. 
 
4.6.3 Common method variance 
 
In general, common method variance (CMV) may raise some concerns when self-report 
questionnaires are used to collect data at the same time from the same participants. This 
concern is strongest when both the dependent and focal explanatory variables are 
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perceptual measures derived from the same respondent (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). 
However, the risk of using CMV to interpret research results differs widely. For instance, 
Campbell (1982) is highly sceptical of the contribution of the study unless clear construct 
validity for the questionnaire measure or for the independent measurement in each 
questionnaire is proven. On the other hand, some researchers warn that the risk of CMV 
may be exaggerated (Crampton and Wagner 1994; Lindell and Whitney 2001; Spector 
1987), and may even be an ‘urban legend’ (Spector 2006). Thus, Posdsakoff et al. (2003) 
eventually reach a balanced conclusion, as the CMV often causes some problems, and 
researchers need to control the CMV to the best of their ability. 
 
According to Podsakoff et al. (2003), the four sources of CMV problem areas are the use 
of a common rater, the manner in which items are presented to respondents, the context in 
which items on a questionnaire are placed and the contextual influences (time, location and 
media) used to measure the constructs. In particular, it is more critical when the perceptual 
data for both the dependent and independent variables is obtained from the same source 
(Chang, Witteloostuijn and Eden 2010). All of the measures used in this research were 
actually collected via the same questionnaire, which introduces the possibility of CMV 
(Simonin 1999a) and, in turn, creates a false internal consistency; that is, an apparent 
correlation among the variables that is generated from their common source.  
 
One of the counters for CMV risk is to ensure that the measurement for the dependent 
variable is constructed using information from different sources of independent variables, 
which is also a representative strategy to evade any potential CMV at the research design 
stage. Furthermore, we performed Harman’s one-factor test, which is arguably the most 
widely known approach for assessing CMV in a single-method research design (Podsakoff 
et al. 2003; Podsakoff and Organ 1986), in order to confirm whether the issue of CMV in 
this research was of dire concern or not and whether it was unlikely to confound the 
interpretation of the results. According to Podsakoff and Organ (1986), CMV issues may 
exist if (1) a single factor emerges from un-rotated factor solutions or (2) a first factor 
explains the majority of the variance in the variables. Thus, both Harman’s one-factor test 
and principal components factor analysis were performed on the questionnaire 
measurement items to address the issues of CMV. Since factor one did not account for the 
majority of the variance, the results of this test are interpreted as CMV not being a 




With respect to possible common method bias, the performance variables were placed after 
the independent variables in the survey in order to avoid, or at least diminish the effects of 
consistency artefacts (Podsakoff, MacKenzie and Podsakoff 2003; Salancik and Pfeffer 
1977). Multiple-item constructs were used to reduce response bias, which has been shown 
to be more problematic on the item than on the construct level (Harrison, Mclaughlin and 
Coalter 1996). Finally, we carried out Harman’s (1967) single-factor test: if common 
method bias existed in the data, a single factor or one general factor accounting for most of 
the variance would emerge from the factor analysis run on the full set of items considered 
for defining the dependent and independent variables. Our un-rotated factor analysis 
criteria revealed nine factors. The first of these explained around 20% of the variance in 





In this chapter, the research method strategy, sampling strategy and respondent selection 
have been addressed. The operationalisation of the measures, design and the results of the 
pre-test from the survey administration are in turn, also presented. After pre-testing the 
survey, the final version of the questionnaire was introduced with slight changes in the 
wording and the design of the items in order for it to remain relevant in this research. Finally, 
the implementation of the online mail survey and the description of the survey responses 
including the response rate, missing data and CMV issues were also clarified. In the next 



















The main purpose of this chapter is to probe the data gathered in order to test the research 
hypotheses, prior to the findings and conclusion of this study in Chapter 6. Fundamentally, 
the characteristics of the sample are chronicled in detail. Next, the normality of the data is 
investigated, and the validity and reliability of the measurements are assessed through 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Finally, the result of a hypothesised relationship is 
proposed in the literature review, taking the form of a structural model that will be revealed 
based on the SPSS performance.  
 
In general, according to Stevens (2002) and Kline (2005), the three stages of data analysis 
are composed of a pre-analysis data-examination and data-preparation stage, including 
descriptive statistics and missing-data analysis (Stage 1), devising a measurement model 
for the validation of the measures (Stage 2) and the development and interpretation of a re-
specified structural model exploring relationships (Stage 3). This chapter hereby presents 
the results of the analysis of the refined data, following the steps, aiming to ensure the 
requirements of the data and the measurements for the main analysis of the causal model 
are met. 
 
5.2 Demographic characteristics of the sample 
 
We laid out the data for a pre-analysis procedure to prepare the actual data before 
performing the data analysis, identifying sample characteristics, descriptive statistics, 
missing data and assumptions. Data examination is time-consuming, but it is a vital initial 
step that researchers often omit in any analysis. Here, the researcher sought to evaluate the 
impact of missing data, identify outliers and test for the assumptions underlying most 
multivariate techniques, which apparently reveal the hidden effects that are frequently 
easily overlooked behind the actual data portrayed (Hair et al. 2009).  
 
Regarding the questions on demographics, it is noticeable that there have been a number 
of negotiation research studies that assume that person parameters are relevant to the 
processes and outcomes of negotiation (Barry and Friedman 1998), as supported by 
practitioners in their anecdotal accounts as well. Mintu and Gassenheimer (2002) also 
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exhort and investigate the gender, age, sales negotiation experience, tenure in the 
organisation and educational level as selected demographic variables relating to the process 
of international negotiation based on the previous negotiation research. The structure of the 
international negotiators that took part in this research differ in terms of (1) gender, (2) age, 
(3) experience in international M&A negotiations and (4) English-speaking level especially. 
Usually, most surveys put demographic questions at the beginning instead of at the end. It 
is essential that the purpose of the survey is to have the respondent answer the core 
questions and address the critical issues, instead of being distracted by non-pertinent 
questions such as ticking boring demographic questions and background information 
requests. We initially asked for the negotiator’s experience in international M&As over the 
phone before distributing this survey. Since we limited the respondents to experienced 
international M&A negotiators, the demographic questions were important at the beginning 
of the survey. As a result, we did not receive enough demographic answers, with many 
missing due to the excessively sensitive nature of confidentiality issues in international 




The gender effects on the behaviours and outcomes of negotiations have frequently been 
dealt with in the literature as part of relationship studies (Pruitt 1981; Parasuraman and 
Futrell 1983; Cotham 1969). However, research on the relationship between gender and the 
outcome of a negotiation have had mixed results in the social psychology literature 
(Cantrell and Butler 1997), while Rubin and Brown’s (1975) extensive negotiation 
literature review shows no systematic relationship between them. Other extensive literature 
reviews by Pruitt (1981) and Neu, Graham and Gilly (1998), also show no significant 
difference in terms of gender.  
 
This is a mandatory question, which reveals that nearly 95.1% of the respondents were 
male. The study did not examine the differences between the answers of males and females, 
although this could make for a potential basis for future research. Moreover, as mentioned 
above, the mixed results and no systematic results regarding the relationship between 
gender and negotiation outcome in the social psychology literature have been recognised 
(Cantrell and Butler 1997; Rubin and Brown 1975; Pruitt 1981). Thus, we do not consider 
the gender variable as a part of our research frame or as independent variables, since there 
have been no consistent findings to explain a main effect for gender differences in 
 121 
 
negotiation performance across hundreds of studies (Lewicki et al. 1994; Thompson 1990).  
 
As seen in Table 5.1 below, male negotiators are predominant, factoring at 95.1% of 
respondents based on the restrictions made wherein the respondents have to be Korean 
international negotiators with foreign partners. This phenomenon is actually limited to 
Korea and a few other Asian countries. To further emphasise this, females made up 5.38% 
of manager-level positions and 1.48% of board-member positions among the top 100 
companies in Korea in 2011, while the total female employment ratio (e.g., ages 15 and 
older) was 47.6% in 2010 (World Bank, 2012).  
 
Table5. 1 Gender demographics 
 
Respondents’ gender Frequency Percent 
Male 116 95.1% 
Female 6 4.9% 




Most of the respondents to this questionnaire revealed that they were part of the 36–40-
year-old age group, while 37% were 41 years of age and above. Only seven responses came 
from ages 61 years and over. This survey question was also mandatory to demonstrate that 
most of the respondents participated or were then currently participating in international 
M&As and were experienced at the level of manager or middle manager, interpreted 
through 88.5% of the respondents’ ages ranging between 30 and 59, as shown in Table 5.2. 
 
Table5. 2 Age demographics 
 
Age range Frequency Percent 
-29 8 6.6% 
30-39 47 38.5% 
40-49 49 40.2% 
50-59 12 9.8% 
60- 6 4.9% 





5.2.3 International business negotiation experience 
 
Results revealed that over 44.9% of the participants had greater than three years of 
international business-negotiation experience. Around 16.4% of them had more than 10 
years of international negotiation experience, especially in M&As. This adds strength to 
the fact that it is an appropriate sample of negotiators with corresponding experience, 
although 32.8% of them had only 0–2 years of experience. However, 21.3% of the 
respondents had not answered all of the questions, as there were missing variables, which 
may increase the concentration of experienced negotiators, such as those with more than 6 
years of experience; the management level of some of the missing respondents was at CEO 
level or at higher levels than middle managers.  
 
Since the experience of negotiators is based on both their knowledge and skill for a lengthy 
period of time, previous research has operationalised experience using various multiple 
measures with high correlation results (Levy and Sharma 1994). In Mintu and 
Gassenheimer (2002), prior experience of negotiations and tenure in an organisation are 
suggested as factors that need to be considered for a cooperative result and they are well 
supported by some of the research (Rubin and Brown 1975; Thomson 1990) and even by 
empirical evidence provided by Baserman, Magliozzi and Male (1985). Thus, this question 
was also mandatory. 
 
Table5. 3 Negotiators' experience 
 
Year range Frequency Percent 
0-2 40 32.8% 
3-5 27 22.1% 
6-9 9 7.4% 
10-19 9 7.4% 
20- 11 9% 
Missing 26 21.3% 
Total 122 100% 
 
 
5.2.4 Nationality and Industry of foreign partners 
 
At the beginning or end of the survey questionnaire, the general questions regarding the 
demographic and industry related information. However, the importance of confidentiality 
in M&A deals, international negotiators strongly refused to reply regarding the general 
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information of their M&A deals, when they think questions are sensitive or sometimes 
illegitimate behavior as a representative of company’s critical deal.  
 
As a result, unfortunately 24.5% and 6.6% of missing points are shown in Table5.4 and 
Table5.5. Korean companies made an agreement for cross-border M&As mostly with Japan 
(6.2%), U.S. (5.3%), Europe (5.3%), and China (3.7%) among the deals of respondents. In 
terms of industry types in the cross-border M&A deals, manufacturing (6.2%), investment 
banking (5.8%), consulting (4.9%), banking (4.1%), accounting (2.9%), and high-
technology (2.1%) are mainly managed, meanwhile the industry type of this sample is 
broad.   
 
























Table5. 5 Industry of cross-border M&A deals 
 Frequency Percent 
Japan 15 6.2 
U.S. 13 5.3 
Europe 13 5.3 
China 9 3.7 
Malaysia 2 0.8 
Peru 2 0.8 
Vietnam 2 0.8 
Australia 2 0.8 
Africa 1 0.4 
Egypt 1 0.4 
Hong Kong 1 0.4 
Saudi Arabia 1 0.4 
Taiwan 1 0.4 
Thailand 1 0.4 
UAE 1 0.4 
Missing Data 57 23.5 
Total 122 100 
 Frequency Percent 
manufacturing 15 6.2 
investment banking 14 5.8 
consulting 12 4.9 
banking 10 4.1 
accounting 7 2.9 




5.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
The purpose of this section is to explore whether there is an independent variable showing 
a prominently different nature compared with the other factors. In addition, descriptive 
analysis examines whether there are any differences between samples including and 
excluding other foreign origins. Thus, if there is a huge difference between them, then it is 
better to discard those responses in order to prevent the potential distortion of the results. 
If there is no significant difference, the researcher intends to include other variables. After 
the descriptive analysis is conducted, a series of regression examinations will be attempted 
to identify factors facilitating cooperative negotiation processes, after checking the 
reliability and validity performances.  
 
5.3.1 Descriptive analysis of variables 
 
Table 5.6 presents the descriptive statistics for the individual items with the means and 
standard deviations, and the minimum and maximum of their ratings in the research. Except 
for some variables, the means of the predictors are generally in the middle of their ranges. 
construction 4 1.6 
electronics 4 1.6 
engineering 4 1.6 
software 4 1.6 
telecommunication 4 1.6 
wholesale 4 1.6 
steel 3 1.2 
apparel 2 .8 
automotive 2 .8 
biotechnology 2 .8 
pharmaceuticals 2 .8 
service 2 .8 
transportation 1 .4 
computer 1 .4 
cosmetics 1 .4 
energy 1 .4 
food and beverage 1 .4 
insurance 1 .4 
real estate 1 .4 
MISSING 16 6.6 
Total 122 100 
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With respect to the standard deviation, it is a statistic that indicates how tightly all the 
variables are clustered around the mean in a set of data. When the variables are tightly 
bunched together around the mean, then the standard deviation is small. In other words, 
since it is defined as a statistical measure of the dispersion of a set of data from its mean, 
the more spread apart the data, the higher the deviation. The standard deviation is calculated 
as the square root of variance.  
 
Table 5.7 provides the intercorrelations with the correlation coefficients between each pair 
of variables listed by using the Pearson correlation command in SPSS. The correlation 
coefficient (r) that indicates the strength of association between any two variables has a 
value ranging from −1.00 to 1.00, indicating the strength of the relationship between two 
variables (Pallant 2010)12. A value of +1.00 indicates a perfect positive relationship and 
−1.00 indicates a perfect negative or reverse relationship; this relates only to the direction 
of the relationship and not to the strength of correlation. Cohen (1988:79–81) proposed the 
guideline as small 0.10 ≤ r ≤ 0.29, medium 0.30 ≤ r ≤ 0.49 or large 0.50 ≤ r ≤ 1.0, suggesting 
that above 0.5 means quite a strong relationship between two variables. Thus, according to 
Table 5.7, all the correlation coefficients are less than 0.5. Regarding the level of statistical 
significance of the correlation coefficient, it does not actually denote the association of two 
variables, but instead it explains how much assurance there is in the results of the achieved 
correlation analysis. Then, there is no need to check the significance level, and further 
statistical analysis is thus performed, since there is no significant problem from 
intercorrelation based on the results shown in the table5.7.  
 
It is true that the simplest and most explicit vehicle for identifying collinearity is an 
examination of the correlation analysis for the independent variables. The presence of high 
correlations of 0.90 or more is generally the first evidence of substantial collinearity, which 
is due to the combined effect of two or more other independent variables and is called 
multicollinearity. The effect of multicollinearity is extremely critical, especially in the 
multiple regressions among variables (Rawlings, 1988). However, based on the results of 
an initial assessment of multicollinearity, as shown in Table 5.7, before checking the 
tolerance and the variance inflation factor (VIF), it seems that multicollinearity between 
the variables may not be a problem, and it will not have a significant influence on the 
                                            
12 A correlation of 0 explains no relationship at all, a correlation of 1.0 explains a perfect positive correlation 
and a value of −0.1 explains a perfect negative correlation (Pallant 2010). 
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regression result derived from all of the independent variables, since most of the 
correlations are relatively low and all are below 0.60. As mentioned above, researchers are 
generally recommended not to include variables with a correlation coefficient of 0.70 or 
more (Pallant 2010) or 0.90 or more (Hair et al. 2009), respectively, in the same analysis. 
Moreover, in terms of the multicollinearity check, we can also check the tolerance and the 
VIF score, as shown in Table 5.16 later. Both the tolerance and the VIF as collinearity 
measures are provided for the impact of collinearity on the independent variables in the 
regression equation (Hair et al. 2006). 
 
Table5. 6 Descriptive statistics (N=122) 
 




Dependent Integrativeness 4.4918 1.23981 2.00 7.00 
Independent 
Attractiveness 4.5191 1.28139 1.00 7.00 
Compliant personality 4.9918 1.00180 2.00 7.00 
Aggressive personality 4.9921 0.76133 2.25 6.50 
Detached personality 2.8579 0.99116 1.00 6.00 
Hard tactics 4.7766 1.07267 2.00 7.00 
Rational tactics 5.5943 0.94657 2.50 7.00 
Soft tactics 5.4139 0.76451 3.25 7.00 
Time pressure 4.2541 1.26698 1.00 6.33 
Legitimate power 4.1373 1.11299 1.00 7.00 
Reputational power 4.0410 1.12877 1.00 6.75 






















Table5. 7 Pearson correlation matrix 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 1.000            
2 .435** 1.000           
3 .150 .203* 1.000          
4 -.218* -.051 .237** 1.000         
5 -.026 .122 -.115 .063 1.000        
6 .062 -.048 .418** .123 -.193* 1.000       
7 .214* .073 .152 .109 -.039 .322** 1.000      
8 .077 .297** .322** .041 -.160 .206* .260** 1.000     
9 -.210* -.136 -.113 .076 .102 .245** .249** .071 1.000    
10 .044 .160 .286** .094 .083 .137 -.104 .260** .006 1.000   
11 .255** .244** .271** .178* .090 .123 .117 .087 .078 .282** 1.000  
12 .085 ..231* .218* .258** .223* .079 .113 .023 .055 .366** .541** 1.000 























The abbreviations used in this study are detailed below in Table5.8. They were generated 
as lower-case letters by the software.  
 
Table5. 8 Abbreviation of key variables and its measurement scales 
 
Dimensions Name Description 
Individual Dimension 
ATTRAC Attractiveness of counterpart 
AGREE Aggressive personality of negotiator 
COM Compliant personality of negotiator 
DETCH Detached personality of negotiator 
Strategic Dimension 
HT Hard tactics during the negotiation activity 
RT Rational tactics during the negotiation activity 
ST Soft tactics during the negotiation activity 
Contextual Dimension 
TP Time pressure perceived during the negotiation 
LEGIP Relative legitimate power with counterpart 
REPUP Relative reputational power with counterpart 
INFOP Relative informational power with counterpart 
Cooperative Approach CORPNESS Cooperativeness with counterpart 
Note: Table summaries each question used in the full questionnaire available in Appendix 
 
CAD : compliant, aggressive, and detached personality 
VIF : variance inflation factor 
FDI : foreign direct investment 
UNCTAD : united nations conference on trade and development 
M&A : merger and acquisition 
KMO : Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure 
SEM : structural equation modeling 
CFA : confirmatory factor analysis 
EFA : exploratory factor analysis 
CMV : common method variance  




5.4 Reliability and validity of the measurements 
 
5.4.1 Checking internal reliability 
 
Multiple question items are preferred because they provide ‘richer’ description of concepts. 
Models with one item for a factor usually encounter difficulties because a single item is 
likely to be inadequate in capturing the abstract concepts involved (Anderson and Gerbing 
1988; Bentler and Chou 1987; Diamontopoilos 1994). A multiple-item approach was 
adopted when operationalising the latent factors in this research. The assessment of 
unidimensionality, reliability and validity are critical for multiple-item measurement 
constructs. 
 
Unidimensionality means that scaled items are strongly associated with each other and 
stand for a single concept, since an underlying assumption and crucial requirement for 
constructing a summated scale is that the items are unidimensional (Haire et al. 2006). The 
assessment of unidimensionality can be executed through factor analysis to evaluate 
whether the summated scale consists of items loading highly onto a single factor (Hattie 
1985). Thus, researchers are encouraged to check the unidimensionality before assessing 
the reliability, because the reliability test itself may not be enough to ensure 
unidimensionality (Haire et al. 2006). A reliability check evaluates the degree of 
consistency between multiple items measured for variables. Construct reliability is not the 
same as validity because we might have consistent but invalid measures (Bollen 1989). A 
number of techniques have been proposed to assess construct reliability: test–retest, item-
to-total correlations and Cronbach’s alpha coefficients. The test–retest method is basically 
the same measures with the same individual at two points in time. That is to say, the best 
way to assess reproducibility is to ask the respondents to complete the questionnaire once 
again and compare both sets of answers. The objective is to ensure that a measurement is 
not remarkably diverse and is reliable at any point in time. The test–retest is the simplest 
method, but it is irrational to execute in reality. Thus, this approach was not performed in 
this research, since it is even more challenging at the firm level of research with managerial 
respondents having to answer the same set of questions twice with their hectic schedules. 
A more popular method of reliability is to check internal consistency, which applies to the 
consistency between the items within a construct. There are a series of diagnostic measures 
to evaluate internal consistency such as item-to-total correlations and Cronbach’s (1951) 
alpha coefficients (Haire et al. 1998). In general, the item-to-total correlations exceed 0.50 
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and the inter-item correlations exceed 0.30. Coefficient alpha, the reliability coefficient that 
inspects the consistency of the entire scale as a diagnostic measure of internal consistency, 
has become the most prominent method index in social research. Conservatively, the lower 
limit of Cronbach’s alpha is generally 0.70, but this may be moderated to 0.60 in 
exploratory research (Hair et al. 2009). One of the most commonly used methods to check 
internal consistency is Cronbach’s coefficient alpha, which indicates the average 
correlation among all of the items consisting of the scale. Based upon the formula _ = rk 
/[1 + (k -1)r], where k is the number of items considered and r is the mean of the inter-item 
correlations, the size of alpha is determined by both the number of items in the scale and 
the mean inter-item correlations. Cronbach’s alpha values range from 0 to 1, with higher 
values indicating greater reliability or internal consistency of the items in the scale. Ideally, 
a level of 0.6 or more is generally considered as good reliability (Noh, 2002), and Nunnally 
(1978) recommends 0.7 as a minimum level, although 0.6 is generally accepted in much of 
the research. George and Mallery (2003) provide the following rules in detail: ‘> 0.9 
excellent; > 0.8 good; > 0.7 acceptable; > 0.6 questionable; > 0.5 poor; and < 0.5 
unacceptable’ (231). To conduct the initial test, all of the variables for the negotiation 
process are included. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability test is conducted only with scales of 
attractiveness, personality, tactics, time pressure and relative power to deduce whether the 
answers given by the questionnaire respondents are indeed reliable or how free they are 
from random error (Babbie et al. 2000). Therefore, the data gathered from the survey must 
be tested for reliability and Cronbach’s alpha will be used to achieve this.  
 
In terms of reliability, the most important figure is the alpha value, in that it is based on the 
overall combination of items within a test. According to Noh (2001), such variables, which 
have a low alpha value, are better removed from the test so that internal consistency can be 
improved. For instance, the elimination of any of the other items with the lowest number 
from the scale results in little change in the alpha value increasing, since the figures for 
‘Alpha if an item is deleted’ actually show the impact of removing a result from each item 
in the scale to increase the reliability (Norusis 1988). Table 5.9 also presents the value of 
‘Correlated item-total correlation’, which indicates the degree to which each item correlates 
with the total score. Less than 0.3 indicates that the item is measuring something different 
from the scale as a whole and all scores from Table 5.9 are over 0.3. The attractiveness 
variable has an alpha of 0.799 and a standardised item alpha of 0.801. This value is well 
above 0.6 and thus shows high reliability. There is little difference between the two alphas, 
Cronbach’s alpha and the standardised item alpha, which is calculated if all of the items 
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were standardised to a variance of 1 (Norusis 1988), since the items have comparable 
variances. Crucially, in terms of personality, there are three variables: compliance, 
aggressiveness and detachment. Their Cronbach’s alpha values were 0.547, 0.582 and 
0.605, respectively. These values are not unacceptable, since the unacceptable level is seen 
at a value less than 0.5, according to George and Mallery (2003); however, the internal 
consistency is still poor. One of the reasons for a poor Cronbach’s alpha value in general is 
that Cronbach’s alpha values are dependent on the number of items in the scale, thus the 
value can be quite small, since there are only a small number of items in the scale, three or 
four, which is obviously less than 10 (Pallant 2010). On the other hand, the results for the 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for relative power in terms of legitimating, reputation and 
information were 0.797, 0.880 and 0.863, respectively, although there are only four items 
in their scales. The scales’ overall Cronbach’s alpha is high, meaning that the scale is quite 
reliable, and there is no need to consider removing items with low correlations since an 
alpha of 0.8 is probably a reasonable goal in general. Overall, it should also be noted that 
a high or average value for Cronbach’s alpha indicates good internal consistency of the 
items in the scale of each variable. In other words, Cronbach’s alpha has been used to assess 
the reliability of these responses. As the result of this reliability test demonstrated, the data 
relating to the variables in this study is trustable, indicating that the survey data is 
reproducible. Practically, it means that this data can be trusted when we use the data for the 
statistical analysis for multiple-regression models. Having determined that the dependent 
variables are reliable, our next step is to understand how they might be grouped together 
for the purpose of further analysis to be conducted through factor analysis. Factor analysis 
is a method to determine the dimensionality of a scale, while the internal consistency of the 























BI1 .645 .725 
.799 BI2 .600 .776 
BI3 .690 677 
Compliant 
Personality 
BII2 .332 .486 
.547 BII9 .303 .552 
BII17 .456 .229 
Aggressive 
Personality 
BII21 .363 .513 
.582 
BII24 .401 .481 
BII26 .335 .536 
BII29 .364 .513 
Detached 
Personality 
BII6 .317 .637 
.605 BII15 .484 .397 
BII22 .448 .455 
Time Pressure 
CVI5 .669 .631 
.775 CVI6 .703 .587 
CVI7 .490 .817 
Legitimate 
Power 
CI2 .565 .768 
.797 
CI3 .538 .780 
CI4 .736 .678 
CI5 .604 .749 
Reputational 
Power 
CIII1 .683 .868 
.880 
CIII2 .751 .843 
CIII3 .816 .816 
CIII4 .719 .855 
Informational 
Power 
CIV1 .681 .837 
.863 
CIV2 .745 .810 
CIV3 .736 .814 
CIV5 .680 .837 
Hard Tactics 
DI4 .616 .708 
.778 
DI5 .563 .735 
DI6 .642 .701 
DI8 .535 .758 
Soft Tactics 
DII2 .668 .798 
.839 
DII3 .744 .767 
DII4 .706 .781 
DII10 .578 .836 
Rational Tactics 
DIII1 .738 .910 
.914 
DIII2 .816 .884 
DIII3 .852 .872 




5.4.2 Confirmatory factor analysis of the measurement 
 
After having ensured that a scale complies with its conceptual definition, unidimensionality 
and the required level of reliability, the scale validity should eventually be investigated 
(Hair et al. 2009). Validity is basically concerned with whether a variable evaluates what it 
is supposed to measure (Bollen 1989:184). There are three types of validity to be introduced 
and assessed: content validity, convergent validity and discriminant validity. Content 
validity is a so-called qualitative type of validity. It can be assessed by experts to recognise 
whether the measures entirely represent the concept through ratings, or by subpopulations 
to pre-test the measures. In this research, the theoretical definition of the concept relating 
to each variable was generated from the previous research and the expert opinions are 
included from the pre-tests with practicing managers and academics. The main purpose is 
to confirm that the scale items contain both theoretical and practical considerations in terms 
of them being applicable, since the items represent the whole range of possible items 
covered. Convergent validity can be estimated simply by looking at the significance of the 
factor loadings, checking whether the two measures for the same concept are correlated 
(Simonin 1999a). Discriminant validity is the degree to which two conceptually similar 
concepts are distinct (Hair et al. 2009). Construct validation is determined by CFA, which 
is a more powerful method suggesting fewer assumptions and providing more diagnostic 
information about construct validity (Bagozzi et al. 1991).  
 
Factor analysis is a universal name given to a class of multivariate statistical methods 
whose primary purpose is to define the underlying structure in a data matrix (Hair et al. 
2009). Factor analysis is also a statistical technique used to reduce a large number of items 
to a smaller set of fundamental variables that include the primary structural information 
contained by the refined variables. More specifically, factor analysis is performed to 
distinguish what the underlying conceptual structure is as a set of dependent variables by 
discovering the correlations between each variable of the set in the research frame, since 
the primary purpose of factor analysis is to recognise the underlying patterns and 
relationships of a set of independent variables (Coakes and Steed 2001; George and Mallery 
1995). Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses are two major types of factor analysis. 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is a more traditional approach and is used as a data-
reduction technique in general quantitative research. EFA is designed for the situation 
where the detailed modelling relating to the latent and observed variables is not specified 
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in advance. In contrast, CFA addresses a situation where the researchers have set the 
number of latent variables and have constructed the model in advance. In substantive cases, 
EFA can prove valuable and can explain the covariances or correlations between many 
observed variables by means of relatively few underlying latent variables (Bollen 1989). 
CFA is deemed more appropriate for this research, since the link between the latent and 
observed variables was specified a priori based on knowledge of the theory and previous 
empirical studies. The CFA model within the context of SPSS is considered to represent 
the measurement model. The confirmatory solution offers the following advantages: (1) 
measures of the overall degree of fit are proved in any particular application (e.g., the chi-
square goodness-of-fit test); and (2) more diagnostic information on how well convergent 
and discriminant validity are achieved (Bagozzi et al. 1991).  
 
The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) index is a measure of sampling adequacy and ranges 
from 0 to 1, reaching 1 when each variable is perfectly predicted, without error, by the other 
variables. According to the guidelines for the interpretation of the measure, in general, as 
in Table 5.10 below, a value of 0.80 or above is meritorious; 0.70 or above, middling; 0.60 
or above, mediocre; 0.50 or above, miserable; and below 0.50, it is unacceptable. To 
increase the measure of sampling adequacy, (1) the sample size increases, (2) the average 
correlations increase, (3) the number of variables increases or (4) the number of factors 
decreases. The researcher is always recommended to have an overall value of sampling 
adequacy above 0.50 before performing the factor analysis. The variable-specific sampling 
adequacy values can identify variables for deletion to achieve an overall value of 0.50 
(Bryman 2012), since small values of the KMO statistic indicate that the correlations 
between pairs of variables cannot be explained by other variables and that factor analysis 
may not be appropriate. In other words, the measure for the sampling adequacy value must 
exceed 0.50 for both the overall test and each individual variable, and then variables with 
values of less than 0.50 should be omitted from the factor analysis one at a time, with the 










Table5. 10 Adequacy level in Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value 
 
KMO Value Degree of Common Variance 
0.90 to 1.00 Marvelous 
0.80 to 0.89 Meritorious 
0.70 to 0.79 Middling 
0.60 to 0.69 Mediocre  
0.50 to 0.59 Miserable 
0.00 to 0.49 Don't Factor 
Source: Bryman (2012) 
 
This research employs varimax rotation, which is the most common of the rotations 
available. The purpose of this is to minimise the complexity of the variables by making the 
large loadings larger and the small loadings smaller within each variable, and there are also 
other rotational methods such as quartimax rotation and equamax rotation (Hair et al. 2009). 
Rotation is often compulsory, since the original factor structure is mathematically correct 
but is difficult to interpret. As a result, the factor-rotation aspect is used to achieve what is 
called a simple structure, containing high factor loadings on one factor and low loadings 
on all others. To determine the number of factors to be extracted, a scree plot created by 
SPSS indicates a sensible cut-off point at three in this research. The total variance explained 
for the items for each variable (personality, tactics and relative power) also confirms a 
three-factor solution, which is the same as those of the scree plot. Table 5.9 shows the actual 
factors extracted with eigenvalues greater than 1. As the table5.9 shows, SPSS always 
initially extracts as many factors as there are variables in the dataset. Next, the ‘% of 
variance’ column explains how much of the total variability in all of the variables together 
can be accounted for by each of these summary scales or factors. For example, factor 1 
accounts for 37.201% of the variability in all 12 possible variables. More interestingly, the 
proportions for the variance criterion suggest a three-factor solution with more than 70% 
of the total variance, except for the personality variable with 53.138%, as reported in Table 
5.11, Table 5.12 and Table 5.13, shown as ‘cumulative %’.  
 
For factor measurement, we used the conventional criterion of the coefficient alpha 
(Nunnally 1967) as well as more advanced criteria based on CFA (Joreskog 1966; 1969). 
We analysed the psychometric properties of our scales for each factor individually. The 




Overall, the results indicate acceptable psychometric properties for all constructs. 
Coefficient alpha values are above 0.7 and thus exceed the threshold value of 0.6 
recommended by Nunnally (1967). Hence, the alpha values suggest a reasonable degree of 
internal consistency between the corresponding indicators. Additionally, the average 
variances extracted and the composite reliabilities are above the recommended threshold 
values of 0.5 and 0.6, respectively (Bagozzi and Yi 1988). Additionally, all individual item 
reliabilities are above the required value of 0.4 (Bagozzi and Baumgartner 1994).  
 
Through principal component analysis as an extraction method, the factor analysis has been 
used to uncover the underlying structure of a series of negotiation processes. The factor 
analysis identifies three dimensions, which have been described as the personality factors 
of compliant, aggressive and detached; the tactical factors of hard, rational and soft; and 
the relative power factors of legitimate, reputational and informational. Each of the factors 
that represent a type of personality, tactic or relative power will be used as dependent 
variables in statistical analysis using multiple linear regressions in order to identify key 
variables affecting the integrative process of negotiation in the next section.  
 
Table5. 11 Total variance explained on 3 items for Personality 
 








1 1.998 19.980 19.980 1.998 19.980 19.980 
2 1.904 19.038 39.018 1.904 19.038 39.018 
3 1.412 14.120 53.138 1.412 14.120 53.138 
4 .960 9.604 62.741    
5 .803 8.029 70.770    
6 .781 7.806 78.576    
       
10 .416 4.156 100.000    











Table5. 12 Total variance explained on 3 items for Tactics 
 








1 4.464 37.201 37.201 4.464 37.201 37.201 
2 2.322 19.348 56.550 2.322 19.348 56.550 
3 1.961 16.341 72.891 1.961 16.341 72.891 
4 .673 5.608 78.499    
5 .516 4.300 82.799    
6 .421 3.505 86.304    
       
12 .163 1.357 100.000    
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis 
 
Table5. 13 Total variance explained on 3 items for Relative power 
 








1 5.333 44.443 44.443 5.333 44.443 44.443 
2 1.852 15.435 59.879 1.852 15.435 59.879 
3 1.234 10.284 70.162 1.234 10.284 70.162 
4 .815 6.792 76.954    
5 .616 5.133 82.087    
6 .507 4.229 86.316    
       
12 .155 1.296 100.000    
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis 
Table5. 14 Factor loading : Varimax rotaed matrix 
 




.585 .826 .816 
Factors 
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 
Compliant Aggressive Detached Hard Soft Rational Legitimate Reputational Information 
 .837 .707 .766 .846 .892 .897 .854 .870 .880 
 .683 .678 .737 .820 .858 .896 .793 .841 .822 
 .576 .625 .680 .731 .821 .887 .709 .807 .716 





5.5 Data analysis 
 
After the identification of the factor dimensions of personality, tactics and relative power 
in the last section, this section analyses the significant factors affecting the negotiation 
process. The model presented in Chapter 3 has introduced a conceptual framework that has 
anticipated the potential influence of several variables on the integrative negotiation 
process during international M&A negotiations. These independent variables are 
categorised into the three conceptual components (individual, strategic and contextual) 
affecting the negotiation’s outcome. 
 
5.5.1 Data analysis procedure in SPSS 
 
Multiple regression is the appropriate method of analysis when the research problem 
involves a single-metric dependent variable presumed to be related to two or more metric 
independent variables. In other words, whenever the researcher is interested in predicting 
the amount or size of the dependent variable, multiple regression is useful. The objective 
of multiple-regression analysis is for the researcher to predict the changes in the dependent 
variable in response to changes in the independent variables. This objective is most often 
achieved through the statistical rule of least squares. Each independent variable is weighted 
by the regression analysis procedure to ensure maximal prediction from the set of 
independent variables. The weights denote the relative contribution of the independent 
variables to the overall prediction and they facilitate the interpretation as to the influence 
of each variable in making the prediction, although correlation among the independent 
variables complicates the interpretative process. The set of weighted independent variables 
forms the regression variate; a linear combination of the independent variables that best 
predicts the dependent variable. The regression variate, also referred to as the regression 
equation or regression model, is the most widely known example of a variate among the 
multivariate techniques.  
 
To apply multiple-regression analysis: (1) the data must be metric or appropriately 
transformed, and (2) before deriving the regression equation, the researcher must decide 
which variable is to be dependent and which remaining variables will be independent. In 
this section, we analyse the significant variables affecting the cooperative process of 
international M&A negotiations. The model presented in Figure2.1 has introduced a 
conceptual framework that anticipates the potential influences of several variables on 
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cooperativeness. The independent variables included in this research are based on the 
previous arguments and theoretical development. Those independent variables are 
categorised into three components to illuminate the characteristics of the negotiation 
environment, especially during the face-to-face performance. This research idea is shown 
as:  
 
CORPNESS (cooperativeness of the negotiation process) = f (individual components, 
strategic components, contextual components) 
 
To reiterate, the above function is used to describe the cooperative negotiation process, and 
can be transformed into the following multiple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
equation. The regression equation and model of this study is as below:  
 
Where CORPNESS is the problem-solving behaviour or cooperative process during the 
international M&A negotiations, b0 , b1……, b11 = coefficients of independent variables from 
ATRAC to INFOP. 
 
The multiple OLS regression is concerned with the relationship between a dependent 
variable and a series of independent variables, which allows for the discovery of the 
simultaneous effect of multiple variables on a dependent variable (Tabachnick and Fidell 
2007).  
 
Table5. 15 Assumptions of Ordinary Least Squares regression 
 
Classical assumptions of Ordinary Least Squares regression 
Assumptions Results 
 
1. Predictors are linearly related to the DV - 
Linearity 
2. The expected value of the error term is 
always zero population mean 
3. The data are a random sample of the 
population : The errors are statistically 
independent from one another, and not 
correlated with X’s – Independence of 
observations 
 
 If assumptions 1-5 are satisfied, OLS 
estimator is unbiased 
 If assumption 6 is also satisfied, OLS 
estimator has minimum variance of all 
unbiased estimators. 
 If assumption 7 is also satisfied, we can do 
hypothesis testing using t and F-test 
 How can we test these assumptions? 
 If assumptions are violated,  
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4. The independent variables are not too 
strongly collinear: No perfect 
multicollinearity 
5. The independent variables are measured 
precisely and captured in the construct 
measured – Reliable measures 
6. The residuals have constant variance - 
Homoscedasticity 
7. The residuals (errors) should be normally 
distributed about the DV - Normality 
-What does this do to our 
conclusions? -How do we fix the 
problem? 
Source: Tabachnick and Fidell 2007; Pallant 2010 
 
There are various models for conducting the regression analyses (Coakes and Steed 
2001:171). All of the approaches differ in the way in which the independent variables are 
introduced into the OLS regression equation. This research undertakes multiple-regression 
analyses and will compare the results. By employing both techniques, it is expected that 
they will provide a thorough understanding of the variables affecting the cooperative 
process of negotiation by testing the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. 
 
As shown in Table5.15, the multiple OLS regression is classically assumed by seven 
criteria. Most assumptions can be verified by the residual scatterplots, which are shown 
when performing SPSS as part of the multiple-regression procedure. Since residuals 
explain the differences between the obtained and the predicted dependent variable (DV) 
scores, the residual scatterplots in SPSS allow for the checking of the normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity and independence of the residuals (Pallant 2010). One of the main 
concerns for sensitive multiple regression is outliers with extreme scores (e.g., very high 
or low scores) identified by the values from standardised residual plots ranging above about 
3.3 or less than −3.3 (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007).  
 
Before regression analyses are conducted, certain prerequisite checks must be completed. 
These checks are necessary to ensure the reliability and validity of subsequent regression 
analyses. The research has run tolerance, VIF, condition index as well as correlation 
analyses to assess the level of multicollinearity among the independent variables (see Table 





In this section, methods, measures and the results relating to the validity and the reliability 
of the regression analyses are introduced. Hence, it is now possible to consider individual 
characteristics in relation to the themes forming the research questions. A series of new 
sections deal with each regression model in turn. This research conducts both simultaneous 
and stepwise regression analyses in order to identify critical factors affecting the process 
of negotiation. Stepwise regression analyses are used particularly in an attempt to verify 
the results derived from the previous analyses.  
 
5.5.2 Results of hypothesised relationships 
 
The results of the multiple-regression analyses for the cooperative negotiation process as 
the dependent variable as performed in SPSS are presented in Table5.18. Four models are 
introduced, consisting of eleven independent variables. The independent variables are 
categorised by three components or levels as ‘individual components’, ‘strategic 
components’ and ‘contextual components’. Model 4 shows the full model, whereas models 
1, 2 and 3 examine the effects of those critical variables on each of the three components 
separately. Overall, the results for the models are significant (e.g., the significance of model 
1 is at p < .001; model 3 is at p < .01; and model 4 is at p < .001), except for model 2, where 
strategic components relate to the cooperativeness of negotiation (DV). 
 
5.5.3.1. Overall assessment of the research model 
 
Before evaluating the model and each independent variable, we need to check whether the 
assumption criteria (i.e., normality, linearity, homoscadasticity, no multicollinearity and the 
independence of the residuals) of the OLS regression are fulfilled in this data, and the 
outliers should be managed. Regarding the mulicollinearity check of model 4, SPSS 
performs ‘collinearity diagnostics’ and ‘correlations’ for the multiple-regression procedure. 
Firstly, the correlation value has been checked, since independent variables need to have at 
least some relationship with the dependent variable, preferably above 0.3, and the 
correlation between each of the independent variables should not be too high, preferably 
less than 0.7 (Pallant 2010). If any highly correlated independent variables are identified, 
either one of the independent variables should be omitted or two correlated independent 
variables should be condensed into one (Hair et al. 2009; Pallant 2010). As shown in Table 
5.7, the highest correlation is 0.476, which is obviously less than 0.7, so all of the 
independent variables can be retained in this study. However, the bivariate correlations 
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between independent and dependent variables are very poor.  
 
Secondly, multicollinearity is identified by examining the two values of tolerance and VIF, 
as shown in Table 5.16. Tolerance is a direct measure of multicollinearity and an indicator 
of how much the variability of the selected independent variables is not explained by the 
other independent variables, which is calculated as 1-R2 for each variable (Hair et al. 2009; 
Pallant 2010). Thus, the high tolerance value means a small degree of multicollinearity. For 
instance, a value less than 0.10 is considered very small, indicating a high multiple 
correlation with other variables equating to the possibility of multicollinearity (Pallant 
2010). In this model, the lowest tolerance value is 0.540, which exceeds the cut-off points 
for determining the presence of multicollinearity. As a second measure of multicollinearity, 
if the value of VIF, which is calculated simply by the inverse of the tolerance value13, has 
a value above 10, it indicates a multicollinearity concern (Hair et al. 2009; Pallant 2010). 
Therefore, the value of 0.54 that was derived is less than 1 (tolerance), and 1.857 (VIF), 
which is well below the cut-off point of 10. Since we did not identify any serious 
multicollinearity issues from the results, there is no need to remove any intercorrelated 
independent variables from the model. Although highly intercorrelated independent 
variables need to be removed from the model, we have not identified any serious 
multicollinearity issues from the results.  
 
Table5. 16 Collinearity statistics (DV: cooperative process of negotiation) 
 
Model Tolerance VIF 
ATTRAC .686 1.458 
COM .815 1.226 
DETCH .819 1.221 
AGREE .656 1.524 
HT .694 1.441 
RT .754 1.327 
ST .685 1.461 
TP .811 1.233 
LEGIP .705 1.418 
REPUP .601 1.665 
INFOP .540 1.851 
                                            
13 The value of tolerance .686 for ATTRAC variable is the inverse of the VIF value of 1.458 (i.e., 




We still need to evaluate the variables for meeting the OLS assumptions such as linearity, 
homoscadasticity, independence of the residuals and normality. The residual, as the 
principal measure for assessing the regression variate, indicates the difference between the 
actual dependent and predicted variable value (Hair et al. 2009). In order for a comparison 
to be made, the studentised residuals are utilised as standardised residuals (Hair et al. 2009).  
 
Linearity denotes that residuals should be distributed around the scores of predicted 
dependent variables, which is evaluated through the analysis of the residuals to examine 
the overall variate and partial regression plots for each independent variable (Hair et al. 
2009; Pallant 2010). In the scatterplot of the standardised residuals shown in Figure 5.1, 
residuals are expected to be roughly rectangularly distributed, with most scores 
concentrating along the centre point 0, while a clear or systematic pattern of residuals such 
as an acurvilinear pattern or a pattern that is higher on one side than the other should be 
avoided (Pallant 2010; Hair et al. 2009). As shown in Figure 5.2, the scatterplot does not 
exhibit any nonlinear pattern for the residuals, thus ensuring the linearity of the overall 
equation and meeting the assumption of linearity for each independent variable.  
 
The homoscadasticity assumption deals with the constancy of the residuals across values 
of the independent variables. Our analysis of the scatterplots is again carried out through 
an examination of the residuals, which shows no pattern of increasing or decreasing 
residuals. This finding indicates homoscadasticity in the multivariate case. In terms of the 
normality assumption, the normality of the error term of the variate is assessed through a 
visual examination of the normal probability plots of the residuals. As shown in Figure 5.1, 
since the values fall diagonally with no substantial or systematic departures, the residuals 
are considered to represent a normal distribution and the regression variate meets the 
assumption of normality.  
 
In a normally distributed sample, only 1 percent of cases are expected to fall outside of the 
standardised residual value range of above 3.0 or below −3.0, while the minimum and 
maximum of the standardised residual values are −2.532 and 2.167. Since 2.167 is not 
above 3, there are no serious issues around retaining this data as a part of the procedure. If 
any strange cases are identified, the Cook’s Distance value is applied to ascertain if this 
case exerts any undue influence on the results for the research model, and we need to 
determine whether it should be removed or whether new variables created by SPSS named 
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Cook’s Distance COO_1 at the end of the file should be used. According to Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2007), cases with values larger than 1 may have potential problems. As shown 
in Table 5.17 for the residual statistics, the maximum value for the Cook’s Distance is 0.111, 
slightly over 1, suggesting a potential outlier issue. In addition, the Mahalanobis distance 
is produced and Mah_1 is presented in the data file as extra variables at the end of the data 
file. In this study, the maximum Mahalanobis distance is 29.362. Tabachnick and Fidell’s 
(2007) guidelines provide a measure of the multivariate outlier based on the assessed chi-
square distribution; that is, the critical value14. According to the guideline, the critical value 
is 29.59 for 10 independent variables; therefore, even with 11 independent variables in the 
data file achieving a maximum value of 29.36, it does not exceed the critical value. As a 
result, critical multicollinearity and outlier issues have not threatened testing the model and 
have supported the results of the regression through the SPSS analytical process. 
 






                                            
14 The critical value is critical chi-square distribution. Utilizing the number of independent 
variables as the degrees of freedom, Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) guide critical value matching 
with the number of variables (i.e., degree of freedom) as; 13.82 (critical value) with 2(degree of 
freedom); 16.27 with 3; 18.47 with 4; 20.52 with 5; 22.46 with 6; 24.32 with 7; 26.13 with 8; 
27.88 with 9; 29.59 with 10. 
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Table5. 17 Residuals statistics 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.6183 6.4381 4.4918 .83068 122 
Std. Predicted Value -2.255 2.343 .000 1.000 122 
Standard Error  
of Predicted Value 
.150 .483 .294 .074 122 
Adjusted Predicted Value 2.6016 6.4251 4.4954 .83854 122 
Residual -2.44396 2.09228 .00000 .92038 122 
Std. Residual -2.532 2.167 .000 .953 122 
Stud. Residual -2.574 2.303 -.002 1.002 122 
Deleted Residual -2.52603 2.36224 -.00360 1.01762 122 
Stud. Deleted Residual -2.643 2.350 -.003 1.009 122 
Mahal. Distance 1.936 29.362 10.910 6.015 122 
Cook's Distance .000 .111 .009 .015 122 
Centered Leverage Value .016 .243 .090 .050 122 
 
Once we have completed checking the OLS assumptions, outliers and missing variables, 
we evaluate the model and independent variables and, finally, we confirm the hypotheses. 
Table 5.18 shows the full model for this research, including all of the variables categorised 
as individual, strategic and contextual components. We interpret the relationships between 
these independent variables and a cooperative atmosphere during the face-to-face 
negotiations in cross-border M&A cases, and identify the strong factors that have a 
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significant effect on cooperativeness as a DV in this research.  
 
In order to assess the model fit, R2, which is the ratio of the sum of squares regression to 
the total sum of squares, should be checked first. In other words, it is a measure of how 
well the least squares equation and the correlation coefficient squared, referred to as the 
coefficient of determination (Hair et al. 2009), as shown in the equation below. This is 
shown in the model summary box in SPSS. 
 
Coefficient of determination =  
 
The value of R2 indicates the percentage of total variation of Y explained by the regression 
model consisting of predictors (Xs). The R2 value is also a single measure of overall 
predictive accuracy indicating the following: (1) the combined effect of the entire variate 
in the prediction, even when the regression equation contains more than one independent 
variable; and (2) simply the squared correlation of the actual and predicted values (Hair et 
al. 2009). For instance, if the regression model perfectly predicts the dependent variable, 
R2 = 1.0, while R2 = 0 provides no better prediction than using an average baseline 
prediction. R2 contains a weakness wherein if more independent variables are added, the 
results will increase proportionately. In other words, the value of R2 in the sample is prone 
to being a rather optimistic overestimation of the true value in the population (Tabachnick 
and Fidell 2007). Thus, an adjusted coefficient of determination improves the weakness of 




Model 5 indicates that the values of R2 and the adjusted R2 are 0.449 and 0.394, respectively, 
as an evaluation of the overall regression model fit. The scores are expressed as a 
percentage multiplied by 100 as 44.9% and 39.4%. The adjusted R2 polishes the R2 to 
provide a better estimation of the true value for the population, and this value is particularly 
acceptable for our regression model due to the small sample size (e.g., 122 final samples) 
and the number of dependent variables (e.g., 11 variables) (Pallant 2010). Therefore, the 
final frame of this study model explains 39.4% of this study, which is interpreted as being 
highly adequate for our research model when compared to the findings in other 
international articles (Pallant 2010). In addition, this full model 4 shows outstanding 



























Next, we evaluate the independent variables that contribute to the prediction of the 
dependent variable. Initially, there are unstandardised coefficients and standardised 
coefficients within the coefficients labelled in the output box as a result of the regression 
performance in SPSS. The values of the standardised coefficients for each of the different 
variables are estimated in terms of how much the regression coefficient will vary between 
samples of the same size taken from the same population, reflecting the change in 
dependent measures for each unit change in the independent variable; thus, the values are 
converted to the same scale so that they are able to be compared (Hair et al. 2009; Pallant 
2010). In order to compare the contribution of each independent variable to the dependent 
variable, the beta coefficient values of 0.346, 0.301, −0.299, 0.295 and −0.252 – 
representing attractiveness, reputational power, compliant personality, rational tactics and 
time pressure of the international negotiators, respectively – have been checked. The results 
highlight the power of attractiveness as having a stronger significant influence on the 
cooperativeness of negotiations in face-to-face scenarios than any of the other independent 
variables. The Beta value of −0.252 for time pressure is lower than the value of 0.346 for 
attractiveness, indicating the lesser contribution made by time pressure to the 
cooperativeness between partners. 
 
In order to identify the significance in the value of each independent variable, Sig. should 
be checked to determine whether the variables have a unique contribution to the equation 
statistically, since this is very dependent on which variables are included in the equation 
and how much overlap there is among the independent variables. In other words, if the 
value of the significance level is less than .05, .01, .001 and .0001, it is interpreted that the 
independent variables have a significant and unique contribution to the prediction of the 
dependent variable, while if the value is greater than .05, it is concluded that the 
independent variables do not have a significant and unique contribution to the prediction 
of the dependent variable. As shown in Table 5.18, based on the full model of this study 
(for model 4) showing the unstandardised coefficients of B, the t-value and the significance 
level, attractiveness, compliant personality, rational tactics, time pressure and reputational 
power have a unique and statistically significant contribution to the prediction of the 






5.5.3.2. Individual component 
 
First of all, the relationship between attractiveness and a compliant personality, from among 
all of the individual components affecting the cooperative atmosphere during international 
negotiations, is significant and exhibits a strong relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables, as we expected. Attractiveness has a significant positive effect on the 
integrative negotiation process, as predicted (t = 5.131, p < 0.001). On the other hand, the 
compliant personality of a negotiator has an unexpected significant negative effect on the 
dependent variable (t = −2.927, p < 0.001), since we assumed earlier that a compliant 
personality may have a positive relationship with the cooperativeness of the negotiation. 
Together with the dependent variables associated with the cooperative process of 
negotiation, the results shed light on the importance of the attractiveness of negotiators 
promoting the cooperativeness between two parties, while highlighting that the compliant 
personality of negotiators actually decreases cooperativeness. The unexpected results 
derived from the compliant personality measure, including the many aspects of its 
definitions, will be discussed in the next chapter with its theoretical interpretation.  
 
5.5.3.3. Strategic component 
 
Among the three independent component models, while model 2 does not explore the 
significant relationship between strategic components (e.g. rational tactics, soft tactics and 
hard tactics) and cooperativeness, the final model 4 demonstrates the strong relationship 
between rational tactics and the cooperative process of negotiation, which we predicted and 
proposed in hypothesis H3b. Based on the comparison between models 2 and 4, we support 
the adequacy of model 4 again. Hard tactics have not been found to be positive, while 
satisfaction as well as soft and rational tactics have been focused on as positive influencing 
factors in the previous research (Standifird, Ponds and Moshavi 2008). Interestingly, in a 
case considering competitive M&A negotiations, rational tactics using logical data or 
information and excluding emotional arguments have been confirmed to have positive 
effects on the outcome of cooperativeness during negotiations. The negotiator’s rationality 
serves to mutually balance the attractive economic range, producing equilibrium in both 





5.5.3.4. Contextual component 
 
This research finds the large explanatory power of the variables ‘time pressure’ and 
‘reputational power’ as contextual components ( = −0.247, p < 0.01;  = 0.330, p < .001, 
respectively) in the full model 4. The regression model’s fit or explanatory power is 
increased from 14.0% to 39.4%, reinforcing the model’s explanatory power. 
  
In particular, the effect of time pressure has been controversial with two different streams 
of thought, both positive and negative. We confirmed the strongly negative effect of time 
pressure on the cooperative process of negotiation in the same vein as Walton and McKersie 
(1965) and Stuhlmacher and Champagne (2000), advocating that intense time pressure may 
hinder the goal of integrative agreements due to ineffective interaction in communication 
and less information exchange. Interestingly, this argument tends to be estranged from the 
main stream of thought, which supports the positive effect of time pressure, as Lewicki and 
Litterer (1985) dispute that tight deadlines soften demands, enhance the chance of 
concessions, generate negotiators to reach agreements faster and also protect the 
negotiators’ image by providing an external justification for ‘softer’ concessionary 
behaviour. 
 
Among the relative powers affecting cooperativeness during negotiations, reputational 
power has a dominating influence on the dependent variable in a positive direction. This 
positive relationship between reputational power and the integrative process of negotiation 
has been continuously verified in models 3 and 4. The strong significance at  = 0.330, p 
< 0.001, supports two different ideas. Firstly, it reinforces the corporate-reputation research 
wherein many academics theorise that corporate reputation is a critical resource for 
competitiveness (Deephouse 2000; Gray and Balmer 1998). Since corporate reputation and 
its image cannot be imitated by competitors, it is definitely factored into the competitive 
power dimension during face-to-face negotiation situations (Balmer 1995). Secondly, most 
researchers argue that low-power negotiators behave in a more cooperative way versus 
high-power negotiators (Fiske 1993). Kramer (1994) endorsed that high-power individuals 
are apt to be suspicious and pessimistic in terms of their behaviours and even intentions 
compared to low-power individuals. However, our results support Staw and Kramer’s 
(2005) school of thought. They argued that negotiators with high power may have intended 
to utilise their power source to encourage a joint outcome between the parties, maximising 
even their own individual outcomes as well, especially that of reputational competitiveness 
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Regarding prediction, only the full regression model 4 in Table 5.18 achieves a high enough 
level of predictive accuracy at the organisational level compared to other international 
business articles (e.g., Lyles and Salk 1996). The amount of variance explained equals to 
about 39.4% in the full model 4 and the expected error rate for any prediction at the 95% 
confidence level is 0.9 points. In this type of research setting, these levels, augmented by 
the results supporting the model’s validity, provide high levels of assurance as to the quality 
and accuracy of the regression models as the basis for improving business negotiation 
strategies.  
 
Models 1, 2 and 3 in Table 5.18 show the respective regression result (e.g., conceptual 
categories such as the individual, strategic and contextual components) with 
cooperativeness. With the exception of model 2 having a very low model fit with the 
adjusted R squared of 27.7%, 2.3% and 16.8%, the explained variance for model 1 and 
model 3 is enough for predictive accuracy, while model 2 (strategic components) 
contributes too little to the whole construct. Model 1 (individual components) contributes 
the most to the full construct. It suggests that almost all of the explanatory power in this 
full model comes from the variables included in model 1 and, in particular, it seems that 
model 2 is practically useless.  
 
The critical variables are determined by the significance level and the sign of the 
relationship between the predictors and the dependent variable. The regression analyses 
focus on the cooperative process during international M&A face-to-face negotiations, and 
show that three highly significant comprehensive components simultaneously influence the 
dependent variable.  
 
These findings particularly confirmed that all of the critical factors highlighted throughout 
the examinations are from all three of the considered dimensions, instead of only 
concentrating on one important component with a narrow-minded perspective. Intriguingly, 
counterparts’ attractiveness, strategically rational tactics and reputational power facilitate 
an integrative or cooperative atmosphere during the negotiation, as we have clearly 
advocated in Chapter 3, while time pressure perceived during the negotiation does not 
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encourage cooperativeness during negotiations. In terms of personality, a compliant 
negotiator does not seem to promote a cooperative atmosphere during the negotiation, 



































Table5. 18 Summary of multiple regression in integrative negotiation 
 
Hypothesis Independent variables 
Expected 
sign 
Result of regression 
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
Individual 
components 











































































R-squared  .277 .047 .168 .449 
Adjusted R-squared  .253 .023 .140 .394 









N  122 122 122 122 
*  Denotes statistical significance (all two-tail test) at 5% level. 
**  Denotes statistical significance (all two-tail test) at 1% level. 







5.5.3.6. Additional models for testing interactive effect  
 
Table5. 19 Additional models 
Hypothesis Independent variables 
Expected 
sign 
Result of regression 
Model5 Model6 Model7 Model4 
Individual 
components 

































































































R-squared  .595 .590 .492 .449 
Adjusted R-squared  .354 .348 .242 .394 









N  122 122 122 122 
*  Denotes statistical significance (all two-tail test) at 5% level. 
**  Denotes statistical significance (all two-tail test) at 1% level. 




Based on the reliability and validity test performed and described above, we performed 
regression in SPSS for additional model 5, 6, and 7 and compared to the full model4 in 
Table. As recommended by examiners during the viva, the change of statistical significance 
of aggressive and compliant personalities as well as rational tactics in different models is 
worrying, as is the change of the signs of soft tactics and legitimate power. It is necessary 
to explain the causes of these changes. Among other explanations, interactive effects should 
be considered. Thus, as examiners proposed, we tested the additional models as: 1) items 
involving individual and strategic components only as in Model5; 2) items involving 
individual and contextual components only as in Model6; and 3) items involving strategic 
and contextual components only as in Model7. Given the change of significance or the sign 
of items in the individual and strategic components, there may be some interaction between 
items comprising these components which need to be investigated and addressed due to the 
robustness of any results.  
 
Although we were suspicious of the interactive effects in each two component, the 
regression results explained the consistency of significant factors effecting on the 
cooperativeness of international negotiation. Interestingly, in all additional models, the 
significant factors are consistent with model4, the full model of this research. In model5, 
the positive effect of attractiveness (t = .5.381, p < .001) and rational tactics (t = 3.936, p 
< .01) and the negative effect of compliant personality (t = -3.672, p < .001) on the 
cooperativeness have been confirmed. In model6, the positive effect of attractiveness (t = 
3.936, p < .001) and reputational power (t = 2.931, p < .01), and the negative effect of 
compliant personality (t = -2.981, p <.01) and time pressure (t = -2.182, p < .05) on the 
cooperativeness has been verified as we assumed. In model7, the positive effect of rational 
tactics (t = 2.512, p <.05) and reputational power (t = 3.683, p < .001), and the negative 
effect of time pressure (t = -4.196, p < .001) have been identified. Thus, we conclude that 
there is no significant interaction effect between two components as individual and strategic 
components, individual and contextual components, and strategic and contextual 
components, since the significant factors are consistent with the full model (model4) of this 
research.  
 
Moreover, the adjusted R-squared to check the regression model fit , 35.4%, 34.8%, and 
24.2% is sufficient for the predictive accuracy, meanwhile the full model (model4) explains 
39.4%. Although model 7 contributes relatively little to the full model, all three additional 
models introduced the significant factors and the relationship between the predictors and 
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In this chapter, a descriptive analysis of the sample characteristics was presented first. Then 
the normality of the data was reported. The reliability and validity of the measures for the 
structural model were examined using CFA. Finally, the overall data-analysis procedure in 
SPSS with the full model is noted, confirming the relationship between the variables based 
on the hypotheses. In the next chapter, the main findings of the study will be discussed in 
depth with regards to the hypotheses and the existing literature. Additionally, the 




























Chapter6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Prior to Chapter 6, the results of the overall data analysis and statistical procedures applied 
in this research were illustrated. Chapter 5 also details how the analysis procedures were 
carried out and explains the choice and procedure for these statistical techniques (e.g., 
regression). This chapter turns to a discussion of the hypotheses in order to build on the 
foundations in addressing the research objectives of the study through appropriate 
discussion. The explanation of the associations has been realised in the table matrix (e.g., 
the correlations of the final model for the negotiation process). Accordingly, this section 
embarks on an evaluation of the results from the data analysis. An in-depth discussion of 
the main findings of this study is conducted in accordance with the hypotheses proposed 
and the existing studies in the area. This chapter also highlights the contributions of the 
study to theory and management practice. Furthermore, the limitations of the study are 
discussed and some suggestions for further research are provided. Ultimately, the final 
conclusion of the study is addressed. 
 
6.1 Discussion of hypothesized relationships 
 
The literature review formulates, justifies and develops corresponding hypotheses that 
captured the framework of the current study. This section will examine the hypotheses in 
relation to the correlation direction and statistical significance, while critically examining 
the reasons for the results yielded from the statistical procedures. The following paragraphs 
will present each hypothesis individually in relation to the results from the data analysis 
and will offer a discussion of the results obtained.  
 
6.1.1 Individual components 
 
Individual various propensities of negotiators in terms of risk taking, experience, attitude, 
perspective, personality and background have been argued about in terms of their 
relationship with the processes and outcomes of negotiations (Wall and Callister 1995; 
Rubin and Brown 1975). Among the many issues regarding individual differences, it is true 
that demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, race and age) and personality (e.g., 
Machiavellianism, authoritarianism, self-esteem, cognitive complexity and tolerance for 
ambiguity) were widely and actively investigated in the 1960s. Throughout the 1960s and 
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1970s, the study of negation research in social psychology shed light on two main streams 
of thought: the individual differences of the negotiators and the situational factors that 
facilitate or impede the negotiation process and performance, and even the study of the 
individual dimension was emphasised (Rubin and Brown 1975). As negotiating is clearly 
an interpersonal activity, the participant’s disposition should have a significant influence 
on the process and outcomes of negotiations. However, hundreds of studies on individual 
difference factors have seldom verified their effects. Especially, the gender effect as an 
individual-level factor of negotiators has been verified as having no consistent relationship 
and a sceptical effect on the performance of negotiators (Thompson 1990; Lewicki, Litterer, 
Minton and Saunders 2006).  
 
Despite the stream of individual-dimension negotiation studies, attractiveness between two 
partners and their personalities have been emphasised as controversial variables in 
negotiation research (Rubin and Brown 1975). In terms of attractiveness, there has been 
clear previous research on the causal relationship between interpersonal attractiveness 
during the negotiation and negotiation outcomes or the success of future transactions (Adler 
and Graham 1989), and the attractive feeling even enhances bargaining outcomes in the 
review of Rubin and Brown (1975) (Berscheid and Walster 1978; Benton 1971; Morgan 
and Sawyer 1967; Swingle 1966). Despite Simons, Berkowitz and Moyer (1970) indicating 
that ‘the relationship between attractiveness (like-dislike, friendly feelings, etc.) and 
attitude change has received scant attention’ and has simply been utilised as a measurement, 
broad support for the positive relationship between a negotiator’s attractiveness and the 
negotiation outcome has even been found across cultural groups in France and Germany 
(Campbell et al. 1988), Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the United States (Graham et al. 1988), 
and in Canada and Mexico (Adler et al. 1987). Most of the previous research has actually 
proven this based on the simulated laboratory setting developed by Kelley (1966) and as 
mentioned in the methodology chapter, and Adler and Graham (1989) include a survey 
questionnaire on the attractiveness of counterparts, which we utilise here in this research. 
This is again an inevitable truth that negotiating activity is apparently interpersonal, so that 
the participants’ disposition should have a critical influence on the process and outcomes 
of negotiations.  
 
Moreover, McGuire (1968) clarified that when people feel attractive to each other, they will 
make concessions or sacrifices to sustain such satisfying personal relationships. Thus, an 
individual negotiator is inclined to give up the economic rewards or benefits for the social 
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rewards of a relationship with an attractive counterpart (Adler and Graham 1989). 
Moreover, in the study by Adler and Graham (1989), attractiveness is considered as a 
process-related construct, in the same vein as Zunin and Zunin’s (1972) findings, who 
suggested that during the first few minutes of communication in a negotiation, whether to 
continue the conversation or interaction by formulating either a cooperative or competitive 
atmosphere during the negotiation conversation is a decision-making act by the negotiators. 
 
As we expected based on the previous literature, regarding the attractiveness of the 
negotiator at the level of individual components, hypotheses 1 was tested and strongly 
supported (β = .334, p < .001), as shown in the regression result in Table 5.18. This 
regression result is translated as the attractiveness dramatically has an effect on the 
cooperativeness of the negotiation outcome, which mostly relates to a future relationship 
with a feeling of satisfaction held by the negotiators.  
 
Regarding hypothesis 2, within the personality literature, scholars have consistently 
suggested the various paradigms of personality as important, especially during negotiations, 
as mentioned in the literature review chapter. For instance, Machiavellianism (Rubin and 
Brown 1975; Fry 1985), persuasiveness and charisma (Yukl and Falbe 1991), different 
types of self-esteem (Adler, Graham and Gehrke 1987), positive and negative affectivity 
(George, Jones and Gonzalez 1998), the five-factor model (Digman and Shmelyov 1996; 
Shmelyov and Phkhil’ko 1993) and CAD (i.e., compliant, aggressive and detached) 
personality types (Horney 1945) have been proposed as paradigms of personality. Among 
the diverse paradigms of personality, we utilise the CAD category in this research, which 
is suggested in Brooks and Rose (2004). According to the description of each personality 
type, a compliant personality instead of an aggressive and detached personality has a 
positive relationship with integrative face-to-face negotiations, since the compliant 
personalities who are task-oriented, systematic, self-sacrificing and analytical are prone to 
comply with the rules and regulations, enhancing the integrative atmosphere during the 
process of negotiation. Meanwhile, the other two types (aggressive and detached) of 
personalities inhibit a negotiator’s ability to achieve collaborative objectives, suggesting 
hypotheses 2b and 2c.  
 
As a result of the regression performance, at the level of individual components, the 
negotiators’ personality as compliant, aggressive, detached or none of them (H2a, H2b, and 
H2c) has been supported, although we predicted that a negotiator with a compliant 
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personality would have a positive effect on the integrative negotiation process, and as for 
the two other personalities (aggressive and detached), one had a negative effect on the 
cooperativeness of negotiation. Interestingly, a compliant negotiator even has a negative 
effect on the cooperativeness (β = −.299, p < .001) and the other two types do not show any 
significant relationship between the independent and dependent variables. This is an 
interesting result for compliant personalities, as it shows the opposite sign to its hypothesis.  
 
Regarding the rejection of hypothesis 2a, which we targeted to reveal the positive 
relationship between a compliant personality and the cooperativeness of a negotiation, 
some practical theorists and professionals, such as the psychologists Dr Henry Cloud and 
Dr John Townsend, support the reason for this result, as outlined below. As people with a 
compliant personality represent 17 percent of the population, they are prone to task- 
oriented modes of operation, just like the detached people who may rely on self-sufficiency. 
Generally, compliant people are systematic, analytical, detail-oriented, self-sacrificing, 
serious and genius prone, while they can also simultaneously be moody, negative, critical, 
revengeful and unsociable. For example, they prefer to set high standards and to comply 
with the rules and regulations, and they want everything to be carried out up to when the 
target is reached. Although they possess quite positive characteristics such as being creative 
problem solvers, job finishers, persistent, systematic, precise, hyper-efficient and 
bureaucratic in their job, scholars suggest that they have outstanding limitations in that they 
focus on dealing with tasks by investing too much time and effort in planning, setting times 
and setting unrealistic goals, instead of focusing on relationship building and on pleasing 
other people. Therefore, the unexpected result of a negative relationship between a 
compliant personality and the integrative process of negotiation is somehow because of the 
two different aspects of traits in compliant people, since they do not tend to focus on 
relationship building with their counterparts specifically.  
 
Over the course of decades of negotiation and bargaining research, it has been widely 
assumed that the personal characteristics of individual negotiators are relevant to an 
understanding of the processes and outcomes of negotiation encounters. However, the 
overall legacy of research on personality and negotiation is one of inconsistency and 
confusion (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). Moreover, empirical support for the role of 
individual differences in negation is inconclusive (Neale and Northcraft 1991; Pruitt and 
Carnevale 1993), leading some researchers to question whether such differences are 
important determinants of negotiation behaviour (Lewicki, Litterer, Minton and Saunders 
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1994) as a controversial issue. Hundreds of studies have been undertaken on individual 
differences such as those mentioned in the literature chapter, and such factors typically have 
not explained much variance in negotiator behaviour (Thompson 1990b). For example, 
Rubin and Brown (1975), in their review of authoritarianism and the negotiating process, 
found no relationship in 7 of 16 experiments, while the other 9 experiments did find a link 
with low-authoritarian negotiators more inclined to cooperative behaviour than high-
authoritarian negotiators were. In addition, they revealed that people high in 
Machiavellianism behave more competitively and strategically than people low in 
Machiavellianism, as Greenhalgh and Neslin (1983) also reported, whereas Fry (1985) 
specifically found that high Machiavellianism outperformed low Machiavellianism 
regarding the negotiated outcome and negotiation context.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Attractiveness has a positive effect on the cooperative negotiation process. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 2a: Negotiators’ aggressive personality has a negative effect on the cooperative 
negotiation process. Not Supported 
Hypothesis 2b: Negotiators’ compliant personality has a positive effect on the cooperative 
negotiation process. Not Supported 
Hypothesis 2c: Negotiators’ detached personality has a negative effect on the cooperative 
negotiation process. Not Supported 
 
6.1.2 Strategic components 
 
Negotiation strategy is the core issue discussed in both the academic and practical world, 
since it is mainly considered during the whole process of negotiation including the pre-
stage, face-to-face stage and post-stage of a negotiation, influencing the outcome through 
strategic behaviour. In terms of the typology of negotiation strategies, many researchers 
have proposed various strategies depending on the particular context of a negotiation. 
Tinsley and Pillutla (1998) suggested the five distinct strategies of self-interested, altruistic, 
joint problem-solving, competitive and equality strategies from the cultural perspective, 
while Ganesan (1993) proposed negotiation strategies as five negotiation styles, such as 
competing/aggressive, collaborating/problem-solving, compromising, avoiding and 
accommodating (Thomas 1976; Thomas and Kilmann 1974). Popularly, the strategic 
choice model by Pruitt (1981) also suggested the three basic strategies of negotiators as 
unilateral concession, contentious behaviour and coordinative behaviour. Meanwhile, one 
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of the popular typologies of influence tactics employed in this study was proposed by 
Kipnis and Schmidt (1988) and Kipnis, Schmidt and Wilkinson (1980). They initially 
introduced seven meaningful and distinct influencing tactics, since this typology is 
sufficiently comprehensive and representative of various frameworks proposed across 
different disciplines (Lee, Yang and Graham 2006). Among the seven tactics, the 
assertiveness, rationality and ingratiation tactics as strong, rational and week influence 
tactics were finally employed in terms of item loadings and dimensions, as in Kipnis, 
Schmidt and Wilkinson (1980), and as proposed in Rao and Schmidt (1998) and Kipnis 
(1976).  
 
According to the regression result, as we predicted, the positive relationship between the 
rational tactical strategy and the integrative process of negotiation was at a highly 
significant level (β = .387, p < .001), while the negative effect of soft and hard tactics has 
not been proven. Many researches empirically tested and investigated the influence of 
tactics by concentrating on the soft and hard tactics among a few more factors, as proposed 
in Falbo (1977), Kipnis, Schmidt and Wilkinson (1980) and Marwell and Schmitt (1967). 
Meanwhile, Rao and Schmidt (1998) empirically advocated that rational tactics rather than 
hard or soft tactics in alliance negotiations were positively and significantly associated with 
negotiators’ time-frame pressure during collaborative negotiation. From a rational-choice 
point of view, a merging case should consider both the buyers and sellers, who can agree 
on the current and future value for cash flows. In this competitive paradigm, rationality 
may prompt both parties to equilibrium, assuming that rational choice and decision-making 
would predict that merger negotiations occur within the mutually attractive economic range 
(Bruner 1992). Moreover, since we consider and limit the context to international M&As, 
it is a more complicated and specific situation than any other negotiation, such as for a 
product or licensing. Thus, as we expected, based on the type of negotiation in terms of the 
size and effect of companies, rational tactics have a positive association with the 
cooperativeness of a negotiation at a highly significant level. It is also confirmed that 
rational tactics, which depend on logical data and information in attempting to obtain 
compliance and a cooperative atmosphere with counterparts, are necessary in the 
international M&A negotiation context.  
 
Hypothesis 3a: Soft tactics have a negative effect on the cooperative negotiation process. 
Not Supported 




Hypothesis 3c: Hard tactics have a negative effect on the cooperative negotiation process. 
Not Supported 
 
6.1.3 Contextual components 
 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the fashion for studying individual disposition provided 
a good example of a failed attempt to find the link between individual differences and 
negotiators’ behaviour based on the hundreds of studies undertaken (Bazerman, Curhan 
and Moore 2007; Thompson 1990). Then, the active research topic was moved slightly 
towards the situational and contextual features in turn.  
 
Among the contextual components previously suggested in the literature review chapter, 
we utilised time pressure and relative power in terms of legitimate, reputational and 
informational power, expecting a negative relationship for time pressure and a positive 
relationship for relative powers with the integrative process of negotiation. As a result of 
hypothesis 4, the negative relationship between time pressure and the cooperativeness of a 
negotiation was tested and strongly supported (β = −.247, p< .01). As in the literature 
reviewed, there are two different streams of thought on the effect of time pressure on the 
integrative process of negotiation or the outcome of negotiation. Thus, this relationship has 
not yet been made clear and has remained controversial, depending on the detailed context 
and strategy utilised during the negotiation (Carnevale and Lawler 1987) under the premise 
of time pressure in an effort to explore the effect on the decision-making process of 
negotiations (Stuhlmacher and Champagne 2000).  
 
In particular, there are two contrary schools of thought on the time-pressure effect. A meta-
analysis of time-pressure effects in negotiation (Stuhlmacher, Gillespie and Champagne 
1998) suggested that time pressure fosters cooperative behaviour among negotiators. 
Moreover, the concession rate is greater when time pressure is high than when it is low 
(Smith, Pruitt and Carnevale 1982; Pruitt and Drews 1969; Pruitt and Johnson 1970; Yukl 
1974; Carnevale et al. 1979). That is, as time pressure increases, the desire to reach 
agreement increases, and negotiators tend to make more concessions in the end. Based on 
this idea, Stuhlmacher, Gillespie and Champagne (1998) also indicated that high time 
pressure is more likely to increase negotiators’ concession rates and a cooperative 




On the contrary, Wright (1974) found that people under high time pressure become more 
sensitive to negative information. Since high time pressure hinders reflection, and often 
makes collecting basic information, researching other options and reaching a mutual 
understanding (Adler 1997; Maron and VanBremen, 1999; Stuhlmacher and Champagne 
2000; Walton and McKersie 1965) difficult (Maron and VanBremen 1999), this is likely to 
cause errors of interpretation (Bazerman and Neale 1983). In other words, the lower the 
time pressure, the higher the possibility of reaching a mutual understanding because the 
parties tend to explore the other’s interests, resources and options more (Adler 1997; 
Beatty1994; Stuhlmacher and Champagne 2000), thereby reducing any cognitive mistakes 
(Pinkley and Northcraft 1994). Supporting this idea, Yukl et al. (1976) also concluded that 
time pressure interrupts integrative bargaining processes, chiefly the processes of 
systematic concession making and the problem-solving orientation, which facilitate the 
exchange of truthful information (Carnevale and Lawler 1987). Moreover, time pressure 
may produce more contract settlements as well in the high time-pressure situation than in 
the low time-pressure situation (Brookmire and Sistrunk 1980). In relation to hypothesis 4, 
as we predicted, the result supports the negative effect of time pressure. 
 
This empirical result clarified and developed the confusing results regarding time pressure 
in negotiations. Carnevale and Lawler (1987) argued that the issue of time pressure is 
pervasive in negotiation and is critical, especially relating to the integrativeness of the 
negotiation, although the mutual joint outcome is simply ignored. They even emphasised 
that if every condition is equal (e.g., relative power and strategy), less time pressure may 
be beneficial for negotiators to both reach an agreement and to mutually meet at an 
integrative solution. This result is the complete opposite of this research result and of the 
main stream of time-pressure research, as above. However, Carnevale and Lawler (1987) 
and most of the research methodology have been limited by simulations with university 
students. For instance, their randomly selected subjects were 48 males and 48 females on 
the campus of the University of Iowa with a three-dollar payment, while this study dealt 
with practical international negotiators with real international M&A negotiation experience. 
Although the restriction of the M&A negotiation environment may influence the outcome, 
the strong negative relationship between time pressure and the cooperativeness of a 
negotiation as an outcome could be a starting point from which to augment the other school 




As for hypothesis 5, the relationship between the relative power and cooperativeness of a 
negotiation has been extensively studied and tested in this research. The test results 
confirmed that only reputational power has a positive effect on the cooperativeness of the 
negotiation process at a highly significant level (β = .330, p < .001), although we expected 
that a negotiator who has all types of relative power feels cooperativeness. As mentioned 
by Wolfe and Macginn (2005), in an asymmetric relationship of negotiation, in which the 
power balance between the partners is unequal in general, the relatively high-power party 
is likely to have his or her interests addressed during a negotiation, while the interests of 
the low-power party may be ignored. This dynamic has implications not only for the 
distribution of outcomes, but also for integration.  
 
However, only reputational relative power has proven its strong effect on the negotiation 
outcome and its process. Many academics consider corporate reputation as a critical 
resource in terms of competitive advantage (Deephouse 2000; Gray and Balmer 1998). It 
is true that corporate reputation is an intangible asset (Aaker 1996; Fombrun 1996; Davies 
et al. 2003) and that it is difficult to value or evaluate in comparison with other tangible 
assets such as cash, land, equipment and buildings. Unlike other intangible assets such as 
trademarks, patents and copyrights, which can be achieved through trading, corporate 
reputation can be achieved through a company’s differentiation in the market. With such 
characteristics, corporate reputation cannot be perfectly imitated by competitors (Balmer 
1995). Thus, if this characteristic of reputation is possessed by one party relatively more 
than by the other party, the more resources one is able to claim to be cooperative to gain a 
better outcome from the negotiation (Fisher and Ury 1981; Thompson 2005).  
 
Hypothesis 4: High time pressure has a negative effect on the cooperative negotiation 
process. Supported 
Hypothesis 5a: Relative legitimate power has a positive effect on the cooperative 
negotiation process. Not Supported 
Hypothesis 5b: Relative reputational power has a positive effect on the cooperative 
negotiation process. Supported 
Hypothesis 5c: Relative informational power has a positive effect on the cooperative 












H1 Attractiveness has a positive effect on the cooperative negotiation 
process 
Supported 
H2a Negotiators’ aggressive personality has a negative effect on the 
cooperative negotiation process 
Rejected 
H2b Negotiators’ compliant personality has a positive effect on the 
cooperative negotiation process 
Rejected 
H2c Negotiators’ detached personality has a negative effect on the 
cooperative negotiation process 
Rejected 
H3a Soft tactics has a negative effect on the cooperative negotiation 
process 
Rejected 
H3b Rational tactics has a positive effect on the cooperative negotiation 
process 
Supported 
H3c Hard tactics has a negative effect on the cooperative negotiation 
process 
Rejected 
H4 High time pressure has a negative effect on the cooperative negotiation 
process 
Supported 
H5a Relative Legitimate Power has a positive effect on the cooperative 
negotiation process 
Rejected 
H5b Relative Reputational Power has a positive effect on the cooperative 
negotiation process 
Supported 






This study has several contributions to make. This is one of the first empirical studies to 
consider three conceptual components affecting the cooperative process during the 
international M&A business negotiations in face-to-face situations around the negotiation 
table. The contributions are categorised by three aspects: theoretical, empirical and 
methodological, as shown below.  
 
6.2.1. Theoretical contributions 
 
This study succeeded in empirically analysing the negotiation frame that is closer to the 
real world, rather than selecting particular outstanding factors. For instance, Metcalf et al. 
(2006) conducted a broad comparative analysis of negotiating tendencies (e.g. attitudes, 
personal style, communication, time sensitivity, emotionalism, agreement form, agreement 
building, team organisation and risk taking) in five different cultures. Kumar, Rangan and 
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Rufin (2005) pushed a relationship-oriented strategy based on formal contracts and trust 
building. The impact factors considered above are all dramatically critical, but are not 
enough to draw a comprehensive picture of the cooperative negotiation process. The impact 
factors also seem to be randomly selected without a comprehensive frame, definition of the 
negotiation process or a bigger picture of it, while the model in this study could be universal, 
including negotiation theory, and it could apply across cultures and be used to develop a 
comparative study of negotiation.  
 
6.2.2. Empirical contributions 
 
One of the outstanding limitations of the previous negotiation research was the use of 
limited simulation methods (see Table 4.2), which are the most prevalent and are based on 
Kelley’s (1966) study. However, regarding simulation methodology, Smith (1987) 
cautioned that the findings suggested by Rubin and Brown (1975) in 27 experimental 
studies of bargaining factors could be artefacts of the laboratory. He recognised that college 
undergraduates who are designated as ‘equal’ in power may assume equality with each 
other in terms of opportunities, responsibilities, options, pay-offs and alternatives, while 
‘real’ counterparts do not assume this in reality. Thus, this research finally dealt with real 
international negotiators in the survey methodology in order to empirically test and verify 
the parsimonious and generalised model of this study.  
 
This study attempted to test the relationship between the influencing factors and the 
outcome of a negotiation empirically, stepping over the descriptive picture of negotiation. 
Wall and Blum (1991) described the impact of the negotiator’s characteristics, negotiator–
opponent interaction, constituencies, third parties and situational environmental factors on 
the negotiation process and its outcomes. Sebenius (1992) also analysed and reviewed the 
negotiation characterisation, developing a prescriptive theory and useful advice for 
negotiators and third parties. The previous scholars have provided us with an understanding 
of the negotiation environment by developing theories and conceptual pictures, while we 
seek an empirical and plausible model for testing to generalise the results.  
 
We employed more plausible and predictable outcome variables, instead of using the 
financial reward perspective or descriptive outcomes. In the hundreds of bargaining 
experiments conducted, both the individual and joint profits attained by negotiators was 
mostly employed as a common measure of the negotiation outcome in negotiation 
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simulations (Rubin and Brown 1975; Clopton 1984; Dwyer and Walker 1981). Apart from 
the joint profits, Graham et al. (1992) suggested the satisfaction of the counterpart as a key 
outcome of negotiation, consistent with some other researchers (Fisher and Ury 1981; 
Weitz 1978), as the scholars assumed that negotiators will try to maximise their own 
economic rewards or their own profit and the satisfaction of their partner by balancing these 
things simultaneously. That is the reason why this research focused on the integrative or 
cooperative approach as an outcome variable, whereby the needs of both parties are 
honestly discussed and eventually satisfied based on an information-exchange orientation. 
 
6.2.3. Practical contributions 
 
In terms of the practical perspective, this study yields practical instructions for international 
negotiators or companies ahead of their entry into international negotiations in face-to-face 
situations around the table. They are able to set a plan regarding the selection of appropriate 
negotiators, strategies and have an understanding of power in a certain kind of environment 
to control and keep a cooperative atmosphere, even for their future relationships and for 
joint profit. In other words, since the perception of attractiveness as an inevitable factor 
during an interpersonal negotiation activity has been verified, it is extremely important for 
the cooperativeness of negotiations in this study.  
 
In terms of the strategy perspective, practical negotiators can recognise the importance of 
rational tactics with logical data and information instead of soft or hard tactics during the 
cross-border M&A negotiations in face-to-face settings. The competitive advantage of 
reputational power (Deephouse 2000; Gray and Balmer 1998) when compared to other 
relative powers (e.g., legitimate and information power) should be emphasised during 
international negotiations. Regarding the contextual strategy level, time pressure, which 
has been controversial regarding whether it has a positive or negative effect on the 
negotiation outcome, has been confirmed as having a negative effect around the negotiation 
table. However, in terms of personality, we found that in developing the measurement, a 
compliant personality was confirmed to have a negative effect on the cooperative process 
of negotiation. 
 




We recognise that we have left many questions unanswered. Firstly, it was extremely 
impressive to deal with actual international M&A negotiators during the survey, since most 
of the negotiation experiments were performed with a group of students (e.g., psychology 
students, undergraduate students or MBA students), which might not be representative of 
international negotiators, even with an instruction-mastering session before the simulation-
game regulations were given (Carnevale and Lawler 1987; Adler, Brahm and Graham 1992; 
Graham 1983; 1985). In other words, this research would have been more objective and 
practical if they had communicated only with experienced international negotiators. As 
Adler, Brahm and Graham (1992) mentioned in terms of future research, we have attempted 
to satisfy the case of intercultural negotiations by dealing with real international negotiators.  
 
The accessibility of the respondents was problematic, since the practical negotiators, 
especially in Korea, refused to participate in this survey due to their high workloads and 
the confidentiality of the information. Although it was a meaningful trial as we dealt with 
real negotiators instead of a group of students, the results of the data collection were poor 
due to the accessibility and confidentiality issues. The total number of surveys completed 
was 125, including a high number of missing answers, and the data collection took over six 
months to complete. Due to the low amount of data collected (e.g., N = 125 in total), we 
could not attempt to categorise the nationality of partners and compare the difference 
between Korean negotiators’ behaviour depending on the partners’ nationality by 
employing this as a control variable. Especially due to the accessibility issue, again we 
were limited to collecting data from Korean practical negotiators who had experienced 
cross-border M&A cases of negotiation, rather than real negotiators from the United States, 
who have more volume and experience in cross-border M&As, or any other nationalities 
of negotiators, for instance. 
 
As for future research, we still have much more remaining work to be done regarding a 
variety of methods to understand the reality of the international negotiation context. Instead 
of negotiation simulations with a student sample, a combination of in-depth case analysis, 
as in Weiss (1987), and a survey approach in a global context, as in Tung (1982), is 
suggested for the future. We also suggest performing and testing the model with more 
samples, with enough data to categorise the nationality of partners beyond the Korean 
context. Alternatively, the dyadic perception of counterparts in a negotiation can also be 




Secondly, for each component (individual, strategic and contextual), more observable 
variables should be considered in approaching the real world in order to construct more 
independent and well-made models for each conceptual level, as in models 1, 2 and 3 with 
individual, strategic and contextual components, since the adjusted R squares of each 
individual model when compared to the result of the full model 4 are not evenly distributed 
(0.253, 0.023 and 0.140, respectively). This explains that almost all of the explanatory 
power in the full model comes from the variables included in model 1, which shows 25.3% 
of the model fit.  
 
In terms of methodological weakness, the coefficients change between each of the models 
1, 2 and 3, and the full model 4 probably denotes the issues about multicollinearity and 
endogeneity, which may produce concerns that the statistical significance of some of the 
variables change when other variables are added. 
  
Thirdly, as Weiss (1993) proposed the embracive and expansive conceptual framework for 
complex negotiations, we assume the overall stages of decision-making are composed of 
pre-negotiation, face-to-face (time-period) negotiation and post-negotiation. Depending on 
each stage, he assessed the counterparts’ relationships, behaviours and conditions of 
negotiation. Ghauri and Fang’s (2001) ping-pong model and Ghauri and Usunier’s (2003) 
international negotiation framework, as in Figure 2.1, always included a timed process. 
However, we attempted to simplify the holistic conceptual pictures for the empirical test in 
order to introduce a generalised model that could be empirically confirmed. Since this study 
focused on the face-to-face stage of negotiation during the long journey of negotiation, 
future research needs to specify and develop the variables in each of the negotiation steps 
(e.g., pre-negotiation, face-to-face, post-negotiation).  
 
Fourthly, we initially narrowed down the context to international M&A negotiations and 
we surveyed Korean international negotiators experienced in this due to the issues 
surrounding the accessibility of respondents and the behaviours of foreign partners of cross-
border M&As. Thus, for future research, it would be meaningful to diversify the research 
context. We focused on cross-border M&As, since the consideration or behaviour of 
negotiators is varied depending on the type of negotiation (i.e., type of business) such as 
sales, licensing, joint ventures and acquisitions, as mentioned in Weiss (1993), often 
described as ‘complex negotiation’. For negotiation activities, complicated perceptions and 




The South Korean Manager as Negotiator and Decision-maker 
 
An important stream of empirical research exists on culture and negotiation (e.g., Adler 
and Graham 1989; Campbell, Graham, Joliber and Meissener 1988; Heydenfeldt 2000; 
Graham 1985; Weiss and Stripp 1984) as we review in literature review chapter. Culture is 
a socially shared meaning system including shared knowledge structure or schema (Geertz 
1973; Triandis 1972). Culture is complex and it consists of a group’s subjective 
characeristics regarding values and norms and institutions (Lytle et al. 1995; Brett 2001). 
 
Heydenfeldt (2000) is attempt to apply the cultural concept of individualism-collectivism 
to the negotiation behavior between U.S. and Mexican, assessing the positive relationship 
between the cultural orientation and the different results of certain negotiation tactics and 
behaviors based on the Hofstedt (1989) idea. Meanwhile, Hall’s (1976) theory can explain 
the behavior of international negotiators between low-high context cultures. For instance, 
communication style or norm in Western cultures is intend to communicate directly and 
explicitly, defined as low-context culture, while communication style in Eastern cultures in 
intend to communicated indirectly and implicitly as high-context culture (Hall 1976; 
Gibson 1998). 
 
In this research, since respondents are specifically South Korean negotiators who have 
international negotiation experience with foreign partners. Since Korea is belong to the 
high-context or collective culture, they are assumed to have the typical tendencies 
suggested by Hofstedt (1989) and Hall (1976). Thus, the Korean negotiators in high-context 
culture may have influence on the cooperative process of negotiation perceived by 
themselves. This research initially limited the cultural context as all respondents are Korean. 
The future research is able to make an attempt to compare two extremely different 
negotiators from the different cultural context. Therefore, we could verify the cultural 
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